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INTRODUCTION 
In the game of Chicken, two drivers at opposite ends of a stretch 
of road face their cars toward each other and accelerate.  The rules 
are simple:  the first driver to swerve in order to avoid a head-on colli-
sion loses.  Game theory teaches that a winning strategy for Chicken 
requires one driver to convince the other driver that she absolutely 
will not swerve.  Perhaps the clearest way to do this is for one driver to 
remove her car’s steering wheel and disconnect her brakes; thus, once 
that driver accelerates her car, she can neither swerve nor stop.1  Short 
of such mechanical adjustments, a winning strategy for the game of 
Chicken is to convince the other driver that you are irrational—that 
you will not swerve, even if it means your death.2  Because swerving to 
avoid an oncoming car is rational, the first driver to convince her op-
ponent that she is irrational and will not swerve is most likely to win. 
Analyzing the game of Chicken can provide insights into the ra-
tionality of apparently irrational behavior.  In particular, the game of 
Chicken can teach a useful lesson about the plausibility of antitrust 
claims.  Antitrust law sets out the rules for competition in the Ameri-
can marketplace.  It proscribes certain agreements among competi-
tors and certain anticompetitive conduct by dominant firms.  As legal 
scholars associated with the law and economics movement have 
achieved significant influence, the concept of business rationality has 
gained greater traction in antitrust case law.  Federal judges are more 
frequently concluding that some types of anticompetitive conduct are 
 
1 Of course, this strategy requires the driver to perform these tasks in full view of the 
other driver.  The point is not merely to preclude swerving; rather, it is to convince the 
other driver that she will not—because she cannot—swerve.  The worst outcome occurs if 
both drivers throw out their steering wheels, and neither driver knows about the other’s 
conduct.  This guarantees a crash, and both parties will be worse off as a result. 
2 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 143 (1960) (stating that, 
in certain game situations, it can be beneficial to act irrationally in order to make a 
credible threat that might not otherwise be heeded).  
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facially irrational or implausible and, therefore, could not have oc-
curred as a matter of law (because it is implausible that a business 
would act irrationally).  This Article challenges the current judicial 
use of rationality theory and argues that in many cases judges are em-
ploying an overly narrow conception of rationality.  This conception 
eliminates potentially valid antitrust claims by elevating theory over 
fact and by failing to appreciate that behavior that appears irrational 
can be rational in some circumstances. 
Part I describes how the law and economics movement assumes 
that businesses act as rational profit maximizers and how this assump-
tion now permeates antitrust law.  Part II challenges the rationality as-
sumption by discussing examples of apparently irrational business be-
havior that, upon closer inspection, is rational, even if ultimately not 
profit maximizing.  Part II also examines how facially irrational con-
duct is often part and parcel of anticompetitive conspiracies and pre-
datory schemes. 
Part III argues that federal courts are generally not effective arbi-
ters of whether alleged business conduct is implausible.  This Part ex-
plains how most federal judges have no relevant business experience, 
do not keep abreast of the pertinent economics and historical scholar-
ship, do not appreciate the full range of business objectives or how 
businesses operate, and are subject to cognitive biases.  As a result, 
courts often label plaintiffs’ allegations of anticompetitive conduct as 
implausible because the plaintiffs’ theory of the case does not com-
port with judges’ constrained conception of business rationality. 
Part IV examines specific antitrust cases in which federal courts im-
properly granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment or over-
turned jury verdicts based on judges’ assertions that the plaintiffs’ 
theory of the case entailed irrational or implausible conduct by the de-
fendant.  These cases—which examine predatory pricing, price-fixing 
cartels, group boycotts, and other antitrust conspiracies—illustrate the 
various judicial shortcomings and biases presented in Part III.  In many 
of these cases, the conduct labeled implausible by the court undoubted-
ly occurred.  In each of them, the court discounted robust fact patterns 
that indicated either an antitrust conspiracy or illegal predatory con-
duct.  This is disquieting given the procedural posture of the cases—
namely that the court should have viewed the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the antitrust plaintiff. 
Finally, Part V advocates a more limited role for rationality theory 
in antitrust litigation.  Over time, a procedural rule regarding eviden-
tiary burdens has evolved into a substantive rule of antitrust law whe-
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reby valid claims are improperly rejected.  Judges should focus more 
on the facts presented by the plaintiff than on any economic theory 
championed by the defendant or held by the judge.  While this may 
result in more jury trials in antitrust cases, jurors may be less likely to 
make the mistakes—detailed in Parts III and IV—that judges are cur-
rently committing. 
I.  ANTITRUST LAW’S ASSUMPTION OF RATIONALITY 
The law and economics movement has firmly taken root in anti-
trust jurisprudence.  The debate today is no longer about whether the 
law and economics approach should affect antitrust law but only 
about how it should do so.3  The movement deserves much praise for 
introducing greater precision and philosophical clarity into antitrust 
thinking, but its influence has also created problems. 
As a result of the dominating influence of law and economics scho-
lars, antitrust law now worships at the shrine of rationality.  Rationality 
serves as the foundation for most model building and policy prescrip-
tions within the law and economics school, as evidenced by such con-
cepts as the rational actor theory and rational choice theory.  Professor 
Herbert Hovenkamp has opined that “[t]he entire antitrust enterprise 
is dedicated to the proposition that business firms behave rationally.”4  
Prominent scholars defend this rationality assumption as “an accurate 
description of firms.”5  Rational choice theory does allow for some irra-
tional behavior, so long as it is randomly distributed.6  Subject to this 
caveat, however, “rational-choice theory has become a routine and al-
most unexamined part of every economist’s intellectual tool kit.”7 
The term “rationality” itself, however, is ambiguous and loaded, 
subject to different interpretations.8  To date, scholars have advanced 
 
3 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW, at vii-x (2d ed. 2001) (highlighting 
widespread agreement among those “professionally involved in antitrust” that econom-
ic theory should be utilized in formulating antitrust law, but noting disagreement with-
in the community “over specific practices, cases, and rules”). 
4 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE 134 (2005). 
5 KEITH N. HYLTON, ANTITRUST LAW 226 (2003). 
6 See Samuel Issacharoff, Can There Be a Behavioral Law and Economics?, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1729, 1730 (1998) (stating that departures from the rationality model would have 
to be random so as not to weaken the power of the analysis). 
7 Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice and the Economic Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 487, 488 (1994) (book review). 
8 See, e.g., Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science:  Re-
moving the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1055 
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over seventy varying definitions, though few are actually used in prac-
tice.9  Because rationality is taken as a given, “there is rarely a discussion 
in the legal literature about what, exactly, constitutes rational beha-
vior.”10  But the most prominent concepts of rationality focus on the in-
ternal consistency of the actor’s conduct, including whether the actor 
chooses appropriate means through which to pursue her self-interest.11 
In the context of business decisionmaking, law and economics 
scholars define rationality as acting to maximize profits.12  For theor-
ists associated with the Chicago School, this assumption of profit-
maximizing behavior is “crucial” to their rational choice theories and 
subsequent policy prescriptions.13  The logic of the assumption lies in 
the argument that firms must maximize profits or else they will be dri-
ven from the market.14  As courts have imported the profit-maximizing 
rationality assumption into substantive antitrust law, the assumption 
 
(2000) (“There is considerable debate within both the economics and law-and-
economics communities about precisely what rational choice theory is and is not.”). 
9 See Amitai Etzioni, How Rational We?, 2 SOC. F. 1, 2 (1987) (“While over seventy 
different definitions [of rationality] have been advanced, only very few are widely used.”). 
10 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1060. 
11 See Etzioni, supra note 9, at 2 (“Dominant among [the various definitions of ratio-
nality] is the core proposition that rational individuals act consistently, choose the means 
most suitable to their goals, and act on behalf of their self-interest.”); see also Christine 
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 
STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1488 (1998) (“Indeed, the term ‘rationality’ is highly ambiguous and 
can be used to mean many things.  A person might be deemed rational if her behavior 
(1) conforms to the axioms of expected utility theory; (2) is responsive to incentives, that 
is, if the actor changes her behavior when the costs and benefits are altered; (3) is inter-
nally consistent; (4) promotes her own welfare; or (5) is effective in achieving her goals, 
whatever the relationship between those goals and her actual welfare.”). 
12 See PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 1 ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 113, at 140 
(3d ed. 2006) (“[B]usiness firms are (or must be assumed to be) profit maximiz-
ers . . . .”); Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1066 (“Nearly all law-and-economics lite-
rature on business organizations, following the neoclassical economic theory of firms, 
is built on the explicit or implicit assumption that firms seek to maximize profits.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
13 See Maurice E. Stucke, Behavioral Economists at the Gate:  Antitrust in the Twenty-
First Century, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 513, 514 (2007) (“One uniformly accepted tenet, ac-
cording to Posner, is that business firms are profit-maximizers, so that ‘the issue in eva-
luating the antitrust significance of a particular business practice should be whether it 
is a means by which a rational profit maximizer can increase its profits at the expense 
of efficiency.’” (quoting POSNER, supra note 3, at ix)); id. at 521 (“Thus, for Robert 
Bork and others, the profit-maximization assumption was ‘crucial’ to the Chicago 
School’s rational choice theories.” (citing ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 
119 (1978))). 
14 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1070 (“Organizations will seek to maxim-
ize profits, and those that fail to do so will be put out of business by a lack of custom-
ers, capital, or both.”). 
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has fundamentally reshaped antitrust doctrine as well as the course of 
antitrust litigation. 
A.  Rationality and Antitrust Conspiracies 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns agreements that unrea-
sonably restrain trade.15  Several categories of agreements—such as 
price-fixing conspiracies, agreements among competitors to allocate 
markets, and some group boycotts—are per se illegal, which means 
that the agreements are unreasonable as a matter of law.16  Other re-
straints of trade are evaluated under the rule of reason, in which the 
factfinder balances the anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of 
the challenged agreements.17  Concerted action with a net anticompe-
titive effect is held to be unreasonable.18  Regardless of the method of 
determining the reasonableness of a trade restraint, the plaintiff must 
prove the existence of an agreement.  The rationality assumption has 
played a critical role in this element of section 1 litigation. 
Courts employ rationality analysis to determine whether antitrust 
plaintiffs alleging anticompetitive conspiracies are entitled to have a 
jury decide their case.  In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Ra-
dio Corp., the plaintiffs, manufacturers of consumer electronics sold in 
the United States, alleged that a group of Japanese electronics manu-
facturers had conspired to dominate the American market by engag-
ing in below-cost pricing, which would drive the American manufac-
turers from the U.S. market and subsequently allow the Japanese firms 
to operate as a cartel.19  According to the plaintiffs, the Japanese con-
spirators funded their predatory pricing with the supracompetitive 
profits secured in the already-cartelized Japanese market.20 
The Supreme Court majority found the plaintiffs’ theory implaus-
ible.  The Court strongly doubted that a firm would attempt predatory 
pricing and reasoned that predatory conspiracies were even less likely 
than predatory pricing by a single predator.21  The majority further 
reasoned that because below-cost pricing forces the predator to forego 
profits, “[f]or that investment to be rational, the conspirators must 
 
15 Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
16 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
17 Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 342-43, 343 n.13 (1982). 
18 Id. 
19 475 U.S. 574, 577-78 (1986). 
20 Id. at 578. 
21 Id. at 588-90. 
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have a reasonable expectation of recovering, in the form of later mo-
nopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.”22  Relying on the argu-
ments of Chicago School theorists, the Court argued that there could 
be no such reasonable expectation of recoupment because, even if 
predation succeeded in driving competitors from the market, subse-
quent price increases would invite into the market new (or former) 
rivals that would drive the price down to competitive levels.23  Given 
these hurdles, the Court asserted that “there is a consensus among 
commentators that predatory pricing schemes are rarely tried, and 
even more rarely successful.”24  In short, predatory pricing was per-
ceived as irrational in theory and thus not attempted in practice.  Rea-
soning that postpredation recoupment would be more difficult for a 
cartel than a single monopolist, the Court concluded that predatory 
pricing conspiracies are even more irrational.25 
After finding predatory pricing conspiracies to be generally im-
plausible, the Court then fashioned a summary judgment rule based on 
its belief that rational firms have no desire to price predatorily.  The 
majority held that “if [defendants] had no rational economic motive to 
conspire, and if their conduct is consistent with other, equally plausible 
explanations, the conduct does not give rise to an inference of conspir-
acy.”26  Thus, if a federal judge believes that a plaintiff’s theory of con-
spiracy entails irrational conduct—and if the judge can posit a benign 
explanation for any ambiguous evidence—then the defendants are en-
titled to summary judgment.  Applying its rationality standard to the 
case before it, the Matsushita Court concluded that the alleged 
predatory pricing scheme . . . makes no practical sense:  it calls for peti-
tioners to destroy companies larger and better established than them-
selves, a goal that remains far distant more than two decades after the 
conspiracy’s birth.  Even had they succeeded in obtaining their monopo-
ly, there is nothing in the record to suggest that they could recover the 
losses they would need to sustain along the way.  In sum, in light of the 
absence of any rational motive to conspire, neither petitioners’ pricing 
practices, nor their conduct in the Japanese market, nor their agree-
 
22 Id. at 588-89. 
23 See id. at 589 (“[I]t is not enough simply to achieve monopoly power, as mono-
poly pricing may breed quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess 
profits.”).  Also, any monopoly profits must be discounted to present value, as they oc-
cur in the future.  Id. 
24 Id. 
25 See id. at 590 (asserting that a predatory pricing conspiracy would be “incalcula-
bly more difficult to execute than an analogous plan undertaken by a single predator” 
and thus is irrational). 
26 Id. at 596-97. 
LESLIE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:35 PM 
2010] Rationality Analysis in Antitrust 269 
ments respecting prices and distribution in the American market, suffice 
to create a “genuine issue for trial.”
27
 
According to the letter of Matsushita, if the judge concludes that a 
plaintiff’s theory of the case entails irrational conduct by the defen-
dants, then the evidentiary burden on the plaintiff to survive summary 
judgment increases.  Subsequent courts, however, have applied an 
even more stringent version of this standard:  if a plaintiff’s complaint 
describes a conspiracy that the judge concludes is irrational, then the 
court rules that the conspiracy must not have happened as a matter of 
law, regardless of the evidence presented by the plaintiff to support its 
claim.28  As the Supreme Court later construed its holding in Matsushi-
ta, “If the plaintiff’s theory is economically senseless, no reasonable 
jury could find in its favor, and summary judgment should be 
granted.”29 
In a similar vein, the Supreme Court has also made it more diffi-
cult for section 1 plaintiffs to survive a motion to dismiss.  In Bell Atlan-
tic Corp. v. Twombly,30 the Court held that antitrust claims warrant dis-
missal if a plaintiff’s theory of conspiracy is not “plausible” in the 
court’s view.31  To the extent that judges will treat so-called “irrational” 
conspiracy claims as inherently implausible, the concepts of irrational-
ity and implausibility can work in tandem against antitrust plaintiffs.  
Because a dismissal prevents the antitrust plaintiff from conducting 
discovery, the Twombly decision makes the rationality assumption even 
more important.  If an antitrust defendant can convince the court that 
the alleged conspiracy is implausible, then the plaintiff will be denied 
discovery that might prove that the conspiracy actually took place de-
spite its facial implausibility or irrationality. 
B.  Rationality and Predation 
Whereas section 1 of the Sherman Act focuses on concerted ac-
tion, section 2 condemns certain unilateral conduct, namely illegal 
monopolization and attempted monopolization.32  Antitrust law does 
not prohibit the possession of monopoly power; it merely proscribes 
the acquisition and maintenance of that power through anticompeti-
 
27 Id. at 597 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2)). 
28 See infra Sections IV.B-C. 
29 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468-69 (1992). 
30 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
31 Id. at 556-58. 
32 See Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
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tive or predatory means.33  Once the defendant’s monopoly power is 
established, section 2 claims generally focus on whether the monopol-
ist engaged in a course of predation or earned its market share 
through competition on the merits. 
Courts utilize the rationality assumption to determine when pre-
dation claims can reach the jury.  Whereas Matsushita dealt with pre-
datory pricing conspiracies, the Supreme Court addressed the ratio-
nality of unilateral predatory pricing in Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp.34  The Brooke Group Court based much of its 
reasoning on Matsushita, but the later case had different legal implica-
tions.  American tobacco markets had long been supplied by an oli-
gopoly of six firms.35  As one firm, Liggett, witnessed its market share 
decrease, it sought to bolster its fortunes by shifting emphasis from 
making branded cigarettes to marketing generic cigarettes, which 
were priced significantly lower than their branded counterparts.36  
Liggett found success with price-conscious smokers, and the generic-
cigarette market grew at the expense of the branded-cigarette mar-
ket.37  Liggett’s development of the economy-cigarette market reduced 
the ability of the major tobacco firms to raise the prices of traditional 
cigarettes because price-sensitive consumers could now shift to Lig-
gett’s lower-priced cigarettes.38  In response, another one of the six to-
bacco companies, Brown & Williamson (B&W), entered the generic-
cigarette market and initiated a price war against Liggett.39 
Liggett brought suit against B&W, claiming that its larger rival was 
pricing below cost.40  Liggett’s theory was not that B&W was attempt-
ing to drive Liggett from the generic-cigarette market entirely.  Ra-
ther, Liggett claimed that B&W’s predatory pricing was 
intended to pressure it to raise its list prices on generic cigarettes, so that 
the percentage price difference between generic and branded cigarettes 
would narrow. . . . The resulting reduction in the list price gap . . . would 
restrain the growth of the economy segment and preserve [B&W]’s su-
pracompetitive profits on its branded cigarettes.
41
 
 
33 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). 
34 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
35 Id. at 213. 
36 Id. at 214. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 215-16. 
40 Id. at 216-17.   
41 Id. at 217. 
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Thus, Liggett argued that B&W did not intend to recoup its invest-
ment in the market segment where the predatory pricing actually oc-
curred—generic cigarettes—but rather through oligopoly pricing42 in 
the branded-cigarette market, which would experience a price hike af-
ter a properly punished Liggett raised its prices for generic cigarettes.43 
While jurors found Liggett’s theory persuasive and supported by 
the nearly 3,000 exhibits and numerous witnesses presented at a 115-
day trial, federal judges did not.44  Following a jury verdict in Liggett’s 
favor, the district court granted B&W judgment as a matter of law.45  
The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning that “[t]o rely on the charac-
teristics of an oligopoly to assure recoupment of losses from a preda-
tory pricing scheme after one oligopolist has made a competitive 
move is . . . economically irrational.”46 
The Supreme Court affirmed, questioning the economic plausibil-
ity of Liggett’s theory.  The majority began with the premises that 
predatory pricing does not inflict antitrust injury absent recoupment 
and that recoupment cannot occur unless the predator can successful-
ly drive the targeted rivals from the market or “caus[e] them to raise 
their prices to supracompetitive levels within a disciplined oligopo-
ly.”47  The Court then concluded that because signaling is ambiguous 
and subject to misinterpretation, “tacit cooperation among oligopol-
ists must be considered the least likely means of recouping predatory 
losses.”48  Despite finding that the trial record contained sufficient evi-
dence for a reasonable jury to conclude that B&W engaged in below-
cost pricing for eighteen months with the anticompetitive intent of 
forcing Liggett to raise prices for generic cigarettes in order to facili-
tate price increases of branded cigarettes,49 the Court concluded that 
it was implausible that B&W would be able to recoup because “relying 
on tacit coordination among oligopolists as a means of recouping 
 
42 Oligopoly pricing is tacit price coordination among competitors in a concen-
trated market.  Price rises above competitive levels because all firms are aware that they 
can increase profits by not undercutting each other, but the firms do not explicitly fix 
price and therefore do not violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. 
43 509 U.S. at 216-17. 
44 Id. at 218-19. 
45 Id. 
46 Liggett Group, Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 964 F.2d 335, 342 
(4th Cir. 1992). 
47 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 225. 
48 Id. at 228. 
49 Id. at 231. 
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losses from predatory pricing is highly speculative.”50  In particular, 
the majority asserted that any tacit coordination among tobacco firms 
would have been “unmanageable.”51  Because B&W “had no reasona-
ble prospect of recouping its predatory losses,” it was entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law.52 
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Brooke Group, lower 
courts have reasoned that predatory pricing schemes are “unlikely to 
be attempted by rational businessmen.”53  Because courts view such 
predation as irrational and thus extremely unlikely, they are quick to 
grant summary judgment to predatory pricing defendants.54 
Beyond predatory pricing litigation, courts have imposed “rationali-
ty burdens” on section 2 plaintiffs more generally.  On the one hand, 
some courts suggest that a plaintiff must prove the rationality of a mo-
nopolist’s alleged anticompetitive conduct.  For example, in the wake of 
Matsushita and Brooke Group, one district court held that “[t]he only way 
for a plaintiff to show willful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
power is to provide evidence that the business accused of violating anti-
trust laws had an economically viable scheme in place.”55  On the other 
hand, the Fifth Circuit has opined that “a finding of exclusionary con-
duct requires some sign that the monopolist engaged in behavior 
that—examined without reference to its effects on competitors—is 
economically irrational.”56  In tandem, such holdings create a two-step 
rationality burden:  first, antitrust plaintiffs must prove that the defen-
dant’s alleged anticompetitive conduct is economically rational, and 
second, they must prove that the alleged conduct would be irrational 
unless it was part of a rational scheme to monopolize a market. 
 
50 Id. at 232 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
51 Id. at 238. 
52 Id. at 243. 
53 Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 528 (5th Cir. 1999). 
54 See, e.g., Nat’l Parcel Servs., Inc. v. J.B. Hunt Logistics, Inc., 150 F.3d 970, 971 
(8th Cir. 1998) (“NPS cannot show a dangerous probability of recoupment . . . . The 
district court properly dismissed this claim.”); C.B. Trucking, Inc. v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 
944 F. Supp. 66, 69 (D. Mass. 1996) (“[I]t is nevertheless economically implausible to 
conclude that Waste Management had a ‘dangerous probability’ of recouping its in-
vestment in below-cost prices . . . . Waste Management is entitled to summary judg-
ment . . . .”), aff’d, 137 F.3d 41 (1st Cir. 1998). 
55 Clark v. Flow Measurement, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 519, 526 (D.S.C. 1996). 
56 Stearns, 170 F.3d at 523. 
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C.  Rationality in Other Aspects of Antitrust Law 
Although both Matsushita and Brooke Group involved predatory 
pricing claims, the Court’s rationality analysis in those cases extends to 
other areas of antitrust doctrine.  For example, the Supreme Court 
has also invoked the rationality assumption in determining which 
standard of analysis to apply in section 1 cases.  For decades, maxi-
mum-resale-price maintenance was condemned as per se illegal.  In 
Albrecht v. Herald Co., the Court justified the per se rule in part because 
the maximum price might be set too low for dealers to offer essential 
services to consumers.57  Nearly thirty years later, in State Oil Co. v. 
Khan, the Court overruled Albrecht, reasoning that a manufacturer 
would be irrational to set a maximum price that was too low because 
manufacturers want customers to be satisfied with the service.58  The 
Court held that a per se rule against vertical maximum price fixing 
was thus unnecessary because firms would not set an irrationally low 
maximum price.59  Thus, maximum-resale-price maintenance is now 
judged under the rule of reason, not the per se standard.60  Other 
areas of antitrust law in which the rationality assumption has proved 
decisive include price fixing, group boycotts, and conspiracies to con-
ceal invalid patents.  These cases are discussed in Part IV. 
II.  QUESTIONING THE RATIONALITY ASSUMPTION 
The assumption that firms behave rationally sounds perfectly sens-
ible.  The pursuit of profits explains most business decisions.  But 
firms have at times engaged in a wide variety of conduct that appar-
ently deviates from profit maximization.  First, firms sometimes pur-
sue policies that generate losses that seem to have been foreseeable ex 
ante.  Second, firms engage in conduct that generates losses, but the 
conduct is nonetheless rational when one considers the constraints 
under which decisions are made.  Finally, some business behavior that 
seems irrational is in fact profit maximizing because it is part of a 
larger anticompetitive scheme.  This Part examines these behaviors. 
 
57 390 U.S. 145, 152-53 (1968), overruled by State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
58 522 U.S. at 17. 
59 Id. at 18.   
60 Id. at 22.   
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A.  Loss-Inducing Business Behavior 
American business history is rife with examples of businesses under-
taking conduct that appears inconsistent with profit maximization.  Co-
ca-Cola’s decision to change the recipe of the world’s top-selling soft 
drink with its disastrous introduction of New Coke is a fabled example 
of how not to maximize profits.61  But it is far from an isolated case.  In 
2004, General Motors (GM) launched a test-drive program in which it 
paid consumers $250 if they bought a competitor’s vehicle, not the GM 
car that they test drove.62  One commentator christened GM’s scheme 
“a customer disloyalty program.”63  John DeLorean lost over $100 mil-
lion of investors’ money—leaving $50 million in unpaid debt—by mak-
ing a “sports car” out of stainless steel that was so heavy that the car had 
a top speed of seventy-five miles per hour and rocketed from zero to 
sixty in ten seconds.64  In short, firms appear to engage in conduct that 
seems at odds with the pursuit of profit maximization. 
Because firms sometimes engage in conduct that is not profit max-
imizing, many scholars—including psychologists, game theorists, and 
legal academics working in behavioral law and economics—have 
sought to explain these apparent deviations from rationality.  The 
root of some irrational behavior by firms probably lies in individual 
irrationality.  The experimental work in behavioral law and economics 
shows that individuals engage in various kinds of conduct inconsistent 
with the predictions made using the rationality assumption of tradi-
tional law and economics models.65  Examples include broad catego-
ries of conduct encompassing “altruism, self-sacrifice, ideological 
commitment, and cooperation,”66 as well as common specific instances 
such as individuals providing interest-free loans to the government by 
 
61 See Timothy K. Smith, More Coke Sellers Consider a Return to Original Drink, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 11, 1986, at 13 (“Howls of protest from loyal Coke drinkers induced the 
company to bring back the original-formula drink . . . .”). 
62 Rich Smith, GM’s Dumbest Move Yet, MOTLEY FOOL, June 9, 2004, 
http://www.fool.com/investing/general/2004/06/09/gms-dumbest-move-yet.aspx. 
63 Id.  Of course, if GM believed that the twenty-four-hour test drive would con-
vince people to buy the GM car, then this seems like a reasonable approach:  people 
accept the offer planning to collect the money but end up liking and buying the GM 
car, and GM makes a sale that it otherwise would not have made and saves $250. 
64 ADAM HOROWITZ ET AL., THE DUMBEST MOMENTS IN BUSINESS HISTORY 38-39 (2004). 
65 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1055 (“There is simply too much credible 
experimental evidence that individuals frequently act in ways that are incompatible 
with the assumptions of rational choice theory.”). 
66 Edward L. Rubin, Putting Rational Actors in Their Place:  Economics and Phenome-
nology, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1705, 1706 (1998). 
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overwithholding taxes from their wages.67  Some commentators have 
suggested that the findings of experiments showing irrational beha-
vior by individuals cannot be used to suggest that groups would en-
gage in similar irrational conduct.68  But corporate decisions are made 
by individuals.  As Professor Maurice Stucke asks, “If many individuals 
systemically deviate from rational choice theory’s predicted outcomes 
under certain scenarios, why shouldn’t corporate behavior deviate 
under similar scenarios?”69  Indeed, Professor Jennifer Arlen has sug-
gested that the group context may make it more difficult for people to 
learn from experience.70 
Two examples of business behavior that seems inconsistent with 
perfect rationality are failing to ignore sunk costs and overconfidence.  
One of the most basic concepts of microeconomic theory and invest-
ment strategy is that sunk costs should be ignored.  For example, “a 
supplier, in making a decision about whether or not to expand pro-
duction today, should focus solely on the profit potential less the vari-
able costs of that expansion and ignore any fixed costs previously in-
curred.”71  The failure to ignore sunk costs would seem like quintessentially 
irrational behavior.  Despite this, evidence abounds that both individ-
uals and firms make economic decisions by factoring in sunk costs.72 
Overconfidence also explains why firms pursue business strategies 
that appear foolhardy in retrospect.  Research shows that individuals 
are often overconfident in that they “overestimate their positive traits, 
abilities, skills, and likelihood of experiencing positive events, while 
they underestimate their vulnerability to certain risks.”73  Perhaps sur-
prisingly, this overconfidence bias persists even when the decision-
maker knows the actual probabilities of particular events occurring.74  
 
67 See Stucke, supra note 13, at 528-29 (describing such behavior as “contrary to the 
tenets of wealth-maximization”). 
68 See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?  The Unwarranted 
Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907, 2003 
(2002) (“[I]ndividual-level research findings cannot simply be assumed to apply to 
group-type decisions.”). 
69 Stucke, supra note 13, at 515. 
70 Jennifer Arlen, Comment:  The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 52 
VAND. L. REV. 1765, 1783 (1998). 
71 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1124. 
72 See id. (“Notwithstanding economic wisdom to the contrary, people routinely 
cite sunk costs as a reason for pursuing a particular course of action.”). 
73 Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry:  Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and Legal 
Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 505 (2002). 
74 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1091 (citing Christine Jolls, Behavioral Econom-
ics Analysis of Redistributive Legal Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 & n.22 (1998)). 
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Importantly for our purposes, much empirical data demonstrates that 
the overconfidence bias thrives in the business community, including 
among investors75 and corporate managers.76  In one experiment with 
MBA students, participants were not only overconfident about their 
future performance, but they also overestimated the value of their 
past performance.77 
Businesses often exhibit overconfidence when introducing new 
products.  For example, during the 1964–1965 World’s Fair, DuPont 
launched its new synthetic leather, Corfam, to much fanfare.78  Shoes 
made from Corfam were durable, water repellent, and never needed 
shining.79  DuPont boldly predicted that Corfam sales would soon 
represent a quarter of the footwear market, and the firm invested ac-
cordingly.80  But the public did not take to Corfam shoes because their 
durability meant that they could never be broken in, and DuPont had 
to abandon the project, losing approximately $100 million in the 
process.81  DuPont’s confidence in Corfam would have seemed shrewd 
had the gamble paid off, but when losses reach nine digits, yesterday’s 
enthusiasm becomes today’s overconfidence.82 
An important element of overconfidence includes underestimat-
ing the risk of failure.83  Individuals in their daily lives often underes-
timate their risks of common injuries, such as being hurt in a car acci-
dent.84  Such underestimation is particularly pronounced when the 
individual perceives that she has some level of control over the situa-
 
75 See Tor, supra note 73, at 506 & n.94. 
76 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1095. 
77 See Tor, supra note 73, at 506-07 (noting that participants believed that their 
performance in an investment game had equaled market performance even though, 
on average, they had performed significantly worse than the market). 
78 HOROWITZ ET AL., supra note 64, at 2. 
79 Id.    
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
82 This is not to say that DuPont necessarily behaved irrationally; it may simply have 
made a reasonable, but incorrect, prediction.  In any case, the example shows that success-
ful firms sometimes pursue business strategies that result in significant losses.   
83 For example, Avishalom Tor has noted that  
[n]umerous studies show that people exhibit biased predictions of external 
events that are not under their control . . . . When manifesting such biased 
predictions regarding desirable outcomes, entrants may not only overestimate 
the profitability of successful entry, but also underestimate the investments 
and the time necessary for the venture to become viable. 
Tor, supra note 73, at 508-09. 
84 See Arlen, supra note 70, at 1773.  
LESLIE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:35 PM 
2010] Rationality Analysis in Antitrust 277 
tion.85  This may be a reflection of individuals’ overestimation of their 
own abilities.  For example, one-third of Silicon Valley engineers sur-
veyed rated their performance as within the top 5% of their cohort, 
and 90% placed themselves in the top quartile; only 1% rated them-
selves below average.86  In the context of business decisionmaking, 
managers may underestimate the risk of failure because their own in-
ternal estimates focus primarily on the variables within their control 
instead of the factors outside of their control.87 
In short, firms may pursue a course that inflicts losses because the 
decisionmakers overestimate the probability that a high-cost strategy 
will ultimately succeed. 
B.  Distinguishing Unprofitable Conduct from Irrational Conduct 
A business decision that causes a firm to lose a significant amount 
of money may seem inherently irrational because it does not maxim-
ize profits.  However,  the fact that a chosen course of action hurts the 
bottom line—even when it is clear, in hindsight, that an alternative 
course of action would have been far preferable—does not mean that 
the initial decision was irrational. 
Scholars working within the field of behavioral law and economics 
have sought to explain why individuals engage in conduct that seems to 
violate the assumption of rationality.  Their work illustrates several in-
terrelated explanations.  First, many business mistakes may be a func-
tion of limited information.  Business decisions that are based on li-
mited information and that subsequently lose substantial amounts of 
money are not necessarily irrational.  Most decisions, whether personal 
or professional, must be made on the basis of incomplete information.  
While greater information could possibly increase the probability of 
correctly predicting whether a particular decision will maximize prof-
its,88 information gathering is itself costly.89  In addition to the monetary 
 
85 See Tor, supra note 73, at 512. 
86 Todd R. Zenger & Sergio G. Lazzarini, Compensating for Innovation:  Do Small 
Firms Offer High-Powered Incentives That Lure Talent and Motivate Effort?, 25 MANAGERIAL 
& DECISION ECON. 329, 335 (2004). 
87 See Tor, supra note 73, at 516 (identifying this approach as the “inside view” and 
noting that it “is especially likely to make entrants insensitive to background market 
predictors”). 
88 See id. at 524-25 (“If all relevant information were known with certainty, there 
would be no bias . . . . Importantly, however, an increase in the amount of information 
alone may not decrease entrants’ bias, as the psychological literature shows that addi-
tional information rarely changes people’s preexisting attitudes.”). 
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cost of acquiring additional information, time constraints usually neces-
sitate action in the absence of omniscience.  As Robert Frank has ob-
served, “Anyone who tried to make fully-informed, rational choices 
would make only a handful of decisions each week, leaving hundreds of 
important matters unattended.”90  Given these constraints, Judge Posner 
has noted that “it would be profoundly irrational to spend all one’s time 
in the acquisition of information,”91 and thus, “[l]imited information 
must not be confused with irrationality.”92 
In the face of imperfect information, individuals and firms may 
employ heuristics, or shortcuts, including rules of thumb.  While using 
shortcuts in business decisionmaking may sometimes create losses, the 
use of heuristics generally is completely rational.  As Robert Frank has 
explained, “Our cognitive capabilities, although vast, are limited.  Re-
liance on habit and rules of thumb, while perhaps irrational in specif-
ic instances, is a quintessentially rational response to this limitation.”93 
However, limited cognitive abilities may prevent individuals from 
making decisions that maximize profits.  Herbert Simon94 coined the 
phrase “bounded rationality,” which describes how decisionmaking 
takes place in light of human cognitive limitations.95  Even people who 
want to maximize their own utility or corporate profits may be ham-
pered by their flawed memories and imperfect computational skills as 
well as by structural limitations of the organization within which they 
are operating.96  A person’s ultimate decision, whether made in an in-
dividual or corporate capacity, may not be the objectively best one, 
but it may nevertheless be the best decision that the person could 
make given her cognitive constraints. 
Furthermore, risk taking should not be confused with irrationality.  
Much business decisionmaking is about taking risks.  Whether a firm 
 
89 Even after spending vast sums to acquire information, businesses will rarely have 
complete and perfect information, thus leaving some level of uncertainty. 
90 Robert H. Frank, Shrewdly Irrational, 2 SOC. F. 21, 23 (1987). 
91 Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. 
REV. 1551, 1553 (1998); see also Frank, supra note 90, at 23 (“To gather the information 
and do the calculations implicit in naive descriptions of the rational choice model 
would consume more time and energy than anyone has.  More important, by the strict 
terms of the very same model, it would not be rational!” (emphasis omitted)). 
92 Posner, supra note 91, at 1573. 
93 Frank, supra note 90, at 38. 
94 See generally HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR (4th ed. 1997). 
95 See Rubin, supra note 66, at 1714-15 (“The extent to which such bounded ratio-
nality approaches optimality depends upon the operation of external forces.”). 
96 Id.; see also Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 11, at 1477 (suggesting that flaws 
in human memory limit the ability of people to mimic utilitarian models of action). 
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is deciding to enter a new market, to launch a corporate takeover, or 
even simply to modify the packaging of a consumer product, most 
business decisions create the possibility of either profits or losses.  The 
amount of risk a firm is willing to accept is generally a function of its 
executives’ and managers’ level of risk aversion.  A course of action 
that might be unacceptable for a risk-averse entity may represent a to-
lerable gamble for a risk-seeking entrepreneur.  The fact that the 
gamble does not pay off does not necessarily render the initial deci-
sion irrational.  In the stock market, for example, there are winners 
and losers, but the fact that an investor loses money does not necessar-
ily mean that she invested recklessly.  Even a bet-the-farm strategy can 
be rational if a business fears it would not otherwise survive under pro-
jected market conditions.  If the strategy works, then the firm thrives 
and earns profits greater than if it had not attempted the risky ven-
ture.  If the strategy fails, the business is destroyed; that does not, 
however, make the strategy irrational, so long as the decisionmakers 
appropriately considered the relevant variables in adopting the strate-
gy.  Rationality should be determined ex ante even though the success 
of many rational decisions can only be judged ex post.  Independent 
of the level of foreseeable risk involved, a business decision that is ra-
tional when made may turn out to be unprofitable ex post.97  Conse-
quently, not every rational business decision necessarily increases prof-
its, even when rationality is defined as profit-maximizing behavior.98 
In sum, even when seeking to maximize profits, rational firms 
sometimes engage in conduct that ultimately hurts the bottom line.  
Businesspeople sometimes make bad judgment calls, are overconfi-
dent, act on limited information, and take risks that do not pay off.  
Despite the assumption that firms are rational, profit-maximizing enti-
ties, firms—including many successful firms—at times pursue strate-
gies that result in serious losses. 
The following two Sections discuss facially irrational decisions that 
are in fact rational, albeit not in an obvious way. 
 
97 See Richard Craswell & Mark R. Fratrik, Predatory Pricing Theory Applied:  The Case 
of Supermarkets vs. Warehouse Stores, 36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 15-16 (1985) (stating that, 
when warehouse stores enter a market, “even though the initial decision . . . seemed 
rational, the warehouse store may realize after entry that it made a bad decision”). 
98 See infra Section III.C (noting that firms pursue other goals in addition to profit 
maximization). 
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C.  Antitrust Conspiracies Often Entail Conduct That Appears Irrational 
Many business decisions that might seem irrational on first obser-
vation are rational because they occur in the context of an antitrust 
conspiracy.  In a perfectly competitive market, it might be irrational 
for a firm to forego sales, to build capacity that it does not intend to 
use, to decline to enter profitable markets, to share valuable proprie-
tary data with rivals, or to purchase commodities from a competitor 
when the buyer has inventory on hand.  Yet all of these acts occur in 
markets with multiple suppliers, and the reason for such facially irra-
tional conduct is that it can help create, stabilize, and enforce price-
fixing agreements. 
First, some facially irrational conduct is designed to force unwil-
ling rivals into a price-fixing conspiracy.  For example, while it appears 
irrational to build productive capacity and not use it, Archer Daniels 
Midland (ADM) did precisely this when it sought to enter the market 
for lysine, an amino acid.99  Before ADM began producing lysine, the 
international market was dominated by four Asian firms—two Japa-
nese and two Korean—that operated as a cartel.100  ADM did not wish 
to break up the cartel.101  Rather, it sought to join and lead it.102  ADM 
correctly predicted that the members of the Asian cartel would be re-
ticent to allow an American firm to join—let alone dominate—their 
profitable enterprise.103  So ADM engaged in predatory pricing to 
force their hands.104  And to demonstrate its staying power as a preda-
tor, ADM invited its Asian competitors to its Illinois factory in order to 
show them the enormous productive capacity that ADM was building 
for lysine.105  The purpose of the visit was to threaten the Asian firms 
by suggesting that if they did not divide the world market to ADM’s 
 
99 See John M. Connor, Global Cartels Redux:  The Lysine Antitrust Litigation (1996) 
(explaining that, ultimately, ADM and four other companies “had been illegally col-
luding on lysine prices around the world for three years”), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLU-
TION 300, 300 ( John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 5th ed. 2009). 
100 See id. at 307-08 (identifying the Japanese companies Ajinomoto and Kwoya Hakko 
as well as the Korean companies Sewon and Cheil Sugar as the original cartel members). 
101 Id. 
102 Id.  
103 See JAMES B. LIEBER, RATS IN THE GRAIN:  THE DIRTY TRICKS AND TRIALS OF AR-
CHER DANIELS MIDLAND 136 (2000) (explaining that ADM’s foray “into the world ly-
sine market . . . was a big gamble because of the ‘Asian Cartel,’ which for decades had 
controlled the manufacture and trade of the amino acid”). 
104 See Connor, supra note 99, at 316 (“Had the Asian manufacturers not agreed to 
join an ADM-dominated cartel, ADM might well have continued predatory pricing 
beyond June 1992.”). 
105 See LIEBER, supra note 103, at 146.   
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liking, then ADM would flood the market, drive the price down, and 
potentially drive other lysine producers from the market entirely.106  
With this threat, ADM essentially initiated a game of Chicken—a game 
it won.  The ADM field trip proved successful as ADM took a leader-
ship role in the cartel and allocated itself a substantial share in the re-
cartelized lysine market.107  Although it had designed a system of pu-
nishments for cartel members that sold in excess of their cartel 
allotment, 
it was never necessary to implement the system.  ADM, with its new effi-
cient plant and ample excess capacity, frequently reminded the cartel of its 
willingness to flood the market with lysine; its threats were credible be-
cause it had twice driven the world price of lysine to below its own average 
total cost of production, inflicting the others with operating losses.
108
 
ADM was not sailing in uncharted waters; Australian producers had 
employed a similar strategy in the 1970s to force their way into the in-
ternational uranium cartel.109  When the members of the uranium car-
tel were reluctant to admit the Australian producers, the Australian 
producers threatened to sabotage the cartel because “they would be 
able to outproduce and undersell everyone else.”110  In short, building 
and maintaining excess capacity does not maximize short-term profit, 
but it is rational behavior for a firm seeking to force its way into a cartel. 
Second, facially irrational conduct is often employed to maintain 
friendly relations among cartel participants.  It would appear irration-
al for a firm to decline to make profitable sales if the firm’s goal is to 
maximize profits, but firms that belong to price-fixing cartels do so as 
a trust-building measure.  Trust is often necessary to create and main-
tain stable cartels.111  In the absence of trust, cartel members are more 
likely to cheat on the cartel agreement by lowering their price or sell-
ing more than their cartel allotment.112  In order to stabilize price-
fixing conspiracies, cartel members make trust-building goodwill ges-
tures to each other that would appear irrational to outside observers.  
 
106 See id. 
107 See Connor, supra note 99, at 310 (“ADM did earn approximately $200 million 
in profits from the cartel over three years with its one-third share of sales in the world-
wide lysine market.”).   
108 Id. at 311. 
109 See EARLE GRAY, THE GREAT URANIUM CARTEL 161-62 (1982) (detailing Austral-
ia’s belated entry into the uranium cartel by means of the threat of underpricing). 
110 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
111 See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 549-
51 (2004). 
112 See id. at 549, 552-57. 
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For example, cartel members sometimes decline to make profitable 
sales, as Alcoa’s Canadian affiliate once refused to sell alumina to a 
customer outside the cartel simply because “it would irritate members 
of the [international aluminum] cartel.”113  More recently, members of 
the multibillion-dollar vitamins cartel refused to give price quotes to 
customers who had been assigned to other cartel members.114  Cartel 
partners may also decline to enter each others’ profitable product 
lines.  For example, during the interwar period when many interna-
tional cartels thrived, Standard Oil and IG Farben jointly participated 
in several cartels and “sought to stabilize their overall cartel relation-
ships by each ceding a major market to the other, petroleum to Stan-
dard and chemicals to Farben.”115  Similarly, as part of their larger car-
tel arrangements, “[i]n 1927 du Pont stopped selling artificial leather 
cloth (Fabrikoid) and related products in Great Britain, apparently in 
line with its general policy of avoiding competition with ICI,”116 Brit-
ain’s major chemical company.  Another way that cartel partners try to 
build trust is through sharing confidential information, as when 
“ADM shared [with its cartel partners] a wealth of private, proprietary 
data, including information on its production technologies, manufac-
turing costs, lysine production capacity, the number of relevant em-
ployees, technology and enzyme suppliers, as well as planned products 
in the pilot programs.”117 
All of this was part of ADM’s effort to build trust among the lysine 
cartel members.118  None of this conduct—declining to make sales, 
foregoing profitable product lines, and sharing proprietary informa-
 
113 See GEORGE W. STOCKING & MYRON W. WATKINS, CARTELS IN ACTION 254 
(1946) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting testimony of Mr. E.K. Davis, Pres-
ident of Alted, Alcoa’s Canadian affiliate).  
114 In the 1990s, Hoffmann-La Roche, BASF, and other chemical conglomerates 
had successfully divided the multibillion-dollar international vitamin market.  The car-
tel was well disciplined, well concealed, and highly profitable.  But the cartel unwitting-
ly exposed itself when “[v]itamin buyers reported several instances of inexplicable be-
havior.  Customers who habitually purchased from Roche would not be able to get 
price quotes from BASF or other suppliers, and vice versa.”  JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL 
PRICE FIXING 314 (2001).  The act of refusing to give price quotes—while helpful in 
preventing cheating on a price-fixing agreement—was sufficiently irrational to attract 
attention that led to complete exposure of the cartel, guilty pleas by participants to 
criminal charges, and significant civil liability. 
115 Leslie, supra note 111, at 570 (citing STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 491). 
116 STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 450. 
117 Leslie, supra note 111, at 572 (citing CONNOR, supra note 114, at 223-24). 
118 See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 225 (“[A]ll the technical data ADM shared with 
its rivals must have raised the level of trust.  At the cartel’s first major meeting, ADM 
attempted to create trust by giving its best estimates of lysine capabilities.”). 
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tion—is profit maximizing, and it thus appears irrational, until one 
considers how such acts create goodwill among co-conspirators and 
thus stabilize a cartel. 
Finally, some facially irrational conduct may serve as a cartel en-
forcement or accounting mechanism.  Because cheating on a price-
fixing conspiracy can maximize short-term profits for the cheater,119 
many cartels construct enforcement mechanisms to monitor their 
members and to punish those that defect.  In many cases, this means 
firms report their sales data to each other at regular intervals.120  Many 
cartels—including those in nitrogen,121 salt,122 steel,123 and coal124—
have required members who are detected selling more than their car-
tel allotment to pay a fine.  Under the practices of some cartels, such 
fines were funneled to any firms selling less than their cartel quota, as 
was done by the aluminum,125 cement,126 and steel cartels.127  In lieu of 
money transfers, some cartels—including those in dyestuffs, alumi-
 
119 George J. Stigler, A Theory of Oligopoly, 72 J. POL. ECON. 44, 46 (1964) (“It is a 
well-established proposition that if any member of the [cartel] agreement can secretly 
violate it, he will gain larger profits than by conforming to it.”). 
120 See Leslie, supra note 111, at 611-13 (noting reporting mechanisms used by the 
lysine, vitamin, steel, railroad, and citric acid cartels). 
121 See Greta Devos, International Cartels in Belgium and the Netherlands During the In-
terwar Period:  The Nitrogen Case, 18 INT’L CONF. ON BUS. HIST. 117, 120 (1992) (noting 
that members were made to pay fines to a trustee if they exceeded their quotas). 
122 See JOHN E. STEALEY III, THE ANTEBELLUM KANAWHA SALT BUSINESS AND WEST-
ERN MARKETS 35-36 (1993) (describing the somewhat loose system of imposing fines 
on salt producers who did not adhere to set prices and markets). 
123 See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 183 (“If any country exceeded its 
allotted quarterly production, the cartel required that country’s producers to pay into 
the cartel’s common fund a fine . . . .”). 
124 See JEREMIAH WHIPPLE JENKS & WALTER E. CLARK, THE TRUST PROBLEM 106 
(4th ed., Doubleday, Page & Co. 1920) (1900) (explaining how oversellers were 
charged fines, and if they refused to pay, the coal mines would stop supplying them 
with sufficient coal). 
125 See STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 252-53 (“Members were penalized 
if they exceeded their assigned quotas; they received compensation for underselling 
their quotas.”). 
126 See Philip C. Newman, Key German Cartels Under the Nazi Regime, 62 Q.J. ECON. 
576, 594 (1948) (explaining the agreement among European cement producers to 
prevent further dips in price by imposing quotas, prices, and payments owed for ex-
ceeding quotas). 
127 See Daniel Barbezat, Cooperation and Rivalry in the International Steel Cartel, 1926–
1933, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 435, 437 (1989) (“The cartel had penalties for production in 
excess of the quota.  The original penalty was $4 per ton . . . .”); cf. ERVIN HEXNER, THE 
INTERNATIONAL STEEL CARTEL 77 (1943) (discussing the negative effects of failing to 
set fixed prices and production quantities in the fine and compensation systems); Wal-
ter S. Tower, The New Steel Cartel, 5 FOREIGN AFF. 249, 258-59 (1927) (listing the provi-
sions of the European steel syndicate’s 1927 agreement).  
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num, citric acid, and lysine—required members who oversold to pur-
chase the cartelized commodity from another cartel member who had 
undersold during the relevant sales period.128  Giving money to a 
competitor or buying a rival’s competing products in a time of no evi-
dent need is not profit-maximizing behavior.  However, such conduct 
is rational within the larger context of an ongoing cartel that needs to 
balance its books. 
In sum, much conduct that at first glance seems irrational makes 
economic sense in the context of a price-fixing conspiracy. 
D.  Even Absent an Antitrust Conspiracy, “Irrational” Conduct  
Can Be a Rational Predatory Business Move 
In addition to facilitating price-fixing cartels, economically suspect 
conduct may be associated with predation by a single firm.  This Sec-
tion discusses how, while it may seem irrational for a firm to drive up 
the costs of necessary inputs or to overpay for facilities and then de-
stroy them, monopolists have at times employed each of these tactics 
in order to control markets. 
It seems irrational for a business to seek to increase the price of its 
inputs.  Yet firms have done so.129  Thomas Krattenmaker and Steven 
Salop have demonstrated how “[r]aising rivals’ costs can be a particu-
larly effective method of anticompetitive exclusion.”130  While they 
note that the “strategy need not entail sacrificing one’s own profits in 
the short run,” the strategy can entail a dominant firm raising its ri-
vals’ costs by increasing the costs for all market participants, including 
itself.131  For example, in Great Western Directories, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell 
Telephone Co.,132 the defendant convinced a supplier to impose an 
across-the-board price increase because, while costly to itself, the de-
fendant believed that the price increase would “inflict[] more pain on 
 
128 See, e.g., CONNOR, supra note 114, at 136 (citric acid); LIEBER, supra note 103, at 148 
(lysine); STOCKING & WATKINS, supra note 113, at 264 (aluminum); id. at 405 (dyestuffs).  
129 See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04 (1946) (de-
monstrating an instance of cartelists purchasing cheap tobacco to drive up lower-
priced competitors’ costs).  Predatory bidding is a species of increasing input prices, 
but the Supreme Court’s decision in Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber 
Co. casts doubt on the continuing viability of predatory bidding claims.  See 127 S. Ct. 
1069, 1072, 1077 (2007) (holding that the Brooke Group test for predatory pricing 
claims also applies to predatory bidding claims). 
130 Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:  Raising 
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224 (1986). 
131 Id.  
132 63 F.3d 1378, 1383-84 (5th Cir. 1995), modified, 74 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 1996). 
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its cash-starved competitor.”133  The economics expert in the case testi-
fied that Great Western’s conduct would have been irrational but for 
the anticompetitive effect on its rivals.134 
Buying assets at excessive prices and then demolishing them ap-
pears irrational, but destroying physical property can create economic 
power.  In United States v. American Can Co., the defendant paid up to 
twenty-five times the market value for can-making factories and then 
destroyed two-thirds of its acquisitions, often without even inspecting 
the plants.135  This appears to be irrational and hardly the move of a 
profit maximizer.  But the conduct is rational because American Can 
was not trying to purchase productive capacity; it was simply trying to 
remove competitive assets from the marketplace.  Its strategy suc-
ceeded and it acquired monopoly power over the tin-can market na-
tionwide.  In a similar vein, more recently a billboard monopolist in 
the Northeast threatened to “destroy its billboards rather than sell 
them,”136 a move that seems irrational since most profit-maximizing 
firms would rather sell an asset than destroy it.  But the threat makes 
sense when one considers the monopolist’s goal of keeping assets out 
of competitors’ hands. 
Such conduct may appear irrational but is in fact profit maximizing 
when it has the intended effect of forcing competitors to exit the mar-
ket.  Section III.D discusses other examples of successful monopolists 
making seemingly irrational threats—and executing them when un-
heeded—as a means of maintaining their dominant market position. 
III.  THE JUDICIARY’S INABILITY TO EVALUATE BUSINESS RATIONALITY 
While judges are generally correct in assuming that firms act ra-
tionally, judges may not be well situated to recognize what constitutes 
rational business behavior.  As a result, the rationality assumption can 
distort antitrust litigation because many courts hold that if the con-
duct alleged by the plaintiff appears so irrational as to be implausible, 
then it must not have happened.137  Unfortunately, judges are some-
times too quick to label anticompetitive conduct irrational, and hence 
implausible, despite evidence to the contrary.  This Part argues that 
 
133 Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 524 n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) 
(discussing Great Western). 
134 63 F.3d at 1386. 
135 230 F. 859, 870-71, 875-76 (D. Md. 1916). 
136 RSA Media, Inc. v. AK Media Group, Inc., 260 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2001). 
137 See infra Part IV. 
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federal judges may not be the best evaluators of business rationality 
for several related reasons, including the fact that most judges (1) 
have no relevant business experience; (2) are unfamiliar with perti-
nent economics and historical scholarship on anticompetitive con-
duct; (3) fail to recognize that businesses pursue goals beyond profit 
maximization; (4) are unable to appreciate how it may be rational for 
firms to intentionally display apparently irrational behavior; (5) do 
not consider constraints on business decisionmaking; and (6) are sub-
ject to cognitive biases, including hindsight bias and confirmation bi-
as.  This Part explores these judicial limitations.  The Court’s reason-
ing in Matsushita will be used to exemplify the mistakes that courts 
make when evaluating the rationality and plausibility of antitrust 
claims.  Part IV will then discuss other examples across a range of anti-
trust violations in order to illustrate the damage that Matsushita has 
done to antitrust doctrine more broadly. 
A.  Most Judges Lack Relevant Business Experience 
Courts are often not well equipped to accurately determine 
whether an alleged course of business conduct is irrational or implaus-
ible.  Judges do not necessarily understand how businesses operate, 
and most judges are unfamiliar with the full sweep of the relevant 
economics literature, including theory and historical case studies. 
Federal judges are very good at many tasks, such as interpreting 
legislative intent, parsing statutory language, reconciling divergent 
precedent, and developing common law rules that balance competing 
interests.  But most judges are not businesspeople, and many legal 
rules reflect this reality.  For example, the business judgment rule lim-
its the ability of judges in shareholder litigation to review the sub-
stance of corporate decisions.138  Courts have justified the business 
judgment rule on the ground that “businessmen and women are cor-
rectly perceived as possessing skills, information and judgment not 
 
138 One court has noted that, 
generally, the business judgment rule provides that a decision made by an in-
dependent board will not give rise to liability (nor will it be the proper subject 
of equitable remedies) if it is made in good faith and in the exercise of due 
care.  This means that ordinarily the policy of the rule prevents substantive re-
view of the merits of a business decision made in good faith and with due care. 
West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holders Li-
tig.), 542 A.2d 770, 780 (Del. Ch. 1988) (footnotes omitted). 
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possessed by reviewing courts.”139  Consequently, “directors are, in 
most cases, more qualified to make business decisions than are 
judges.”140  Based on this recognition, the business judgment rule pro-
tects directors and officers from “substantive second guessing by ill-
equipped judges or juries, which would, in the long-run, be injurious 
to investor interests.”141  Given that this critical legal doctrine is 
founded on the premise that judges cannot appreciate the constraints 
under which business decisions are made, questioning judges’ apti-
tude to evaluate the wisdom of business decisions should be seen as 
neither disrespectful nor controversial. 
The deference embodied in the business judgment rule is not 
present in antitrust law despite the fact that most judges have no rele-
vant experience or insight when it comes to how to monopolize a 
market or how to orchestrate an antitrust conspiracy.  As a law profes-
sor, Frank Easterbrook famously wrote about the perils of federal 
judges who have no business expertise making antitrust law.  He ob-
served that “[w]isdom lags far behind the market. . . . [L]awyers . . . 
know less about the businesses than the people they represent. . . . 
The judge knows even less about the business than the lawyers.”142  
Easterbrook was confident that judges knew too little about business 
to understand how markets actually operate—until he became a fed-
eral judge, at which point he became quite comfortable announcing 
legal rules based on his personal conception of how businesses make 
 
139 Solash v. Telex Corp., 1988 WL 3587, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988); see also 
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPO-
RATE LAW 243 (1991) (“One rationale for the business judgment rule is that managers 
who make errors (and even those who engage in self-dealing) are penalized by market 
forces while judges who make errors are not.”); Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, 
Shareholders, Creditors, and Directors’ Fiduciary Duties:  A Law and Finance Approach, 2 VA. 
L. & BUS. REV. 1, 23 n.65 (2007) (“The rationale of this decision is that the judges are 
ill-fitted to evaluate managerial decisions, given their lack of business expertise.”).  
140 Int’l Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1458 n.20 (11th Cir. 1989). 
141 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996); see 
also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000 (N.Y. 1979) (“[B]usiness judgment 
doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in the prudent recognition that courts are ill 
equipped . . . to evaluate what are and must be essentially business judgments.”); Karl 
F. Balz, No-Shop Clauses, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 520-21 (2003) (“Business decisions in-
herently entail risks and uncertainty, and it is neither from an individual investor’s nor 
from a social perspective desirable to discourage directors from engaging in reasonably 
risky and uncertain ventures that have potential for great profit.”). 
142 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984). 
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decisions.143  Judge Easterbrook showed no hesitation, despite the fact 
that he—like most federal judges—had never operated a major busi-
ness concern or entered a market controlled by a dominant firm.144  
With respect to judicial competence in evaluating the likelihood and 
rationality of particular business strategies, Professor Easterbrook was 
more correct than Judge Easterbrook. 
B.  Judges’ Absorption of Pertinent Scholarship 
Beyond lacking practical experience, federal judges generally do 
not keep current with relevant economic, legal, and historical scholar-
ship.  Emerging research and game-theoretical models have largely 
undermined the simple explanations of business rationality associated 
with the early Chicago School.145  But this new scholarship is not readi-
ly comprehensible to federal judges.  Professor Hay notes that “a rich 
economics literature has developed, the thrust of which is to demon-
strate that, as a matter of economic theory, predatory or limit pricing 
cannot be dismissed as irrational behavior . . . . Much of the literature 
is highly technical and largely inaccessible to the lay reader.”146  While 
federal judges are experts on many subjects, with respect to much 
academic literature on economics and game theory, most judges are 
lay readers and thus may not necessarily be able to fully understand 
why some conduct that might initially appear irrational is in fact profit 
maximizing. 
Furthermore, while many federal judges are capable of digesting 
the economics literature, it is clear that they do not do so.  For exam-
ple, courts continue to cite uncritically the Matsushita Court’s asser-
tion that there is a consensus that predatory pricing is irrational.147  
 
143 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-02 
(7th Cir. 1989) (holding that a firm’s own perception of its ability to recoup an invest-
ment in predatory pricing is irrelevant when judges believe that recoupment is unlikely). 
144 Nor had he performed any relevant empirical research on such issues during 
his time in academia. 
145 See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp, Predatory Pricing Analysis:  A Practical Synthesis, 59 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 595, 596 (1991) (“The arguments of McGee and Bork to the effect that preda-
tory pricing never happens except in the singular case of a price-setter acting expensively 
against his own self-interest have been dissolved by scholarship.” (footnote omitted)). 
146 George A. Hay, The Economics of Predatory Pricing, 51 ANTITRUST L.J. 361, 364 (1982). 
147 See, e.g., WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting 
that Matsushita held that pricing schemes are “rarely successful” (quoting Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986))); Stearns Airport 
Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 523-24, 527 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Matsushita 
for the proposition that the “Court has expressed extreme skepticism of predatory 
pricing claims”); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1195-97 (3d Cir. 
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This is specious for two reasons.  First, no such uncontested consensus 
existed at the time of the Matsushita and Brooke Group opinions.148  The 
Chicago School law professors upon whom the majority relied had 
“ignored studies of strategic behavior in economic markets which 
demonstrate ‘the learning curve benefits of cumulative production, 
the attributes of investment, techniques for raising rivals’ costs, stra-
tegic reputation effects, and even international strategic features.’”149  
Second, even if the Court’s characterization of economic theory had 
been true at the time the opinions were announced, “modern eco-
nomic analysis has developed coherent theories of predation that con-
travene earlier economic writing claiming that predatory pricing con-
duct is irrational.”150  If any consensus on predation currently exists, it 
 
1995) (asserting that empirical studies support the Matsushita Court’s analysis with re-
gard to the implausibility of predatory pricing); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion 
Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255-56 (5th Cir. 1988) (describing Matsushita as hold-
ing that “the economic disincentives to predatory pricing often will justify a presump-
tion that an allegation of such behavior is implausible”); Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 
152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (“Anticompetitive pricing schemes are ex-
ceedingly difficult to accomplish:  ‘[T]here is a consensus . . . that predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.’” (alteration in original) 
(quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 589)); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 
870 F. Supp. 1042, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (“[T]he Supreme Court [in Matsushita] sug-
gested that predatory pricing schemes are unlikely to succeed . . . .”); Nat’l Benefit 
Adm’rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., No. 88-H-426-N, 1989 WL 
146413, at *7 (M.D. Ala. July 27, 1989) (quoting Matsushita to justify holding that the 
defendant did not engage in predatory pricing), aff’d, 907 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1990); 
cf. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
because Matsushita held that predatory pricing was implausible, the court would “ap-
proach[] the matter [of price predation] with caution” despite recognizing that 
“[r]ecent scholarship has challenged the notion that predatory pricing schemes are 
implausible”).  While lower courts are, of course, bound by Matsushita’s holding, they 
have no obligation to recite the Court’s false assertion of consensus. 
148 Scholarship available to the Court at the time demonstrated the rationality of 
predatory pricing.  See, e.g., Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 97, at 42 (“Nevertheless, the 
possibility that predatory price cuts might be a rational strategy for the incumbent 
cannot be ruled out on purely theoretical grounds.  Recent theories have shown that 
even when the entrant is perfectly aware of the conditions under which incumbents 
would try to disguise market conditions by making otherwise unprofitable price cuts, 
such price cuts can still be a rational and successful strategy.”); John Roberts, A Signal-
ing Model of Predatory Pricing, 38 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS (Supp.) 75, 75-76 (1986) (citing 
economics scholarship from the early 1980s demonstrating the rationality of predatory 
pricing). 
149 Steven F. Benz, Note, Below-Cost Sales and the Buying of Market Share, 42 STAN. L. 
REV. 695, 719-20 (1990) (quoting Oliver E. Williamson, Delimiting Antitrust, 76 GEO. 
L.J. 271, 298 (1987)). 
150 Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing:  Stra-
tegic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 2241 (2000). 
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is arguably the antithesis of the Matsushita majority’s viewpoint.151  But 
federal judges—and most lawyers—do not keep abreast of advances in 
economic theory152 and thus fail to recognize that what might have 
seemed irrational to an earlier court espousing outdated theories 
would be perfectly rational to a modern economist as well as to a do-
minant firm bent on monopolization. 
In addition to economics scholarship addressing collusion and 
predation, a wealth of business and historical research casts light on 
how firms have pursued anticompetitive designs in the past.  Most 
federal judges, including Supreme Court Justices, appear to have little 
grasp of the history of cartels—i.e., how cartels are formed, operated, 
and perpetuated—or how past monopolists have employed predation 
to control markets.  The conduct that federal courts are now labeling 
implausible as a matter of law has, in fact, been successfully used by 
cartels and monopolists.  Yet courts fail to appreciate relevant empiri-
cal scholarship, including case studies that show purportedly “irra-
tional” business schemes succeeding. 
The Supreme Court in Matsushita asserted that cartel members 
would not engage in predatory pricing in order to drive potential 
competitors out of the market because a predatory pricing conspiracy 
“makes no practical sense.”153  But the Court was apparently ignorant 
of historical examples of successful predatory pricing conspiracies.  
Collective predation and recoupment is at least as old as the Sherman 
Act.  Members of the Victorian-era British shipping cartel controlled 
membership through price predation.154  Whenever a nonmember 
tried to enter a route controlled by a current cartel member, desirable 
shippers (defined as those who would be cooperative cartel members) 
were granted admission to the cartel, and undesirable shippers (de-
fined as those who would act competitively) were greeted with a price 
war.155  The losses incurred during the predatory period were rational-
 
151 See id. (“More than that, it is now the consensus view in modern economics that 
predatory pricing can be a successful and fully rational business strategy.”). 
152 See id. (“The courts, however, have failed to incorporate the modern writing into 
judicial decisions, relying instead on earlier theory that is no longer generally accepted.”). 
153 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 597 (1986).   
154 See Joel M. Podolny & Fiona M. Scott Morton, Social Status, Entry and Predation:  
The Case of British Shipping Cartels 1879–1929, 47 J. INDUS. ECON. 41, 42 (1999) (“A new 
entrant on the route governed by the cartel presented these prominent individuals 
with a decision:  should this new entrant’s owner be admitted into their ‘club’?  Alter-
natively, should they engage in predatory behavior to exclude the entrant’s owner 
from their ranks?”).  
155 See Leslie, supra note 111, at 599 (linking the desirability of shippers as cartel 
entrants to their perceived trustworthiness).  Whether or not this price was below 
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ly incurred because the cartel members had more to lose in the long 
run if an uncooperative shipper got a foothold in the market.156 
Since then, firms in cartels have often collectively used price to 
drive existing competitors from the market, to bring rogue cartel 
members into line, and to deter new competitors from entering the 
market.  For example, the steel cartel of the interwar period used 
price wars to punish firms that charged less than the cartel price.157  
Similarly, when the 1930s tobacco cartel faced competition for lower-
priced cigarettes, the cartel partners responded collectively.158 
More recently, corporate leaders of the international vitamins car-
tel apparently used predatory pricing to force smaller companies to 
follow the cartel’s pricing structure,159 and members of the school-milk 
cartel employed “cutthroat pricing” against any firm (cartel member 
or not) that dared to bid independently in a cartel-rigged auction.160  
In short, the historical record is replete with examples of cartels using 
price wars to discipline rogue members.161  Cartel members are thus 
often willing to endure a short-term reduction in price because they 
believe that it will create a stable cartel in the long run. 
Perhaps even more relevant for exposing the problems with the 
Matsushita holding are instances in which Japanese firms have en-
gaged in collective predatory pricing in the American marketplace 
with success, as seen in the market for digital random access memory 
(DRAM). 
 
“some appropriate measure of cost” is beside the point; the cartel members forewent 
profits as a group and recouped them collectively through cartel pricing—precisely the 
conduct that the Matsushita Court asserted was implausible.   
156 See Podolny & Scott Morton, supra note 154, at 50 (“The cartel is more willing 
to wage a price war because it has more to lose if the entrant is uncooperative.”).   
157 See FRITZ MACHLUP, THE BASING-POINT SYSTEM:  AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF A 
CONTROVERSIAL PRICING PRACTICE 131 (1949); see also STOCKING & WATKINS, supra 
note 113, at 190 (“To fight outside competition, the committee could authorize sales 
in any area ‘at prices appreciably below normal prices.’”); Jonathan B. Baker, Identify-
ing Cartel Policing Under Uncertainty:  The U.S. Steel Industry, 1933–1939, 32 J.L. & ECON. 
S47, S49 (1989) (“Collusive prices punctuated by competitive episodes have been 
noted . . . in some international cartels during the 1920s and 1930s.”). 
158 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 803-04 (1946) (explaining 
the government’s argument that cartelists purchased cheap tobacco to drive up costs 
of lower-priced competitors). 
159 See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 314. 
160 Robert F. Lanzillotti, The Great School Milk Conspiracies of the 1980s, 11 REV. IN-
DUS. ORG. 413, 429 (1996). 
161 See Leslie, supra note 111, at 548, 552, 559-60, 599 (providing examples from 
the steel, shipping, and lysine cartels). 
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In the well-publicized semiconductor trade dispute between Japan and 
the United States, evidence revealed in the antidumping investigations 
indicated that the Japanese had conducted campaigns of “regular long-
term pricing below the cost of production . . . for [very] extended pe-
riods of time.  It is doubtful that DRAMs have ever been sold above the 
cost of production.”
162
 
Japanese firms appear more willing to focus on “[s]trategic considera-
tions [that make] the long-term buying of market share economically 
feasible.”163  For example, such transoceanic predatory pricing can be 
highly rational if the foreign producers are trying to achieve “scale 
economies in production (which can occur irrespective of compara-
tive advantage), cumulative experience conferred on first movers, and 
the advantages of innovation. . . . [Certain] industries may generate 
important spillover effects in the rest of the domestic economy, par-
ticularly in the area of improved technology.”164  For firms organized 
under the auspices of Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and In-
dustry—as the defendants in Matsushita were—these are rational 
goals, independent of any desire to maximize short-term profits of in-
dividual firms on particular products. 
The DRAM situation was not an isolated example.  In a statement 
to a congressional committee addressing antitrust issues, the former 
counselor for Japan Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce testified that 
[t]he thrust of Japanese industrial activity in virtually all areas is to build 
up initially on the home market, keeping the home market closed, and 
then to go into international markets, usually utilizing some kind of 
dumping or predatory pricing method and very often the terms of that 
competition involve collusion which under U.S. law would be illegal.
165
 
In short, we know that some Japanese firms have in fact engaged in 
the very conduct that the Matsushita Court said they would never 
agree to engage in because it makes no economic sense.  This suggests 
that federal judges are not particularly adept at assessing the plausibil-
ity of potential business ventures. 
 
162 Benz, supra note 149, at 714 (alteration added to correct Benz’s mistake in in-
ternal quotation) (quoting A. Paul Victor et al., The Interface of Trade Competition Law 
and Policy:  Questions and Answers, 56 ANTITRUST L.J. 457, 458 (1987) (statement of Gil-
bert B. Kaplan)). 
163 Id.  
164 Harry First, Structural Antitrust Rules and International Competition:  The Case of 
Distressed Industries, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1054, 1067 (1987). 
165 Oversight and Authorization of the Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice:  
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Economic and Commercial Law of the H. Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 101st Cong. 27 (1989) (statement of Clyde V. Prestowitz, Jr., former Counselor 
for Japan Affairs to the Secretary of Commerce). 
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C.  Judges Do Not Appreciate Business Objectives 
Rationality is a function of the actor’s goals.166  Judges may not be 
able to evaluate the rationality of many business decisions because 
judges often do not appreciate corporate goals beyond profit maximi-
zation.  While courts generally assume that firms are interested only in 
profit maximization,167 that is not necessarily the case.  Corporations 
and their employees may pursue other objectives as well.  When this 
occurs, observers looking solely for evidence of profit maximization in 
a firm’s behavior may incorrectly conclude that an antitrust plaintiff’s 
allegations of anticompetitive conduct are implausible. 
One obstacle to evaluating the rationality of business conduct is 
that firms have multiple actors, who may be pursuing diverse, and pos-
sibly inconsistent, objectives.  Much rational actor analysis, including 
that found in judicial opinions, treats a business entity as a monolith 
with a single goal.  But corporate structures are composed of individ-
uals, some of whom may have goals separate from those of the share-
holders.168  Corporate managers may pursue goals beyond mere profit 
maximization.  Depending on market structure, compensation 
schemes, and the value of bragging rights, managers may aspire to in-
crease sales and sales revenue even at the expense of the firm’s profit-
maximizing ability.169  Managers may even pursue psychological re-
 
166 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.3, at 15 (7th ed. 2007) 
(“Rationality means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose . . . an apt 
means to whatever ends the chooser happens to have selected . . . .”). 
167 See supra Part I. 
168 See T. BURKE, A. GENN-BASH & B. HAINES, COMPETITION IN THEORY AND PRAC-
TICE 97 (1988) (noting “strong evidence that goals other than profit maximisation are 
pursued in manager-controlled organisations”); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE 
AND AMERICAN LAW 1836–1937, at 357 (1991) (“[T]he interest of managers and the 
interest of stockholders are not always the same.  As a result, the corporation may not 
behave as the theory of competition suggests it should.”); MICHAEL E. PORTER, COM-
PETITIVE STRATEGY 51 (1980) (“Diagnosis of goals should also be at multiple manage-
ment levels.  There are corporate-wide goals, business unit goals, and even goals that 
can be deduced for individual functional areas and key managers.”). 
169 See Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 515, 550-52, 550 n.139 (1985) (explaining that management decisions may be 
beneficial to management but not to the firm); Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., Continuities 
and Discontinuities in Antitrust:  The Early 1980’s, 1982 ANTITRUST CONF. 12 (statement 
of Ira M. Millstein) (“[T]here are a multitude of managerial goals being pressed for, 
some of which transcend or stretch profit maximization.  For example, market-share 
enhancement, or sales maximization, has been recognized as one possible manage-
ment objective in our economy and the pursuit of such objectives could lead to con-
duct (such as the adoption of vertical restraints) unrelated to strict profit maximiza-
tion.”); Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor:  A Simple 
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wards unrelated to the corporation’s balance sheet.170  Thus, “popular 
business literature recognizes the heterogeneity and emotionality of 
employees’ behavior, which is not driven solely by corporate impera-
tives but also by the employees’ own values.”171  A manager’s pursuit of 
goals other than profit maximization may reflect agency costs, but that 
does not render the manager’s conduct irrational or make it implaus-
ible that such conduct has occurred. 
In addition, business objectives can vary across different cultures, 
which can make rationality analysis more complicated in transnational 
contexts.  The Supreme Court, however, has generally viewed rational-
ity from a strictly American perspective.  In particular, the Matsushita 
majority assumed, without any evidence about the patterns and prac-
tices of Japanese multinational corporations, that Japanese firms make 
their exporting and pricing decisions based solely “on their profit ex-
pectations.”172  The Justices assumed that the primary goal of all firms 
is to increase profitability, that is, to maximize the return on invest-
ment.173  Judges sometimes fail to consider that foreign firms may op-
erate in business cultures that value other goals above (or as highly as) 
profit maximization.  Most notably, Japanese firms may often care 
more about growth and market share than return on investment: 
The single overriding characteristic of [ Japanese corporations] is their 
unrelenting focus on competitive position.  They constantly search for 
growth, driven by the economics of relatively high fixed costs and the 
dynamics of their system of labor relations.  The result is a preoccupa-
tion with market share and competitive position in contrast to the West-
ern firm’s return on investment objective.  Leading market share will 
provide high margins in time, which in turn makes possible investment 
in still another growth area, and still another drive for leading share. . . . 
Perhaps, then, the single most important lesson to be learned from the 
study of [ Japanese corporations] is in terms of corporate objectives and 
 
Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727, 769 (2004) (noting the role that 
goals other than profit maximization play in management decisions). 
170 See Frank, supra note 90, at 24 (discussing the relationship between consump-
tion and psychological pleasure or pain and arguing that the emotional response may 
provide more direct motivation). 
171 Stucke, supra note 13, at 533. 
172 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 582 n.6 
(1986). 
173 The Matsushita Court defined rationality solely in terms of profitability.  See id. at 
588-89 (“For the investment to be rational, the conspirators must have a reasonable expec-
tation of recovering, in the form of later monopoly profits, more than the losses suffered.”). 
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corporate planning. . . . World [market] share is the measure of corpo-
rate stability and success.
174
 
Survey data supports the conclusion that many Japanese firms em-
phasize growth over profits.  One study released by the Japanese gov-
ernment in the 1980s revealed that “Japanese executives ranked market 
share as their most important corporate objective, followed by return 
on investment and the refreshment of the product portfolio.”175  
Another study of Japanese business culture concluded that although “it 
is extremely important that the Japanese company should make a prof-
it . . . high profitability, a large return on assets or capital employed, is 
unlikely to be a very important goal.”176  The Matsushita Court never 
mentioned that American and non-American firms may perceive the 
world differently and certainly did not take that fact into account in eva-
luating the plausibility of the Japanese firms’ alleged conduct. 
In short, courts may not appreciate the range of objectives that anti-
trust defendants or firms generally pursue.  As a result, judges may not 
accurately evaluate the rationality and plausibility of alleged conduct in 
many contexts.  Matsushita’s “no rational economic motive to conspire” 
test is fraught with peril and prone to mistakes if courts incorrectly con-
clude that a firm’s alleged conduct makes no sense because judges do 
not appreciate the firm’s (or its managers’) true ambitions. 
D.  Judges Fail to Appreciate How Behaving Irrationally Can Be Rational 
Courts assume that predatory pricing is irrational and that there-
fore firms do not pursue this strategy.177  But such reasoning is often 
too facile.  Simply because the threat to engage in predatory pricing 
seems to be irrational for the threatening firm does not mean that it is 
not a plausible long-term business strategy.  A better understanding of 
game theory—and of how dominant firms actually employ threats 
against rivals—should persuade judges that it is sometimes rational to 
convince a competitor that you are irrational. 
 
174 JAMES C. ABEGGLEN & GEORGE STALK, JR., KAISHA, THE JAPANESE CORPORATION 
276-77 (1985). 
175 Benz, supra note 149, at 708 n.55. 
176 RODNEY CLARK, THE JAPANESE COMPANY 136 (1979). 
177 See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1196 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Matsushita . . . created a legal presumption, based on economic logic, that predatory 
pricing is unlikely to threaten competition.”); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion Spark 
Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1255 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The [Matsushita] Court [held] that the 
economic disincentives to predatory pricing often will justify a presumption that an 
allegation of such behavior is implausible.”). 
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The game of Chicken is instructive.  A competitive market does not 
resemble a game of Chicken.  Rather, competition is like NASCAR—
race-car drivers sharing the track and all moving in the same direction, 
each attempting to outrun the other.  Each driver’s goal is not to van-
quish the other drivers from the track but merely to post a better time.  
In contrast, monopolization is more like the game of Chicken because 
the last car on the road is the winner.178  A would-be monopolist is not 
interested in merely outperforming her rivals (for example, through 
higher profits or larger market share); she wants to eradicate them 
from the race entirely.179  She is thus more willing to aim her car directly 
at a competitor’s front bumper and hit the gas—a strategy that is 
frowned upon in NASCAR.  In competition, with all cars traveling in the 
same direction, it probably does not make sense to be irrational.  How-
ever, if the goal is to be the only car remaining on the road at the end 
of the day, then a prominent display of irrational behavior may make 
sense. 
Some observers argue that given the dangerous nature of the game, 
rational firms would never initiate a game of Chicken—i.e., engage in 
costly predatory conduct.  But such thinking ignores the in terrorem 
effect that a willingness to play Chicken has on the market.  It is true 
that most rational firms would rather not play Chicken, but this fact 
works to the predator’s advantage.  It is impossible to avoid the game if 
a would-be monopolist declares a price war with below-cost pricing.  A 
dominant player can unilaterally force a game of Chicken on its com-
petitors by saying, “It’s you or me.  I’m going to reduce my price until 
one of us is forced from the market.”  The only way to avoid the game is 
to not enter markets with firms that are likely to play Chicken, which is 
exactly what Chicken-playing monopolists want. 
Commentators and a majority of the Supreme Court assert that the 
threat to play Chicken is not credible because predatory pricing is too 
costly.  They argue that if the target of predation does not exit the mar-
ket quickly, predatory pricing will take time and rack up losses that 
cannot be recouped, which makes predatory pricing not profit max-
 
178 It is more accurate perhaps to describe the marketplace in this scenario as a 
demolition derby that transitions to a traditional game of Chicken when only two play-
ers remain. 
179 Chicken is not a game that most rational drivers would choose to play.  There is a 
risk of humiliation and death that is not sufficiently offset by the value of victory (which 
merely consists of bragging rights for humiliating the other player by showing her to be 
“chicken”).  The potential gains from winning the game of Chicken in the marketplace, 
however, are significantly greater.  If one firm can repeatedly play and win high-stakes 
games of Chicken with its competitors, it can secure monopoly profits. 
LESLIE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:35 PM 
2010] Rationality Analysis in Antitrust 297 
imizing.  Many theorists assume that a dominant firm would not follow 
through on a predatory pricing threat because doing so would cause it 
to lose money overall.180  They argue that once the target of a predation 
threat realizes this, it will stay in the market, and because the predator is 
aware of the target’s calculus, the predator will not actually engage in 
(or even threaten) predatory pricing.181  Because predatory pricing is 
irrational, according to this theory, any threat to pursue a sustained 
strategy of predatory pricing is not credible, and any allegation that a 
competitor has engaged in predatory pricing is not plausible. 
The skeptics of predatory pricing are correct to argue that credi-
bility is critical.  In the game of Chicken, if one driver’s pledge not to 
swerve is not credible, the other driver will be less likely to swerve, be-
lieving that she can win the war of wills.  In contrast, if a driver’s prom-
ise to stay the course is believed, the other driver must choose be-
tween swerving and dying.  The former is the best choice, though it 
means she will lose the game. 
1.  Creating Credibility Through Facially Irrational Conduct 
Because credibility is key, it is important to understand why the 
threat to engage in predatory pricing can be credible.  Early theorists 
assumed that any target of predatory pricing would know with certain-
ty that a predator would lose money by following a predatory strate-
gy.182  Some commentators assumed that if a potential new entrant 
called the incumbent’s bluff to price below cost by entering the mar-
ket, the incumbent would not follow through on the threat because “it 
would be irrational for the incumbent to engage in predation.”183  
 
180 See, e.g., M. Steven Wagle, Predatory Pricing, a Case Study:  Matsushita Electric In-
dustries Co. v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 89, 129 (1988) (“[A] 
rational incumbent will conclude that a duopoly share of the market is more desirable 
than following a predatory strategy.”). 
181 Commentators have argued that 
[b]y backward induction at each stage, predation does not pay.  At each stage 
an entrant knows that if it enters and is preyed on it would have been better 
not to enter.  But this expectation is offset by the potential prey’s also knowing 
that with actual entry the incumbent is better off not to predate.  Thus it is ra-
tional throughout the history of the market for the incumbent not to predate 
and for the potential prey to enter. 
R. Marc Isaac & Vernon L. Smith, In Search of Predatory Pricing, 93 J. POL. ECON. 320, 
342 (1985). 
182 See Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 97, at 40-41 (1985). 
183 Wagle, supra note 180, at 109.  The author proceeds to note that reputational 
effects from predation could deter entry.  Id.  
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Such reasoning misses the overarching premise of much predatory 
conduct:  behaving “irrationally” makes the threat credible.  Even if a 
potential entrant is not deterred by the threat, the predator should 
follow through on its threat because that will make any future threats 
much more credible. 
The threat to follow through on predatory pricing can be credible 
because of reputational effects.  One of the key assets that a business 
has is its reputation.  Most firms try to establish positive reputations for 
manufacturing superior products and providing excellent customer 
support, as well as reputations for trustworthiness and being good busi-
ness partners.  But some firms actively hone reputations for being overly 
aggressive against competitors.  Thus, dominant firms with intellectual 
property rights sometimes pursue weak lawsuits, viewing even a losing 
suit “as a profitable investment in that reputation.”184  After it has ac-
quired a reputation for suing competitors, a dominant firm no longer 
needs to litigate as much; it can rely on its reputation as an aggressive 
litigator to deter rivals even if those rivals do not believe that they are 
infringing the dominant firm’s intellectual property rights.185 
In the context of predatory pricing, a dominant firm may employ 
predatory pricing to purchase a reputation for aggression.  Any losses 
suffered in the short term reflect the purchase price of acquiring the 
reputation.  Theorists who argue that predatory pricing cannot occur 
because it is irrational assert that predatory pricing costs the dominant 
firm much more than it costs the excluded rivals because the firm en-
gaging in predatory pricing is taking a loss over a greater number of 
products (since it has a large market share that it is trying to make 
larger) than its smaller competitors.  However, the firm engaging in 
predatory pricing only has to take this loss of profits until it establishes 
sufficient credibility that its threats to engage in predatory pricing will 
deter firms from entering the market.  It is rational for a firm to en-
gage in predatory pricing and take a disproportionately greater loss 
than the firms that it is targeting so long as the firm believes that it will 
be able to recoup these profits once it establishes a credible reputa-
tion as a predator. 
If a dominant firm can drive one challenger from the market—
even at high cost—that success can deter future challengers from en-
 
184 Michael J. Meurer, Controlling Opportunistic and Anti-Competitive Intellectual Prop-
erty Litigation, 44 B.C. L. REV. 509, 515 (2003). 
185 See id. at 518 n.59 (“The reputation for being tough makes [a] frivolous claim 
more credible and more valuable.”); see also Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive 
Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 116-17 (2006). 
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tering the market.  For example, the dominant cable company in Sac-
ramento engaged in predatory pricing to repel two upstarts that 
sought to enter its market.186  Although the predation cost the firm $1 
million in losses, it saved over $16 million by precluding the conver-
sion of its monopolized market into a competitive one.187  Predatory 
pricing threats are more likely to be credible if similar threats have ac-
tually been carried out in the past.  This credibility in turn translates 
into deterrence:  “If potential entrants recognize that predatory pric-
ing has caused the current rival’s exit, fear of facing a similar fate may 
deter their entry.”188  With the market to itself, the surviving firm can 
charge a supracompetitive price while deterring both reentry by the 
previously exiting competitor as well as entry by other firms that are 
considering competing in that market. 
Theorists who claim that predatory pricing is inherently irrational 
generally fail to examine the big picture.  The first time that the pre-
datory pricing threat is carried out may not be net profitable for the 
predator in the short term.  For example, the cost that the dominant 
firm incurs may not be quickly recouped.  But that one episode is not 
the sum total of the strategy.  “Even if ‘irrational’ when considered in 
isolation, such conduct may create a reputation for aggressive re-
sponse that discourages any other competitors from initiating action.  
The value of that reputation justifies the expenditure in the initially 
targeted market.”189  The recoupment will come as the dominant firm 
does not have to carry out the threat in the future.  Merely making the 
threat should suffice going forward, as potential entrants will have 
greater confidence that the dominant firm will carry out even facially 
unprofitable (read:  irrational) threats.  Even if the predator must re-
peatedly prey upon its competitors in order to purchase its reputation 
for aggression, the investment can pay off in the long run, once rivals 
come to believe that threats will be acted upon.190  Ultimately, 
[t]he predator establishes a reputation for aggressive conduct in the 
demonstration market that induces potential entrants to believe it will 
price aggressively in the future when faced with new competition.  In this 
 
186 See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2297-98. 
187 See id. at 2298. 
188 Id. at 2302. 
189 John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White, Horizontal Practices:  The Economic and 
Legal Context, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION, supra note 99, at 211.   
190 See Rapp, supra note 145, at 602 (“Under these conditions repeated predatory 
episodes pay off in total even though the defeat of a single rival in any one of them 
would cost the predator more than it would return in extra profits.”). 
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manner, reputation effect serves as a barrier to entry, allowing the pre-
dator to increase prices in the recoupment market.
191
 
In sum, knowing that a predator needs to hone its reputation for 
aggression, the rational target of predation should realize that an in-
cumbent might willingly incur the costs of apparently irrational preda-
tory pricing.  Decisions that appear “irrational” in the short term can 
lead to credible threats in the long run.  It is hard to measure the re-
turn on investments in developing a reputation for predation,192 but 
some firms do invest in their reputations and they are rewarded for 
their efforts by rivals declining to compete.193  Over the long run, ap-
parently irrational moves become rational. 
2.  Facially Irrational Conduct Can Deter Funding for Rivals 
The difference between successful entry into a market and merely 
sitting on the sidelines is often a function of access to venture capital.  
No matter how good a firm’s new product is, and no matter how great 
its ambition, an absence of capital can doom a new start-up to failure.  
Venture capitalists do not award money to start-ups based solely on 
the intrinsic merits of the new product.  Rather, they evaluate the 
marketplace in which that product will be sold.  In particular, venture 
capitalists must predict the likely response of current market players 
to the entry of a new competitor into the market.  If venture capitalists 
believe that the existing market participants (whether a dominant 
firm or a group of current sellers) will render any new entry unprofit-
able through predatory pricing, then the venture capitalists will most 
likely not fund the start-up.194  They will find another new firm that 
seeks to compete in a less hostile market.  Even if a venture capitalist is 
willing to lend funds, she may require the new entrant to pay a pre-
mium that reflects the increased risk of entering a market with an un-
predictable (or predictably aggressive) dominant player.  If so, this 
 
191 Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2300-01. 
192 See Lawrence J. White, Antitrust Activities During the Clinton Administration, in 
HIGH-STAKES ANTITRUST 27 n.49 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 2003). 
193 See infra subsection III.D.4.  
194 See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2301 (“[Predatory pricing] 
may discourage financiers from backing either existing or future rivals—or otherwise 
discourage entry based on the belief that such conduct will be repeated in the future.  
The incumbent’s predatory reputation can then serve as an exclusionary mechanism 
protecting monopoly profits.” (footnote omitted)). 
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differential access to capital on equal terms significantly handicaps the 
start-up’s ability to enter the market profitably.195 
A historical example illustrates the point.  In order to monopolize 
the early market for telephone service, the Bell Telephone Company 
used predatory tactics to dissuade lenders from funding its rivals.  
Faced with strong competition in Madison, Wisconsin, Bell engaged in 
below-cost pricing over a thirteen-year period, which made it signifi-
cantly more difficult for its rivals to secure the financing necessary to 
expand service and construct a competing network.196  While Bell en-
gaged in other predatory acts as well, “economic studies generally 
agree that the predatory pricing was a significant cause of the wide-
spread exclusion of the independent telephone companies from 
Bell’s markets.”197 
Venture capitalists are much less likely to fund a new firm that 
seeks to compete against a dominant firm that behaves in a seemingly 
irrational way, including engagement in costly predation.  Whether on 
Main Street or Wall Street, appearing irrational makes people run the 
other way.  This can make appearing irrational a paradoxically ration-
al exclusionary tactic. 
3.  Facially Irrational Behavior as a Barrier to Entry 
Courts generally assume that predation is irrational because com-
petitors will enter the market once the predator charges a supracom-
petitive price in order to recoup its investment in predatory pricing.  
The Supreme Court in Matsushita claimed that monopoly pricing 
“breed[s] quick entry by new competitors eager to share in the excess 
profits.”198  This, of course, presupposes an absence of barriers to en-
 
195 See Kwoka & White, supra note 189, at 211. 
196 See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2308 (citing David Gabel & 
David I. Rosenbaum, Prices, Costs, Externalities and Entrepreneurial Capital:  Lessons from 
Wisconsin, 40 ANTITRUST BULL. 581, 602 (1995)). 
197 Id. at 2309 & n.310 (attributing the elimination of independent telephone ser-
vices in the Midwest to AT&T’s strategic moves, “not least of which was predatory pric-
ing” (quoting David Gabel, Competition in a Network Industry:  The Telephone Industry, 
1894–1910, 54 J. ECON. HIST. 543, 567-68 (1994))); see also id. at 2308 (“The rival’s fi-
nancing difficulties were substantially caused by the low pricing, which severely re-
duced the rival’s return, allowed only a one percent annual dividend, and blocked ad-
ditional financing.  To be sure, other factors impeded the Madison rival, such as the 
refusal of the Bell system to interconnect, but the below-cost pricing was a significant 
and material cause of the Madison rival’s exit.”). 
198 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986). 
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try.  According to the Third Circuit, easy entry eliminates the credibil-
ity of predatory pricing threats: 
 As a matter of economics, ease of entry makes the threat implicit in 
strategic entry deterrence non-credible.  Potential competitors will real-
ize that at some point the predatory firm will be unable or unwilling to 
charge below-cost prices and absorb further losses, since nobody’s pock-
ets are bottomless.  High prices will attract a stream of competitors who 
eventually will sap the predator’s bank account.
199
 
The Brooke Group Court converted similar reasoning into a rule to dis-
pose of predatory pricing cases when it held that “where new entry is 
easy . . . summary disposition of the case is appropriate.”200 
This rule would be acceptable if correctly applied, but federal 
judges may be too quick to conclude that entry is easy because they 
fail to appreciate that apparently irrational predatory behavior is itself 
a barrier to entry.  High price alone may be insufficient to induce 
market entry.  A dominant firm’s excess capacity and its previously ex-
ecuted threats to flood the market can be effective barriers to entry 
even if it is charging a supracompetitive price.  As just discussed, pre-
viously executed “irrational” threats of predation can create a reputa-
tion for aggression that makes other firms reluctant to invest in a 
market where they will be greeted with a loss-inducing price war, and 
prior irrational predation may hamper the financing of new entrants.  
As a result, the so-called irrational predatory conduct can itself reduce 
the “ease of entry” that federal judges take for granted as a reason why 
predation cannot succeed. 
4.  Successful Predation and Other Credible, “Irrational” Threats 
The potential rationality of predatory pricing is empirically dem-
onstrated by the many historical examples of the strategy’s success.  
Dominant air carriers in different markets have employed various 
forms of predatory pricing to drive new carriers from the market and 
to deter would-be rivals.201  Threats of predation in such markets are 
 
199 Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1202 (3d Cir. 1995). 
200 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993). 
201 See Paul Stephen Dempsey, Predatory Practices & Monopolization in the Airline Indus-
try:  A Case Study of Minneapolis/St. Paul, 29 TRANSP. L.J. 129, 164 (2002) (“Any time that a 
low fare carrier attempted to enter Northwest’s monopoly markets, Northwest engaged 
in a predatory response designed to drive the low fare choice from the market, and to 
serve as a painful example to any other potential competitor.”).  While the government’s 
recent predatory pricing case against American Airlines resulted in victory for the defen-
dant, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has cogently explained why American’s strategy 
represented predatory pricing.  See HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 165-66. 
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credible when the dominant carriers have relatively deep pockets and 
actually follow through on their threats whenever a new carrier ig-
nores the case studies of earlier failed entrants.202  Similarly, long be-
fore Liggett brought suit against B&W, American tobacco markets ex-
perienced predatory pricing episodes to bring “rogue” firms into 
line.203  Other historical examples of successful predatory pricing have 
been documented in the markets for matches, cement, shipping, tele-
phony, and sugar.204  These historical success stories can help establish 
the credibility of current predatory threats. 
Furthermore, despite some commentators’ assertions that appar-
ently irrational threats are not credible, threatening irrational conduct 
is a well-trod path to monopoly.  Dominant firms often announce 
threats that would appear to be irrational (i.e., not profit maximizing) if 
they were actually carried out.  For example, when a new radio station 
represented competition for local advertising dollars, the Lorain Jour-
nal, the local newspaper, threatened its own customers:  if they aired 
commercials on the radio station, the Journal would not sell them ad-
vertising space.205  As the newspaper depended on advertising revenue, 
it would have been apparently irrational for the Lorain Journal to carry 
out its threat on any large scale.  But that did not negate the exclusio-
nary effect of the Journal’s policy of intimidation, which helped the 
newspaper maintain a monopoly in the local advertising market. 
More recently, Microsoft maintained its monopoly over operating 
systems by making facially irrational threats.  Concerned that the 
technologies represented in Netscape’s Internet browser and Sun Mi-
crosystems’s Java Virtual Machine could evolve in a manner that would 
undermine Microsoft’s monopoly position, the software giant sought 
to prevent its business partners from assisting these technologies.206  In 
 
202 See Dempsey, supra note 201, at 181 (“Northwest has the financial ability to 
weather a predatory storm longer than a new entrant.”). 
203 See Malcolm R. Burns, Outside Intervention in Monopolistic Price Warfare:  The Case 
of the “Plug War” and the Union Tobacco Company, 56 BUS. HIST. REV. 33, 41-45 (1982) 
(crediting Continental Tobacco Company’s successful predatory pricing scheme with 
enabling it to acquire smaller firms, including those that fought acquisition with their 
own price cuts). 
204 Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2244-45. 
205 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 148-49 (1951). 
206 See Steven C. Salop & R. Craig Romaine, Preserving Monopoly:  Economic Analysis, 
Legal Standards, and Microsoft, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 617, 636 (1999) (documenting 
Microsoft’s practice of making exclusive deals with business partners requiring them to 
carry Internet Explorer instead of Netscape browsers); see also id. at 629 (“Microsoft 
allegedly has tried to replace Sun’s cross-platform compatible Java and supersede it 
with a proprietary version that is not cross-platform compatible.”). 
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particular, Microsoft pressured Intel to reduce support for Java with 
the threat that Microsoft would stop supporting the multimedia fea-
tures of Intel’s new chips.207  Additionally, Microsoft advised Apple 
that Microsoft would cease producing Microsoft Office applications 
for Apple’s Macintosh computers unless Apple adopted a series of  
anti-Netscape policies.208  Both of these policies were irrational in the 
sense that Microsoft threatened actions that would cause Microsoft to 
lose money if carried out.  Despite this, the threats were credible and 
the companies did Microsoft’s bidding, facilitating Microsoft’s main-
tenance of monopoly power over operating systems. 
Finally, even when a monopolist actually carries out so-called irra-
tional threats, the result can be net profitable.  Dentsply International 
maintained a monopoly in the market for prefabricated artificial 
teeth, which are used in various dental appliances manufactured by 
dental laboratories.209  Dentsply distributed its artificial teeth through 
a network of dealers, which represented the most efficient distribution 
method because dental labs—the ultimate consumer—strongly pre-
ferred to purchase from dealers.210  Dentsply repeatedly threatened to 
terminate its lucrative relationship with any dealer who also handled 
the artificial teeth of Dentsply’s rivals.211  Dentsply announced that if a 
dealer purchased any artificial teeth from another source, Dentsply 
would refuse to use that dealer for any Dentsply product.212  The 
threat appeared irrational given Dentsply’s complete dependence on 
dealers and the fact that these dealers wanted to purchase teeth from 
multiple manufacturers.  But Dentsply followed through on its threat 
and terminated dealers who did not submit.213  These loss-inducing 
moves enhanced the credibility of Dentsply’s threats.  While Dentsply 
may have lost revenue by ending particular dealer relationships, most 
other dealers succumbed to the threats and this denied Dentsply’s ri-
vals access to the best distribution method.  The Third Circuit ex-
plained that Dentsply’s threats had “a significant effect in preserving 
 
207 See id. at 640. 
208 See id. at 640 & n.66 (reporting testimony that Microsoft threatened both Apple 
and Intel with reduced support if they refused to support Windows). 
209 United States v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181, 184 (3d Cir. 2005). 
210 Id. at 191-93. 
211 Id. at 190. 
212 See id. (“For example, when the DLDS firm considered adding two other tooth 
lines because of customers’ demand, Dentsply threatened to sever access not only to its 
teeth, but to other dental products as well.”). 
213 See id. at 194 (cataloging instances of dealers acquiescing to Dentsply’s threats 
and practices).  
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Dentsply’s monopoly.  It help[ed] keep sales of competing teeth be-
low the critical level necessary for any rival to pose a real threat to 
Dentsply’s market share.”214  In sum, Dentsply’s apparently irrational 
threats proved both credible and profitable. 
5.  Summary 
Courts, including the Supreme Court, have consistently rejected 
predatory pricing claims because judges, relying in part on early aca-
demic writings, have asserted that the plaintiff’s theory requires the 
jury to conclude that the defendant engaged in irrational conduct, 
and the rationality assumption posits that firms do not behave irra-
tionally.  Such reasoning fails to consider that a demonstrated willing-
ness to sacrifice profits—including but not limited to predatory pric-
ing—can be the cornerstone of a long-term, profit-maximizing 
strategy.  In short, pursuing a facially irrational strategy can deter 
competitors and thereby render the prior conduct rational. 
E.  Judges May Not Appreciate Business Constraints 
Judicial decisions evaluating the economic plausibility of anti-
competitive conduct may also be constrained by a lack of understand-
ing about the processes by which businesses make decisions.  Busi-
nesses must operate under informational constraints, and sometimes 
they make mistakes due to overconfidence. 
1.  Uncertainty 
Courts often misconceive the role of uncertainty in business deci-
sionmaking.  Federal judges often assert that if the outcome of an al-
leged predatory scheme is uncertain, then it is implausible that the 
defendant would have pursued that strategy.  In particular, in reject-
ing predatory pricing claims, courts consistently emphasize the uncer-
tainty of recoupment.  For example, the Matsushita Court stressed that 
“[a] predatory pricing conspiracy is by nature speculative”215 and that 
“the success of such schemes is inherently uncertain:  the short-run 
loss is definite, but the long-run gain depends on successfully neutra-
lizing the competition.”216  Upping the uncertainty quotient, the Brooke 
Group Court asserted that “relying on tacit coordination among oligo-
 
214 Id. at 191. 
215 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588 (1986). 
216 Id. at 589. 
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polists as a means of recouping losses from predatory pricing is highly 
speculative.”217  Following the Court’s lead, lower federal courts now 
equate the uncertainty of success with implausibility of attempt.218 
At times, the Court’s treatment of uncertainty in antitrust cases is 
painfully tautological.  For example, the Matsushita majority opined 
that “[a]bsent some assurance that the hoped-for monopoly will mate-
rialize, and that it can be sustained for a significant period of time, 
‘[t]he predator must make a substantial investment with no assurance 
that it will pay off.’”219  In short, “absent some assurance . . . [firms 
must invest] ‘with no assurance.’”220  That is true, but it is agonizingly 
unhelpful in analyzing the question of how firms will act in situations 
in which they have no assurance of success.  And, as noted earlier, 
firms necessarily make most of their business decisions with limited or 
imperfect information. 
More importantly, the Court’s effort to conflate uncertainty of out-
comes with implausibility of attempt betrays a fundamental misunders-
tanding of how businesses function.  Most business ventures require an 
upfront investment that must be made without any assurance that the 
outlay will be profitable.  No business makes an investment in new 
products, new distribution methods, or other improvements knowing 
for certain that the investment will pay off.  Business is about taking 
risks.  Firms accept uncertainty as an inherent component of the busi-
ness environment.  Cartel members and potential monopolists are no 
different.  All are willing to invest money in the hopes of receiving sub-
stantial returns on their investment.  Businesses willingly accept a level 
of uncertainty, whether launching a newfangled product or committing 
an old-fashioned antitrust violation.  Thus, the uncertainty of success of 
a particular course of conduct should not lead a court to conclude as a 
matter of law that such conduct does not occur.221 
 
217 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 232 
(1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 238 (“Uncertainty is an oligo-
poly’s greatest enemy.”). 
218 See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(“Implausibility of predatory pricing schemes was said to flow from the fact that their 
success is inherently uncertain.” (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 598)). 
219 475 U.S. at 589 (second alteration in original) (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, 
Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 268 (1981)). 
220 Id. (quoting Easterbrook, supra note 219). 
221 While firms may be risk averse in many contexts, they have shown a willingness 
to engage in anticompetitive conduct—even per se illegal conduct—when the prospect 
of monopoly profits is present. 
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2.  Business Confidence 
In denying the existence of certain antitrust conspiracies and pre-
datory schemes, courts also fail to consider the role of overconfidence 
in business decisionmaking.  In the context of monopolization, a domi-
nant firm may mistakenly assume a high probability that its anticompe-
titive action will lead to successful monopolization.  For example, a pre-
dator might be overconfident in its ability to drive competitors from the 
market,222 or it may incorrectly believe that its target does not have the 
stomach to fight a protracted predatory price war.223  A predator may 
not accurately estimate the length of time that the predation will have 
to continue in order to succeed.224  The predator’s miscalculation of the 
target’s resolve does not mean that the attempted predation did not oc-
cur but only that overconfidence caused the predator to underestimate 
the duration and cost of the predatory period. 
In the context of anticompetitive conspiracies, overconfidence 
can explain why an arguably irrational scheme is perceived as rational 
and consequently undertaken.  In finding predatory pricing conspira-
cies to be inherently irrational, the Matsushita Court focused on the 
fact that recoupment would require the conspirators to participate in 
a traditional cartel.225  Because price fixing is illegal, the majority sug-
gested that a recoupment strategy based on price fixing would be irra-
tional.  The Court’s equation of illegality with irrationality, and then 
irrationality with nonoccurrence, is flawed.  First, price-fixing cartels 
exist and thrive throughout the American and international econo-
 
222 A firm that engages in predatory pricing may also simply make a mistake in 
predicting its target’s response.  See Oliver E. Williamson, Predatory Pricing:  A Strategic 
and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284, 286 n.6 (1977) (“Strategic behavior, in the con-
text of predatory pricing, involves not merely prepositioning, which is standard to en-
try barrier analysis, but also contingent responses to entry.”). 
223 See Phillip E. Areeda, Predatory Pricing (1980), 49 ANTITRUST L.J. 897, 903 (1980) 
(“[P]redation occurs, if at all, only because a defendant makes a long-run strategic cal-
culation about the market and rival responses.”). 
224 See Craswell & Fratrik, supra note 97, at 33 (“Factoring such costs into the analy-
sis not only depends on having an accurate measure of those costs, but also depends 
on the firm’s estimate of the length of the price war.”). 
225 The Matsushita Court stated in a footnote that 
[t]he alleged predatory scheme makes sense only if petitioners can recoup 
their losses.  In light of the large number of firms involved here, petitioners 
can achieve this only by engaging in some form of price fixing after they have 
succeeded in driving competitors from the market.  Such price fixing would, 
of course, be an independent violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 
475 U.S. at 592 n.16 (citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940)). 
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mies, despite being illegal.226  Second, price-fixing conspirators often 
display extreme overconfidence in the belief that they will never be 
exposed.227  Exhibiting daring and cheek, businesspeople routinely 
plan long-term business strategies based on continuing and undisco-
vered antitrust violations.228  In the context of price fixing, the fine 
line between overconfidence and audacious profit maximization often 
turns out to be largely a function of whether one gets caught. 
The fact that a firm allegedly pursuing an anticompetitive strategy 
ultimately fails does not mean that the strategy was unattempted.  It 
could simply mean that the firm was overoptimistic about its prospects 
for success, just as DuPont was when it launched Corfam.  Behavioral 
research suggests that the more that a firm values an outcome—e.g., 
monopoly power—the more likely it is that overconfidence will bias 
the decisionmaking process.229  In short, firms bent on monopoliza-
tion or cartelization may make a decision to violate antitrust laws even 
though a federal judge later scrutinizing the same business environ-
ment would not find such behavior plausible or rational.  The fact 
that the judge would make a particular decision in that situation does 
not answer the question of whether the defendant, brimming with 
overconfidence, did in fact violate antitrust laws.230 
F.  The Risk of Judicial Cognitive Bias 
Finally, cognitive biases may undermine judges’ ability to evaluate 
whether a particular anticompetitive scheme was plausible (and at-
tempted) or implausible (and consequently not attempted).  Cogni-
tive biases refer to observed phenomena that interfere with people’s 
perceptions and reduce their ability to accurately process information.  
Scholarship in psychology and related fields has documented a range 
of various cognitive biases, such as the bandwagon effect and status 
quo bias.  This Section highlights two cognitive biases—hindsight bias 
 
226 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in 
Faithless Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621 (2008) (surveying successful cartels and 
considering agency-cost theory as a means of destabilizing them).  
227 See Gilbert Geis, The Heavy Electrical Equipment Antitrust Cases of 1961 (“Like most 
reasonably adept and optimistic criminals, the antitrust violators had hoped to escape 
apprehension. ‘I didn’t expect to get caught[,]’ . . . one of them said.”), in WHITE-
COLLAR CRIMINAL 103, 107 (Gilbert Geis ed., 1968).   
228 See generally Leslie, supra note 111, at 586.  
229 See Tor, supra note 73, at 522. 
230 If an anticompetitive scheme—whether a conspiracy or predation—is ultimate-
ly unprofitable, it may affect liability and damages, but the ultimate failure of an en-
deavor is not dispositive proof that the plan was not executed. 
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and confirmation bias—that appear to afflict judges’ determinations 
of alleged anticompetitive conduct’s plausibility. 
1.  Hindsight Bias 
Judges evaluating the rationality of alleged anticompetitive con-
duct do so in retrospect and therefore run the risk of hindsight bias.  
Hindsight bias describes the fact that people overestimate the ex ante 
probability of an event occurring when they are told what outcome ac-
tually occurred.231  Hindsight bias may affect judges’ ability to evaluate 
whether alleged conspiracies or predation were rational schemes at 
the time that they were conceived and undertaken.  One of the lead-
ers in the study of this bias, Baruch Fischhoff, explained that, 
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been antic-
ipated in foresight.  They not only tend to view what has happened as 
having been inevitable but also to view it as having appeared “relatively 
inevitable” before it happened.  People believe that others should have 
been able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.
232
 
Since his early work, “[v]irtually every study on judging in hindsight 
has concluded that events seem more predictable than they actually 
are.  The research on judging in hindsight, taken as a whole, strongly 
supports Fischhoff’s conclusion that ‘[f]inding out that an outcome 
has occurred increases its perceived likelihood.’”233 
Many experiments illustrate the forms and pervasiveness of hind-
sight bias.  Early experiments by Fischhoff demonstrated how subjects’ 
predictions of probable outcomes were driven in large measure by 
what researchers told each group the actual outcome was.234  Profes-
sors Korobkin and Ulen neatly summarized this research: 
In what is arguably the most famous of the many hindsight bias studies, 
Baruch Fischhoff gave five groups of subjects a passage to read describ-
ing the events leading up to a military confrontation between the British 
army and the Gurkas in Nepal in the nineteenth century and asked 
them, on the basis of that information alone, to specify the likelihood 
that four specified military outcomes would have resulted.  Each of four 
 
231 See Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1095. 
232 Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past:  Heuristics and Biases in 
Hindsight, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY 335, 341 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic 
& Amos Tversky eds., 1982). 
233 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 571, 580 (1998) (footnote omitted) (quoting Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight 
≠ Foresight:  The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOL.:  HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288, 297 (1975)). 
234 Fischhoff, supra note 233, at 297. 
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groups was told that a different outcome of the four specified outcomes 
actually occurred, while the fifth group (the control group) was given no 
information on the actual outcome.  Subjects in each of the groups to 
whom the investigators gave an outcome reported an ex ante prediction 
of that outcome that was considerably higher than the prediction for 
that outcome made by the subjects in the control group.  In other words, 
information about what actually occurred apparently influences our 
judgments concerning what we thought would occur before we knew the 
outcome.  Events that have actually occurred can seem, through the lens 
of hindsight, to have been almost inevitable.
235
 
Hindsight bias has been documented among the educated elite,236 
including doctors237 and politicians.238  Research subjects also show 
significant hindsight bias in business contexts, with subjects molding 
their ex ante predictions of business success or failure to the actual 
outcome they are told occurred.239  Unfortunately, evidence shows that 
judges, too, exhibit hindsight bias.240  Professor Rachlinski reports that 
using experienced judges does not avert hindsight bias,241 and that a 
 
235 Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 8, at 1095-96. 
236 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  The Prob-
lem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999) (stating that biases are 
“not limited to the uneducated or unintelligent”).  
237 See Jolls, Sunstein & Thaler, supra note 11, at 1523 (“[P]hysicians . . . when 
asked to assess the probabilities of alternative diagnoses, given a set of symptoms, offer 
significantly different estimates depending on what they are told the actual diagnosis 
turned out to be.”). 
238 Donald C. Pennington, Being Wise After the Event:  An Investigation of Hindsight 
Bias, 1 CURRENT PSYCHOL. RES. 271, 277 (1981) (finding that outcome knowledge af-
fected subjective likelihood assessments among active political-party members). 
239 See Clifton E. Brown & Ira Solomon, Effects of Outcome Information on Evaluations 
of Managerial Decisions, 62 ACCT. REV. 564, 568-75 (1987) (detailing a study in which 
knowledge of a corporate committee’s decision and the resulting project outcome af-
fected subjects’ assessment of the project-failure probability); Thomas A. Buchman, An 
Effect of Hindsight on Predicting Bankruptcy with Accounting Information, 10 ACCT. ORGS. & 
SOC’Y 267, 274 (1985) (finding that a report of bankruptcy “increased the perceived 
likelihood that it would happen”); Ed Bukszar & Terry Connolly, Hindsight Bias and 
Strategic Choice:  Some Problems in Learning from Experience, 31 ACAD. MGMT. J. 628, 637 
(1988) (finding that MBA students forecasting the success of an investment decision 
were unable, once told, to ignore its results); Terry Connolly & Edward W. Bukszar, 
Hindsight Bias:  Self-Flattery or Cognitive Error?, 3 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 205, 207 
(1990) (outlining a study designed to measure the effects of motivational factors in 
hindsight bias); Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 578 (“[S]ubjects . . . rate the outcome of 
more ordinary events, such as whether a business would be successful, as more predict-
able than they are.”). 
240 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 
(2001) (“Judges, it seems, are human.  Like the rest of us, they use heuristics that can 
produce systematic errors in judgment.” (footnote omitted)). 
241 Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 595. 
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judge may “be unaware of the influence that the hindsight bias has on 
[her] assessment of a party’s ex ante actions.”242 
Hindsight bias can affect litigation.  Most notably, Professors Ka-
min and Rachlinski have demonstrated that if subjects acting as jurors 
are told that a particular event (in their experiment, flood damage) 
did in fact occur, then the jurors are significantly more likely to con-
clude that the defendant was negligent than subjects in a control 
group who are informed that the event did not occur.243  As a result, 
“the defendant’s level of care will seem less reasonable in hindsight 
than it did in foresight.  Reasonableness must be determined from the 
perspective of the defendant at the time that the precautions were 
taken, but the hindsight bias ensures that subsequent events will influ-
ence that determination.”244  In short, the knowledge of subsequent 
events clouds one’s ability to evaluate the wisdom of actions that took 
place before those subsequent events occurred. 
Courts have acknowledged the risk of hindsight bias in nonanti-
trust contexts, including in patent,245 securities,246 and corporate litiga-
tion.  In some ways, the business judgment rule in corporation law is a 
guard against hindsight bias.  Courts defer to the rationality of corpo-
rate decisionmaking through the business judgment rule because they 
recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to eva-
luate corporate business decisions.  The circumstances surrounding a 
corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in a courtroom years lat-
er . . . . [A] reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch 
viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
247
 
 
242 Id. at 601.  
243 Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post ≠ Ex Ante:  Determining Liability in 
Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 98 (1995) (finding that fifty-seven percent of the 
juror subjects who were told the outcome found the defendant liable as compared to 
twenty-four percent of the juror subjects in the control group). 
244 Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 572 (footnote omitted).  
245 See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007) (“A factfinder 
should be aware . . . of the distortion caused by hindsight bias and must be cautious of 
arguments reliant upon ex post reasoning.”); Ellicott Mach. Corp. v. United States, 405 
F.2d 1385, 1390 (Ct. Cl. 1969) (“[H]indsight is often difficult to avoid in determining 
obviousness of inventions . . . .”). 
246 DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 628 (7th Cir. 1990) (asserting that a 
showing of securities fraud requires more than a hindsight-based statement of a firm’s 
changed circumstances); Rachlinski, supra note 233, at 616-18 (explaining that federal 
courts have prohibited the assignment of liability based on hindsight alone). 
247 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982); see also Wash. Bancorporation v. 
Said, 812 F. Supp. 1256, 1267-68 (D.D.C. 1993) (“Courts recognize that even disinte-
rested, well-intentioned, informed directors can make decisions that, in hindsight, 
were improvident.”). 
LESLIE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:35 PM 
312 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 261 
In short, many legal rules are designed to minimize the prospect of 
hindsight bias. 
Despite their general awareness of hindsight bias, courts to date 
have failed to recognize the risk of hindsight bias when determining 
whether a firm’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct was plausible.  As a 
result, judges may fall victim to hindsight bias by failing to recognize 
that alleged anticompetitive behavior may have been rational at its 
conception even though it failed when implemented.  To determine 
whether or not multiple defendants conspired in violation of section 1 
of the Sherman Act or whether a single defendant violated section 2, 
courts routinely employ a backward-looking “rationality analysis” of 
the alleged conduct.  When the plaintiff’s theory is based on a preda-
tory scheme that ultimately fails, federal judges appear susceptible to 
concluding that the failure of the alleged scheme demonstrates that 
the scheme must never have existed.  Some judges employ the follow-
ing logic:  “If the alleged conspiracy existed, it has failed.  The reason-
able person (or firm) would have realized at the outset that such a 
conspiracy would have failed and thus would not have entered into 
such a conspiracy.  Therefore, there was no conspiracy.”  For example, 
in Matsushita, the Court held that Japanese electronics makers could 
not have conspired to engage in predatory pricing in an attempt to 
drive the American manufacturers from the U.S. market because the 
alleged predation had been going on for twenty years and still had not 
vanquished all of the American firms.248  The Matsushita majority con-
cluded as follows:  “The alleged conspiracy’s failure to achieve its ends 
in the two decades of its asserted operation is strong evidence that the 
conspiracy does not in fact exist.”249 
 
248 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 (1986); 
Jessica L. Goldstein, Note, Single Firm Predatory Pricing in Antitrust Law:  The Rose Acre 
Recoupment Test and the Search for an Appropriate Judicial Standard, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1757, 1767 (1991) (“Because the defendant Japanese firms had failed to achieve mo-
nopoly power even two decades after the commencement of the alleged conspiracy, 
the Court concluded that the conspiracy did not exist.”). 
249 475 U.S. at 592; see also Randolph Sherman, The Matsushita Case:  Tightened Con-
cepts of Conspiracy and Predation?, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 1121, 1131 (1987) (“The failure of 
the alleged conspiracy to come any closer to its objective after so long a period was 
viewed by Justice Powell as ‘strong evidence’ that no conspiracy ever existed.”).  The 
Court attached incorrect significance to the twenty-year time frame when it asserted 
that “because the alleged losses have accrued over the course of two decades, the con-
spirators could well require a correspondingly long time to recoup.”  475 U.S. at 592.  
If the predatory price were five percent below the competitive price and the cartel sub-
sequently successfully charged a price thirty percent above the otherwise prevailing 
market price, twenty years of predatory losses could be recouped in a few years. 
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The Court engaged in Monday-morning quarterbacking.  Falling 
victim to hindsight bias, the majority seemed unaware of the possibili-
ty that a conspiracy existed but had failed.  Furthermore, Justice Pow-
ell’s reasoning assumes that the Japanese manufacturers planned to in-
cur twenty years’ worth of losses in the American market before they 
could begin recoupment.  In Kodak, the Court described the irratio-
nality of the alleged conspiracy in Matsushita by asserting that “the de-
fendants had every incentive not to engage in the alleged conduct 
which required them to sustain losses for decades with no foreseeable prof-
its,” and thus the Matsushita Court properly “found an ‘absence of any 
rational motive to conspire.’”250  Such reasoning bears the hallmarks of 
classic hindsight bias.  If a predatory pricing conspiracy did exist, it is 
possible that the Japanese firms initially predicted that they could 
corner the U.S. market in far less time, incurring far fewer losses.  
That this prediction proved false does not mean that an initial agree-
ment to engage in predatory pricing was irrational, let alone that such 
a conspiracy did not exist as a matter of law.  Ultimately, the Supreme 
Court never considered the ex ante position of the alleged conspira-
tors.  Moreover, the Court’s characterization that the conspiracy re-
quired sustained losses smacks of hindsight bias.  The conspirators—if 
a conspiracy did in fact exist—may have expected to succeed much 
sooner.  Yet the Court knew at the time of the litigation that the con-
spiracy had failed to achieve its goals after twenty years, which colored 
the Court’s view of the inevitability of that failure and consequently 
the implausibility of the conspiracy from the outset. 
In sum, the risk of hindsight bias presents another reason why 
federal judges should not be in the business of determining whether 
alleged anticompetitive conduct is plausible as a matter of law.  The 
rationality of a business strategy should be determined ex ante.  But 
judges—and certainly a majority of Justices in Matsushita—do not 
(and perhaps cannot) analyze rationality ex ante but instead employ 
ex post reasoning.  Corporate decisionmakers may undertake projects 
that seem irrational in hindsight but appeared potentially profit max-
imizing when the firm made the decision.  After the fact, judges may 
not be particularly good arbiters of what constitutes rational ex ante 
business decisionmaking. 
 
250 Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 468 (1992) 
(emphasis added) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 597). 
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2.  Confirmation Bias 
Judges may also fall victim to confirmation bias.  Confirmation bi-
as is a cognitive bias that limits people’s ability to dispassionately find 
and interpret evidence.  When affected by confirmation bias, people 
seek out evidence that confirms their prior beliefs251 and assign more 
weight to such evidence.252  More importantly, confirmation bias caus-
es people “to miss or irrationally undervalue disconfirming informa-
tion.”253  As a result, confirmation bias undermines an observer’s neu-
tral processing of information in a dispute.254 
Confirmation bias is well documented.255  Empirical research sug-
gests “that people are incapable of evaluating the strength of evidence 
independent of their prior beliefs.”256  Studies have found confirma-
tion bias in trained scientists,257 doctors,258 and prosecutors.259  The bias 
 
251 See, e.g., SCOTT PLOUS, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 
233 (1993) (“[Confirmation bias] usually refers to a preference for information that is 
consistent with a hypothesis rather than information which opposes it.”); ARTHUR S. 
REBER, THE PENGUIN DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGY 151 (2d ed. 1995) (defining confir-
mation bias as “[t]he tendency to seek and interpret information that confirms exist-
ing beliefs”). 
252 See Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 STAN. L. REV. 115, 121 n.26 
(2007) (“[C]onfirmation bias . . . refers to the tendency of persons to seek out and as-
sign more weight to evidence that confirms a prior belief or hypothesis than to evi-
dence disconfirming it.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Simon Stern, Construc-
tive Knowledge, Probable Cause, and Administrative Decisionmaking, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1085, 1121 (2007) (“Confirmation bias leads people to accentuate the positive thrust 
of evidence that accords with their expectations or desires, and to minimize the thrust 
of evidence to the contrary.”). 
253 Keith A. Findley & Michael S. Scott, The Multiple Dimensions of Tunnel Vision in 
Criminal Cases, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 291, 309; see also id. at 313 (“Indeed, studies show that, 
in some circumstances, people do not respond to information at variance with their 
beliefs by simply ignoring it, but rather by working hard to examine it critically so as to 
undermine it.”); Michael A. McCann, It’s Not About the Money:  The Role of Preferences, 
Cognitive Biases, and Heuristics Among Professional Athletes, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1459, 1460 
(2006) (“[B]ecause of confirmation bias, individuals are subject to ignore or discount 
information that challenges existing beliefs.”). 
254 See Robert Prentice, Enron:  A Brief Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 417, 424 
(2003) (“[P]eople tend to be subject to the confirmation bias in that they seek out and 
process information in such a way as to confirm preexisting beliefs rather than in a 
more optimally neutral manner.”). 
255 See generally Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias:  A Ubiquitous Phenomenon 
in Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 175 (1998) (presenting and analyzing examples 
of confirmation bias in various contexts). 
256 Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making:  Some Lessons of Cognitive 
Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587, 1596 (2006). 
257 See Prentice, supra note 254, at 424 n.29 (“Because of the confirmation bias, 
even trained scientists tend to find articles that agree with their positions to be of 
higher quality than articles that disagree with their positions.” (citing Jonathan J. 
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is driven in part by people’s “desire to have their own beliefs con-
firmed.”260  Confirmation bias is not solely driven by the observer hav-
ing a financial or other personal stake in the outcome of the debate, 
as studies have found that people exhibit confirmation bias “even 
when they have no vested interest in those hypotheses.”261 
In theory, legal standards should provide a bulwark against con-
firmation bias.  In reviewing a defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, the district court judge is not to weigh the evidence presented 
by both sides but only to determine whether the plaintiff has pre-
sented enough evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact.  
For example, the Matsushita opinion defined its task as reviewing “only 
the standard applied by the Court of Appeals in deciding this case, 
and not the weight assigned to particular pieces of evidence.”262  In re-
viewing a defendant’s motion for judgment notwithstanding a jury 
verdict for the plaintiff, the court is to interpret all of the evidence in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.263 
However, the Matsushita decision invites federal judges to weigh 
the evidence and to do so in a manner that favors antitrust defen-
dants.  At the outset, the Matsushita Court encouraged judges to re-
flect on the likelihood of the plaintiffs’ antitrust allegations and indi-
cated that “if the factual context renders [plaintiffs’] claim 
implausible—if the claim is one that simply makes no economic 
sense—[plaintiffs] must come forward with more persuasive evidence 
to support their claim than would otherwise be necessary.”264  The 
 
Koehler, The Influence of Prior Beliefs on Scientific Judgments of Evidence Quality, 56 ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 28, 47 (1993))); Lisa J. Steele, Trying 
Cases of Mistaken Identity:  Advice to Connecticut Counsel Following State v. Ledbetter, 25 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 799, 814 (2007) (“Confirmation bias has caused famous scientists 
to fail to report easily-visible phenomena that don’t fit their expectations and to ob-
serve non-existent phenomena.” (footnote omitted)). 
258 See Nickerson, supra note 255, at 192-93 (examining the effect of diagnosticians 
formulating a small set of hypotheses early in the diagnostic process). 
259 Findley & Scott, supra note 253, at 315 (“[E]ven when presented with DNA evi-
dence proving that semen taken from a sexual assault victim could not have come from 
the defendant, prosecutors sometimes persist in their guilt judgments and resist relief 
for the defendant.” (citing Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal:  Prosecutorial Resistance to 
Post-Conviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 129 (2004))). 
260 Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should Judges Care?, 
60 STAN. L. REV. 155, 176 n.67 (2007). 
261 Findley & Scott, supra note 253, at 311. 
262 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 577 (1986). 
263 See, e.g., Fineman v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 980 F.2d 171, 194 (3d Cir. 
1992). 
264 475 U.S. at 587. 
LESLIE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:35 PM 
316 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 261 
opinion essentially instructs judges to utilize their own conceptions of 
business rationality as a lens through which to view the evidence that 
supports a plaintiff’s case.  Judge Posner has opined that “summary 
judgment for a defendant is proper, even if there is some evidence of 
an antitrust violation, if the plaintiff’s theory of violation makes no 
economic sense.  This has to be the right rule . . . .”265  As a result, if 
the plaintiff’s theory of the case conflicts with the judge’s own view of 
how businesses operate, the latter theory will prevail even if the plain-
tiff provides evidence to support its allegations.266 
Some recent antitrust opinions provide evidence of confirmation 
bias affecting judicial decisionmaking.  For example, in In re Baby Food 
Antitrust Litigation,267 the plaintiffs alleged that three major baby food 
manufacturers—Gerber, Beech-Nut, and Heinz—participated in a 
conspiracy to raise and stabilize the price of baby food in what the 
court described as a “highly concentrated nationwide industry” in 
which the three defendants “account[ed] for over 98% of all baby 
food products manufactured and sold in the United States.”268  After 
showing that the defendants’ prices were increasing in tandem, the 
plaintiffs presented evidence of pricing coordination through infor-
mation exchanges.269  This is a classic form of cartel behavior.270  For 
example, the defendants’ salespeople informed their counterparts at 
their competitors of planned—yet unannounced—price increases.  In 
particular, Gerber knew of Beech-Nut’s price increases in the spring 
of 1989 before they were announced to the industry.271  Similarly, 
“Beech-Nut had advance knowledge of a planned February 1990 Ger-
ber list price increase as early as two months and no less than eight 
days before its announcement to the industry on December 28, 
1989.”272  In at least one instance, Beech-Nut had in its possession a 
Gerber memorandum detailing the latter’s planned price increases, 
and even though each page was stamped “HIGHLY CONFIDEN-
 
265 In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 614 (7th 
Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (citations omitted) (citing Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587; Eastman 
Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 467-69 (1992)). 
266 While it is reasonable for courts to require more proof when the plaintiff as-
serts implausible facts, it is wrong for courts to ignore actual evidence.  Section IV.B 
will provide several examples of this phenomenon. 
267 166 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 1999). 
268 Id. at 116. 
269 Id. at 118-23. 
270 See generally Leslie, supra note 111.  
271 In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 119. 
272 Id. 
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TIAL,” Beech-Nut had the pricing memorandum at least a week be-
fore the information was made public.273  In some cases, Gerber knew 
of Beech-Nut’s planned price increases before Beech-Nut’s own bro-
kers and sales force.274  One e-mail documented a discussion between 
Beech-Nut and Gerber managers about price increases, and the e-mail 
was circulated among Gerber managers.275  An internal Heinz memo-
randum referred to the difficulty of supplying some retailers because 
the “‘truce’ in effect” meant that their “hands were tied.”276  Addition-
ally, the plaintiffs’ expert explained how the available evidence dem-
onstrated the likelihood of illegal price fixing.277 
The court’s reasoning and result in In re Baby Food Antitrust Litiga-
tion seems infected with confirmation bias.  Despite proof that com-
petitors exchanged price information, the Third Circuit concluded 
that the plaintiffs presented “hardly a scintilla of evidence of con-
certed, collusive conduct.”278  To reach this result, the court mini-
mized the import of the presented evidence by asserting that 
“[e]vidence of sporadic exchanges of shop talk among field sales rep-
resentatives who lack pricing authority is insufficient to survive sum-
mary judgment.”279  Such cavalier dismissal seems odd for several rea-
sons.  First, this was not mere “shop talk,” but rather competitors 
divulging planned future price increases, a quintessential area of anti-
trust concern.  Second, the court glossed over the fact that the infor-
mation about future planned price increases did, in fact, make it to 
the executives with pricing authority and that the firms actually had 
policies of funneling this pricing information to those top execu-
tives.280  In a similar vein, the court declined to assign any probative 
value to the internal memorandum referring to a “truce” among the 
baby food manufacturers because the author of the memorandum did 
not have the authority to set prices.281  But, again, this misconstrues 
the import of the memorandum, which is that (according to one rea-
sonable reading) it memorialized the existence of a price-fixing 
agreement regardless of whether the memorandum’s author set the 
 
273 Id.  
274 Id. at 120. 
275 Id. 
276 Id. 
277 Id. at 122-23. 
278 Id. at 137. 
279 Id. at 125. 
280 See id. at 118-19, 121 (discussing policies of passing information to supervisors 
and claiming that such evidence is unpersuasive). 
281 Id. at 127. 
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price.  The majority also mischaracterized the exchange of sensitive 
pricing plans as mere “shop talk”282 and ignored the plaintiffs’ “exten-
sive circumstantial evidence.”283  The court claimed to draw all infe-
rences in the plaintiffs’ favor,284 but it is difficult to reconcile that 
claim with the court’s treatment of the evidence presented.  The 
court’s manipulation of the evidentiary standards and its vigorous ef-
forts to assemble a benign explanation for highly suspicious conduct 
bears the hallmarks of confirmation bias, as the court’s own interpre-
tation trumped both expert testimony and direct evidence of price 
coordination.  This confirmation bias caused the court ultimately to 
deny plaintiffs the opportunity to prove the conspiracy’s existence to a 
jury. 
IV.  “IMPLAUSIBLE” ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS 
Part III explored a litany of reasons why federal judges may not be 
particularly well equipped to distinguish whether alleged anticompeti-
tive conduct is rational or implausible.  That Part explained that if 
courts perceive the anticompetitive conduct alleged by the plaintiff to 
be irrational or implausible, then judges hold (often erroneously) that 
the conduct must not have occurred and thus the defendant is en-
titled to summary judgment or judgment notwithstanding a jury ver-
dict for the plaintiff.  Part IV substantiates the arguments made in Part 
III by examining several recent antitrust decisions in which courts 
held that the plaintiff’s theory of anticompetitive conduct made “no 
economic sense.”285  These cases include claims of predatory pricing, 
price-fixing conspiracies, group boycotts of a supplier, and conspira-
cies to conceal invalid patents.  In each of these decisions, the court 
committed one or more of the errors detailed in Part III.  Most of 
these opinions share two common flaws.  First, the court found the al-
leged conduct to be implausible despite strong—and sometimes irre-
futable—evidence that the conduct in fact occurred.  Second, most 
cases involved garden-variety antitrust violations, examples of which 
had been well documented in antitrust history, thereby making the 
notion that the plaintiff’s allegations were implausible itself implausi-
ble. 
 
282 Id. at 125. 
283 Id. at 118. 
284 Id. at 138. 
285 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
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A.  Predatory Pricing 
As established in Parts I and III, courts routinely hold plaintiffs’ al-
legations of predatory pricing to be implausible because judges view 
the alleged conduct as irrational.  In Matsushita, the majority reasoned 
that predatory pricing “makes no economic sense” because the al-
leged conspiracy in that case failed.286  However, in some later opi-
nions invoking Matsushita, the court’s pronouncement of implausibili-
ty is belied by the very success of the alleged predation.  For example, 
in Brooke Group, Liggett alleged that B&W engaged in predatory pric-
ing in order to coerce Liggett into increasing the prices of generic 
cigarettes, which would allow B&W and the other tobacco firms to 
raise prices of branded cigarettes.287  The Supreme Court found Lig-
gett’s theory to be implausible because it would have required B&W to 
engage in allegedly irrational conduct—sustaining definite losses with 
a speculative likelihood of recoupment.288  Despite the fact that Lig-
gett convinced a jury otherwise, the Supreme Court majority held that 
the predation as described by Liggett could not have happened as a 
matter of law.289 
The Brooke Group majority found Liggett’s theory implausible for a 
number of reasons.  First, B&W would have to have borne the costs of 
predation, and the other tobacco companies would have been able to 
free ride.290  This struck the majority as an irrational move for B&W.291  
Second, the plaintiffs could not show that the price of generics would 
rise sufficiently for B&W to rationally incur the losses associated with 
predatory pricing.292  Third, the Court found it implausible that B&W 
could recoup the losses sustained in the generic-cigarette market 
through tacit oligopoly pricing in the branded-cigarette market.293  
Given the Court’s view of the implausibility of each of these events, 
the majority held that B&W must not have engaged in predatory pric-
ing as a matter of law.294 
 
286 Id. at 587, 592. 
287 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 212, 
217 (1993). 
288 Id. at 243. 
289 Id. 
290 Id. at 230-32. 
291 Id. 
292 Id. at 232. 
293 Id. at 241. 
294 Id. at 243. 
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In contrast to the Matsushita plaintiffs, though, the Brooke Group 
plaintiffs presented direct evidence at trial to refute each link of the 
chain in the majority’s implausibility logic.  First, the trial evidence 
showed that B&W did, in fact, charge a below-cost price for eighteen 
months, as alleged by Liggett.295  Indeed, “B&W’s own economic ex-
perts conceded at trial that B&W had priced below average variable 
cost.”296  Furthermore, it was entirely rational for B&W to bear the cost 
of predation because it was bearing the brunt of the losses that Lig-
gett’s generic-cigarette strategy was inflicting on the market for 
branded cigarettes.  As the majority itself acknowledged, “the growth 
of generics came at the expense of the other firms’ profitable sales of 
branded cigarettes.  B&W was hardest hit, because many of B&W’s 
brands were favored by consumers who were sensitive to changes in 
cigarette prices.”297  Moreover, B&W targeted its predatory pricing by 
giving the largest discounts to Liggett’s largest customers.298  Thus, 
B&W had more to lose if Liggett succeeded and more to gain if Lig-
gett were brought back into the fold.  Second, Liggett did capitulate 
and increase the price of generic cigarettes in response to B&W’s pre-
dation.  B&W and the other cigarette manufacturers followed Lig-
gett’s lead, and the price of generics increased more than seventy per-
cent between 1985 and 1989.299  Third, after Liggett increased the 
price of generic cigarettes, the price of branded cigarettes increased 
dramatically.  Over the next four years, the list price of all cigarettes—
branded and generic—increased twice each year in lockstep fashion 
by identical amounts.300  In the aftermath of B&W’s predation, “the 
prices for branded and generic cigarettes increased every six months 
from $33.15 and $19.75, respectively, to $46.15 and $33.75.”301  Thus, 
within a period of a few years, the list price of previously low-priced 
 
295 See id. at 231 (“There is also sufficient evidence in the record from which a rea-
sonable jury could conclude that for a period of approximately 18 months, [B&W]’s 
prices on its generic cigarettes were below its costs . . . .”). 
296 Kenneth L. Glazer, Predatory Pricing and Beyond:  Life After Brooke Group, 62 
ANTITRUST L.J. 605, 614 (1994). 
297 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 214. 
298 See id. at 249 n.10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“By offering its largest discounts to 
Liggett’s 14 largest customers, B&W not only put its money where the volume is, but 
also applied maximum pressure to Liggett at a lesser cost to itself than would have re-
sulted from a nondiscriminatory price cut.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
299 See Bolton, Brodley & Riordan, supra note 150, at 2257 (“The list price of non-
branded black and whites rose by seventy-one percent . . . .”). 
300 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 249-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
301 Id. at 258. 
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generic cigarettes was actually higher than the prepredation price of 
branded cigarettes.  The price increases far outpaced inflation302 as 
well as any increases in the manufacturers’ costs, taxes, and promo-
tional expenditures.303 
The Brooke Group majority dismissed the evidence of the success of 
the predation as failing to establish the plausibility of the anticompeti-
tive scheme articulated by Liggett.304  The Court stated that “[t]he evi-
dence is inadequate to show that in pursuing this scheme, [B&W] had 
a reasonable prospect of recovering its losses from below-cost pricing 
through slowing the growth of generics.”305  Even though prices had 
risen, the majority asserted that “no evidence suggests that [B&W] . . . 
was likely to obtain the power to raise the prices for generic cigarettes 
above a competitive level.”306  Thus, “[n]o inference of recoupment is 
sustainable on this record.”307  But prices did in fact rise substantially—
in both the generic and branded markets.308  The Court attempted to 
diminish this fact by asserting that “rising prices do not themselves 
permit an inference of a collusive market dynamic. . . . [R]ising prices 
are equally consistent with growing product demand.”309  The Court 
suggested that, given this possibility, the jury could not infer that in-
creased prices were supracompetitive prices.310  But in fact, overall 
demand for cigarettes was decreasing311 and the evidence at trial 
showed that the postpredation “price increases were unwarranted by 
increases in manufacturing or other costs, taxes, or promotional ex-
penditures.”312  Prices were increasing significantly above their prior 
levels despite the fact that costs did not increase; that is strong evi-
dence of supracompetitive pricing. 
 
302 See Glazer, supra note 296, at 617-18 (“Specifically, record evidence showed that 
from June 1984 to December 1989 the list price of all cigarettes, including branded, ge-
neric, and subgeneric, weighted according to volume, went up 61 percent at a time when 
inflation was only 20 percent, demand was falling, and costs were basically constant.”). 
303 See Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 235 (noting Liggett’s economic expert’s testimony 
that prices increased more quickly than these costs). 
304 Id. at 231.  
305 Id. 
306 Id. at 232. 
307 Id.  
308 See id. at 258 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
309 Id. at 237 (majority opinion). 
310 Id.  
311 See Glazer, supra note 296, at 619 (“[T]he cigarette market as a whole was expe-
riencing declining demand and excess capacity during the relevant period.”). 
312 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 250 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Next, the Court asserted that B&W could not have planned on 
these price increases when allegedly initiating a predatory pricing 
strategy because “the situation facing the cigarette companies in the 
1980’s would have made such tacit coordination unmanageable.”313  
The Court’s assertion, however, is contrary to economic theory, busi-
ness history, and common sense.  The American tobacco market is a 
textbook example of a market where tacit coordination occurs:  a con-
centrated market consisting of a handful of firms that, over the last 
century, have operated at times as a well-heeled cartel and otherwise 
as a well-disciplined oligopoly that imposed lockstep price increases 
unrelated to costs every six months and had done so for years before 
the alleged predation.314  It would be perfectly plausible for B&W to 
anticipate that the other manufacturers of branded cigarettes would 
raise their prices in unison, as they had done for decades and as they 
in fact did after Liggett raised the price of generics.315  For the Brooke 
Group majority to assert that tacit coordination could not work in the 
American tobacco market is tantamount to claiming that there is no 
such thing as tacit coordination, period. 
Ultimately, the Court concluded “that the evidence cannot sup-
port a finding that [B&W]’s alleged scheme was likely to result in oli-
gopolistic price coordination and sustained supracompetitive pricing 
in the generic segment of the national cigarette market.  Without this, 
[B&W] had no reasonable prospect of recouping its predatory 
 
313 Id. at 238 (majority opinion). 
314 The majority itself acknowledged this history:   
 The cigarette industry also has long been one of America’s most profitable, 
in part because for many years there was no significant price competition 
among the rival firms.  List prices for cigarettes increased in lockstep, twice a 
year, for a number of years, irrespective of the rate of inflation, changes in the 
costs of production, or shifts in consumer demand.  Substantial evidence sug-
gests that in recent decades, the industry reaped the benefits of prices above a 
competitive level, though not through unlawful conduct of the type that once 
characterized the industry. 
Id. at 213 (citations omitted); see also Glazer, supra note 296, at 609 (“[S]uccess for 
B&W did not depend on bringing about supracompetitive prices for the first time; they 
already existed and merely needed to be protected.”). 
315 In dissent, Justice Stevens opined that, 
On this point, there is ample, uncontradicted evidence that the list prices on 
generic cigarettes, as well as the prices on branded cigarettes, rose regularly 
and significantly during the late 1980’s, in a fashion remarkably similar to the 
price change patterns that characterized the industry in the 1970’s when su-
pracompetitive, oligopolistic pricing admittedly prevailed. 
Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 255 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
LESLIE_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/1/2010  6:35 PM 
2010] Rationality Analysis in Antitrust 323 
losses . . . .”316  Thus, the Court held that B&W had no reasonable 
prospect of recoupment despite the fact that the evidence at trial 
showed that B&W did in fact recoup.  If anything positive can be said 
of the majority’s opinion, it is that the Court did not fall victim to 
hindsight bias—proof of success did not shake the majority’s assertion 
that profitable predatory conduct is implausible. 
Brooke Group illustrates many of the arguments from Part III ex-
plaining why judges are ill-equipped to evaluate whether alleged anti-
competitive predation is plausible.  For example, seven years after 
Matsushita, the Court remained unaware of post-Chicago literature in 
economics and game theory that explains how predatory pricing can 
be a profit-maximizing business strategy.  The Court was also appar-
ently oblivious of past successes of predatory pricing as well as tacit 
coordination in concentrated industries. 
Further, the Court’s opinion exhibits confirmation bias in that the 
majority ignored any evidence inconsistent with its view that predatory 
pricing does not happen.  For example, in Brooke Group, the majority 
discounted the opinion of Liggett’s expert.  The Court began by di-
minishing the value of experts, noting that “[e]xpert testimony is use-
ful as a guide to interpreting market facts, but it is not a substitute for 
them.”317  The Court’s claimed allegiance to the facts seems strained 
given that the Court ultimately based its decision not on facts actually 
found or resolved in favor of the nonmovant but on its view of the 
theoretical implausibility of recoupment.318  The majority opinion 
noted that 
Liggett’s expert based his opinion that [B&W] had a reasonable pros-
pect of recouping its predatory losses on three factors:  [B&W]’s black 
and white pricing structure, corporate documents showing an intent to 
shrink the price differential between generic and branded cigarettes, 
and evidence of below-cost pricing.
319
   
But the Court immediately discounted all of this evidence, instead 
concluding that such “evidence is insufficient as a matter of law to . . . 
sustain the jury’s verdict.”320 
Although the Supreme Court has declared that “theory will not 
stand in the way of liability” in predatory pricing cases,321 it has done 
 
316 Id. at 243 (majority opinion). 
317 Id. at 242. 
318 See supra notes 46-52 and accompanying text.  
319 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 242-43. 
320 Id. at 243. 
321 Id. at 229. 
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just that in many antitrust opinions.  For example, if a federal judge 
believes that “a plaintiff’s predatory pricing claim is implausible”—
which she essentially must since the Supreme Court said so in both 
Matsushita322 and Brooke Group323—then “actual cost data indicating be-
low-cost pricing is the only evidence . . . sufficient to survive a sum-
mary judgment motion.”324  But many courts refuse even to look at the 
plaintiff’s direct evidence of below-cost pricing if the judge finds the 
plaintiff’s theory of recoupment implausible.325  Thus, predatory pric-
ing plaintiffs are stuck in a Catch-22:  because courts perceive predato-
ry pricing as irrational, the plaintiff must have direct evidence, but be-
cause courts perceive predatory pricing as irrational, they disregard 
direct evidence of predation.  By relying on a constrained and out-
dated theory, federal judges have put predatory pricing plaintiffs in an 
untenable position. 
B.  Price-Fixing Conspiracies 
Because price fixing among competitors is per se illegal, the sole 
liability question in price-fixing litigation is whether the defendants 
actually conspired to fix prices.326  A plaintiff can prove an illegal 
price-fixing agreement with direct evidence, such as recordings of the 
actual price-fixing meetings, as in the lysine conspiracy.327  In the ab-
sence of direct evidence, antitrust plaintiffs can establish an agree-
ment by proving that the defendants engaged in parallel conduct 
 
322 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
323 Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 239. 
324 N.C. Elec. Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 780 F. Supp. 322, 
335 (M.D.N.C. 1991). 
325 See, e.g., A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1401-
04 (7th Cir. 1989) (asserting that recoupment was not possible in the egg industry); see 
also Page I. Austin, Predatory Pricing Law Since Matsushita, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 895, 898 
(1990) (“Judge Easterbrook emphasized that if market structure makes it impossible 
for the defendant to recoup a predatory investment, then the defendant is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law regardless of whether it priced below its costs, and even if 
it had the most evil of intents.”).  Judge Easterbrook relies on a recoupment require-
ment to hold that there is no market harm from predatory pricing absent recoupment.  
In a draft paper, Reconsidering the Recoupment Requirement in Predatory Pricing, I argue 
that this is incorrect. 
326 Beyond the issue of liability, the plaintiff must also prove that it suffered anti-
trust injury and that it is an appropriate plaintiff to pursue the antitrust claim. 
327 See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 230 (“For Andreas, the FBI played excerpts of 
meetings on a tape recorder on which [the conspirators] say incriminating things.”). 
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(“conscious parallelism”328) and that the presence of so-called “plus 
factors” suggests that the parallel conduct was the product of an 
agreement among the defendants rather than independent action.329  
Examples of “‘plus factors’ include actions contrary to a defendant’s 
economic self-interest, product uniformity, exchange of price infor-
mation and opportunity to meet, and a common motive to conspire 
or a large number of communications.”330  It is in evaluating plus fac-
tors that courts sometimes inappropriately invoke rationality analysis 
or claims of implausibility to conclude that no reasonable jury could 
find a conspiracy among the defendants to fix prices. 
1.  Tobacco 
Courts have employed a constrained version of rationality analysis 
to reject price-fixing claims that are supported by relatively strong evi-
dence.  For example, in Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, whole-
salers that purchased cigarettes for resale brought a class action law-
suit against tobacco companies, accusing them of price fixing.331  
Although the American tobacco market had long been characterized 
by episodes of illegal price fixing and tacit collusion, by the early 
1990s the introduction of discount cigarettes had undermined price 
stability.332  According to the wholesalers, Philip Morris responded to 
this price instability by dropping its price considerably in order to dis-
cipline its previously price-cutting competitors and to recreate the to-
bacco price-fixing cartel of prior eras.333  Following Philip Morris’s 
dramatic price decrease, prices for tobacco rose in a lockstep fashion 
semiannually, for a total of twelve parallel price increases between 
1995 and 2000.334 
 
328 See In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121 (3d Cir. 1999) (“In the 
absence of direct evidence, the plaintiffs may nevertheless support their claim with cir-
cumstantial evidence of conscious parallelism.”). 
329 See Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 
1033 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“An agreement is properly inferred from conscious 
parallelism only when certain ‘plus factors’ exist.”); Wallace v. Bank of Bartlett, 55 F.3d 
1166, 1168 (6th Cir. 1995) (“[P]arallel pricing, without more, does not itself establish a 
violation . . . . Courts require additional evidence which they have described as ‘plus 
factors.’”). 
330 Wallace, 55 F.3d at 1168 (citations omitted). 
331 346 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2003). 
332 See supra notes 34-48, 287-316, and accompanying text. 
333 Williamson Oil, 346 F.3d at 1293-94. 
334 Id. at 1294. 
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The class pointed to a slew of evidence suggesting that the parallel 
price increases were the result of an underlying agreement among the 
tobacco firms to stabilize prices.  For example, the class explained how 
the rival firms sent market signals to increase prices, how they imple-
mented “permanent allocation programs” that reduced output despite 
excess capacity, and how the competitors used a common consultant 
to track each other’s shipments and prices to help monitor and en-
force a price-fixing agreement.335  The class noted that the tobacco 
firms had a long history of illegal price fixing in the United States, and 
the plaintiffs also alleged that during the 1990s, the defendants main-
tained explicit ongoing price-fixing agreements in other countries, in-
cluding Argentina, Canada, Costa Rica, France, Hungary, Saudi Ara-
bia, and Venezuela.336  The Eleventh Circuit acknowledged that the 
American tobacco market represented a “classic oligopoly.”337  The 
class explained how this market structure—including concentrated 
sellers, inelastic demand, high barriers to entry, and fungible prod-
ucts—facilitated illegal cartelization.338  The class also highlighted the 
defendants’ numerous opportunities to conspire and argued that the 
firms performed little analysis before their price hikes, suggesting that 
the price increases were made pursuant to a conspiracy among com-
petitors rather than independent decisionmaking.339 
Despite this evidence, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that “the 
class ha[d] not carried its burden of demonstrating the existence of a 
plus factor.”340  Furthermore, the court asserted that the “allegations of 
collusive price fixing are economically untenable.”341  Because ciga-
rette prices were lower in 2000 than they were before Philip Morris 
dramatically dropped its price in 1993, the court concluded that “the 
class’s conspiracy theory is utterly implausible.”342  The opinion 
represents a classic example of federal judges relying on their own 
conception of rational business behavior to deny antitrust plaintiffs 
their day in court. 
The Williamson Oil decision seems to evidence many of the prob-
lems discussed in Part III.  First, the court fell victim to hindsight bias 
 
335 Id. at 1295-96. 
336 Id. at 1296. 
337 Id. at 1291. 
338 Id. at 1296. 
339 Id. 
340 Id. at 1320. 
341 Id.  
342 Id. at 1323. 
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by concluding that because the alleged conspiracy did not raise prices 
sufficiently, the accusation of price fixing was “untenable” and “im-
plausible.”343  The fact that price did not rise as much as the court 
thought it would have had there been a conspiracy does not render 
the wholesalers’ claim implausible.  The court did not consider that 
Philip Morris may have been overconfident in its ability to raise prices 
higher through price fixing.  If so, antitrust liability still attaches.  An-
titrust law imposes no requirement that price fixing be net profitable 
for a cartel ringleader in order for price-fixing plaintiffs to recover 
damages for the cartel overcharges that they paid. 
Second, the court failed to consider that Philip Morris may have 
been pursuing other goals beyond strict short-term profit maximiza-
tion.  Although the court acknowledged that Philip Morris’s concern 
about its declining market share spurred the firm to slash its price, the 
court’s rationality analysis focused exclusively on profits, not market 
share.  But Philip Morris may have been balancing the two goals by 
trying to preserve its market share while fixing the price as much as 
possible.  By focusing exclusively on price, the court failed to appre-
ciate that Philip Morris may have actually achieved its initial goal:  pre-
serving market share first and then stabilizing price through price fix-
ing.  After all, as shown by its initial price-cutting decision, Philip 
Morris was clearly willing to trade profits for market share. 
Finally, the court’s opinion exhibits a lack of awareness that cartel 
leaders often use price wars as a mechanism of cartel formation and 
discipline.  The most enduring public cartel of the twentieth cen-
tury—the diamond cartel—also relied on the threat (and execution) 
of price predation to rein in defectors.  For example, when President 
Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire began to sell his country’s industrial di-
amonds outside of the cartel led by DeBeers, the South African com-
pany responded by flooding the international market with industrial 
diamonds.344  After DeBeers’s move caused the price of diamonds to 
plummet from $3.00 per carat to below $1.80—imposing significant 
losses on both Zaire and DeBeers for the two years of predation—the 
Zairian government requested readmission into the cartel.345  DeBeers 
allowed Zaire to rejoin the cartel only on less favorable terms, which 
Zaire accepted as its punishment.346  Given that DeBeers used the 
price war—which cost the diamond cartelist millions of dollars—to 
 
343 Id. at 1320, 1323. 
344 DEBORA L. SPAR, THE COOPERATIVE EDGE 62 (1994).   
345 Id. at 62-63. 
346 Id. at 63.  
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great effect, it is far from implausible that Philip Morris may have 
thought that it could use a price war to similar cartel-stabilizing effect. 
2.  Citric Acid 
While the Williamson Oil court found the plaintiffs’ price-fixing 
complaint implausible because price did not rise sufficiently to make 
the conspiracy worthwhile in the court’s view, other courts have also 
found price-fixing claims unbelievable even when the underlying cartel 
was thoroughly successful until it was exposed.  For example, we know 
for a fact that a conspiracy existed to fix prices and allocate market 
share in the market for citric acid.  The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) 
Antitrust Division exposed the cartel, and several firms pleaded guilty to 
criminal price fixing and paid tens of millions of dollars in criminal 
fines.347  However, one major supplier of citric acid, Cargill, did not 
plead guilty and was not prosecuted by the DOJ.348  So the question re-
mained whether Cargill participated in the citric acid conspiracy. 
Manufacturers that purchased citric acid as an ingredient for their 
products sued the citric acid producers for price fixing.349  Cargill had 
been granted summary judgment on the ground that insufficient evi-
dence linked it to the proven price-fixing conspiracy.350  To make their 
case that Cargill participated in the cartel, the plaintiffs focused the 
court’s attention on Cargill’s pricing decisions and its relationship 
with its convicted competitors.351  The court noted that Cargill in-
creased prices in “nearly identical” lockstep with its price-fixing com-
petitors.352  The plaintiffs argued that this was suspicious because Car-
gill was a member of the European Citric Acid Manufacturer’s 
Association (ECAMA), which the convicted firms had used as a cover 
for their price-fixing conspiracy.353  Furthermore, Cargill had ex-
changed price information with its (later convicted) competitors and 
possessed copies of their price lists.354  Cargill had held meetings and 
phone conversations with the people running the citric acid cartel, in-
 
347 See CONNOR, supra note 114, at 365 (“A couple of days later, ADM paid a $30 
million fine for its role in price fixing in the market for citric acid, an amount that re-
flected a hefty discount for its cooperation with prosecutors.”). 
348 Id. at 381-83. 
349 In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1092 (9th Cir. 1999). 
350 Id. at 1093. 
351 See id. at 1102. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. at 1104. 
354 Id. at 1103. 
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cluding the ADM employee, Barrie Cox, who ran the cartel and testi-
fied that he had discussions with a Cargill employee regarding the 
“bidding price for certain [citric acid] accounts.”355 
The plaintiffs also highlighted Cargill’s suspicious behavior with re-
spect to its output.  In early 1992, Cargill issued a press release an-
nouncing that it was going to double its capacity for making citric ac-
id.356  In the late 1990s, however, Cargill reduced its planned increase by 
half.357  The plaintiffs argued that the decision reflected Cargill’s partic-
ipation in the cartel.358  Since Cargill argued that it decided to limit its 
expansion months before the plaintiffs claimed that Cargill had joined 
the conspiracy, the Ninth Circuit held that “[b]ecause ‘the factual con-
text renders [appellants’] claim implausible,’ no reasonable factfinder 
could conclude from this evidence that Cargill was part of the conspira-
cy.”359  The court rejected any anticompetitive interpretation of Cargill’s 
announcement that it was going to increase its output significantly and 
its subsequent decision to produce a smaller amount. 
The Ninth Circuit found nothing suspicious about the exchange 
of price information, reasoning that such “is standard fare for trade 
associations.”360  But this ignored the fact that this particular associa-
tion was the core of a proven criminal conspiracy.  The ECAMA 
“play[ed] a key-facilitating role in the conspiracy”361 and “provide[d] a 
convenient cover for illegal price-fixing discussions.”362  An insider 
who helped run the illegal citric acid cartel through the ECAMA ex-
plained “that there always was a meaningless official meeting followed 
by an ‘unofficial’ meeting where the ongoing strategy of the conspira-
cy was developed.  The official ECAMA meetings had an agenda.  The 
unofficial meetings did not.”363  In essence, “[t]he biennial meetings 
of ECAMA were pretexts for holding secret parallel price-fixing ses-
sions for citric acid.”364  The court’s desire to equate the ECAMA with 
other legal trade associations conflicted with the known illegal nature 
of the citric acid organization. 
 
355 Id. at 1104 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
356 Id. at 1100. 
357 Id. 
358 See id. at 1102. 
359 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). 
360 Id. at 1098. 
361 CONNOR, supra note 114, at 134-35. 
362 Id. at 202. 
363 LIEBER, supra note 106, at 188. 
364 CONNOR, supra note 117, at 220. 
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The court was confronted with an incriminating note handwritten 
by an attendee at one ECAMA meeting, which read, “Undertaking is a 
confidential agreement to maintain price.  Producers must police.”365  
The majority then set out to minimize the note’s significance, explain-
ing that 
minutes of an ECAMA meeting indicate that the suggestion “was quickly 
overviewed and it was decided not to pay attention to that message for 
most of the information contained in it [was] against the spirit of the  
anti-trust law.”  It would not be reasonable to infer that Cargill engaged 
in illegal activities merely from evidence that an illegal course of action 
was suggested but immediately rejected.
366
 
This explanation is strained given that we know that the suggestion of 
illegal activity was not rejected—most of the attendees were actually 
committing antitrust crimes at the time.  They knew their actions were 
illegal, and they knew that they needed to cover their tracks.  In particu-
lar, “[t]he manufacturers’ representatives at the [citric acid] conspiracy 
meetings took pains to cover up their activities by destroying any docu-
mentary evidence of their conspiracy.  These actions reveal that the 
conspirators knew their ‘unofficial’ meetings were illegal.”367 
Finally, the court sapped all probative value out of the testimony 
of Barrie Cox, the ADM employee who testified that he had discus-
sions about bidding prices with a counterpart at Cargill.  The court as-
serted that “Cox’s testimony at the lysine trial does not constitute direct 
evidence, however, because it still requires an inference that the price 
discussions were conspiratorial in nature.”368  For support, the court 
cited the Third Circuit’s opinion in the In re Baby Food case:  “Evidence 
of sporadic exchanges of shop talk among field sales representatives 
who lack pricing authority is insufficient to survive summary judg-
ment.”369  But this was not mere “shop talk” by a low-level functionary; 
it was a discussion with an ADM employee who was running an illegal 
cartel.  Moreover, months before the Ninth Circuit published its opi-
nion, new evidence came to light.  As reported in the New York Times, 
Cox swore during his FBI interviews that he had regular meetings with 
his counterpart at Cargill, that the two explicitly fixed prices of citric 
 
365 In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1097-98. 
366 Id. (alteration in original). 
367 CONNOR, supra note 114, at 137; see also Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing 
Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 774-75 (2009) (discussing how price-fixing conspirators 
destroy documentation). 
368 In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1104. 
369 In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 125; see also In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1105. 
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acid, and that Cargill had participated in the larger cartel through 
Cox.370  The court declined to consider this evidence. 
Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “there is no more 
than a scintilla of evidence that Cargill was a participant in the citric 
acid conspiracy, and the existence of ‘a scintilla of evidence of con-
certed, collusive conduct’ is not sufficient . . . to overcome Cargill’s 
summary judgment motion.”371  To reach this result, the court com-
mitted several of the errors detailed in Part III.  Most notably, the 
Ninth Circuit exhibited an extreme form of confirmation bias.  The 
plaintiffs directed the court to a raft of damning evidence, founded 
primarily on the fact that other citric acid producers had already been 
convicted of criminal conspiracy to fix prices.  Yet the court had al-
ready made up its mind; it was not prepared to change its opinion de-
spite direct evidence that Cargill had participated in illegal price fix-
ing. 
Further, the court seemed unaware of cartel dynamics and anti-
trust history.  For example, the court deprived Cargill’s announced 
massive expansion and subsequent reduced expansion of probative 
value.  But, as discussed in Part II, this is the precise strategy that ADM 
employed to join the lysine cartel.372  Cargill’s initial threat of expan-
sion followed by a more moderate increase in capacity, coupled with 
the fact that Cargill’s price followed that of its criminally convicted 
competitors in lockstep fashion, bears the hallmark of using a threat 
to gain admission to a cartel.  Yet the court was either unable or unwil-
ling to recognize this fact, holding that no reasonable jury could find 
that Cargill engaged in price fixing.  We now know with near certainty 
that Cargill did in fact participate in the citric acid cartel.373  However, 
 
370 David Barboza, Archer Daniels Executive Said to Tell of Price-Fixing Talks with Cargill 
Counterpart, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 1999, at C6.   
371 In re Citric Acid, 191 F.3d at 1106 (quoting In re Baby Food, 166 F.3d at 137). 
372 See supra notes 104-07.  Ironically, ADM was criminally convicted for participat-
ing in the citric acid price-fixing conspiracy. 
373 Cartel expert Professor John Connor explains Cargill’s role:  
On October 12, 1996, Barrie Cox was interviewed by the FBI.  At the same 
time, he had been offered immunity from prosecution in return for his com-
plete and truthful cooperation in the FBI’s investigation of the citric acid con-
spiracy. (Perjury during the interview would be grounds for removing Cox’s 
immunity).  Cox stated that he had held more than a dozen conversations 
with William Gruber, his counterpart at Cargill.  The conversations dealt with 
Cargill’s plans to raise prices and rig bids to certain customers.  Cox said that 
he agreed to “go along” with Cargill’s plan to raise the price of citric acid and 
restrain ADM’s sales volume.  Thus, it appears that Cargill and ADM had a bi-
lateral price-fixing agreement separate from the G-4 cartel.  
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because of the Ninth Circuit’s eagerness to declare such conduct im-
plausible, Cargill’s victims will be denied compensation for the illegal 
overcharges. 
3.  Potash 
Potash is an ingredient in fertilizer and represents a nearly half-
billion-dollar annual market.374  Potash manufacturers are no strangers 
to either price fixing or antitrust litigation.  Potash has been subject to 
various domestic and international cartels for over a century.375  Dur-
ing the Golden Age of Cartels between the two World Wars, interna-
tional cartels controlled the price and output of dozens of major 
commodities, including potash.376  Although they had a shaky start, the 
potash makers ultimately successfully cartelized the market.377  In rein-
vigorating the DOJ’s Antitrust Division, Thurman Arnold brought suit 
against potash makers as well as many other cartels.378  Many potash 
makers nevertheless continued to enter anticompetitive agreements.379 
In the late 1990s, a class of potash buyers initiated class action liti-
gation alleging that potash was yet again being controlled by an illegal 
cartel.380  To support their claims, they presented significant evidence 
of an agreement among potash producers to raise and stabilize 
price.381  Potash prices had shot up and experienced tandem price in-
creases despite no increase in the producers’ costs.382  The producers 
 
CONNOR, supra note 114, at 140. 
374 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, MINERAL COMMODITY 
SUMMARIES 2007, at 124 (2007), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/ 
mcs/2007/mcs2007.pdf (“In 2006, the production value of marketable potash . . . was 
about $411 million.”) 
375 See Newman, supra note 126, at 577-88 (discussing the German potash cartel of 
the 1890s). 
376 See Leslie, supra note 111, at 548 (observing that cartels during this period are 
easier to study due to their openness). 
377 See Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 
J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 74 (2006) (“Several cartels in our case study sample got off to a 
rocky start but later managed to sustain collusion for longer periods.  This was the case 
for the Swedish beer, railroad-oil, tea, potash, and sugar cartels.” (footnote omitted)). 
378 See Harry First, The Vitamins Case:  Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of Interna-
tional Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711, 729-30 (2001). 
379 See, e.g., Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 866 (10th Cir. 1981) 
(finding that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over actions of Cana-
dian subsidiaries of American potash producers that allegedly belonged to a cartel). 
380 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Saskatchewan, 203 F.3d 1028, 1033, 
1035 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
381 Id. at 1040. 
382 Id. at 1032-34.  
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had called each other and verified the price increases on dozens of 
occasions.383  The plaintiffs presented 
a great deal of evidence that one firm freely solicited price-fixing, and 
one rival frequently complained to another rival about the latter’s failure 
to adhere to its published price lists.  The CEO of one firm even went to 
officers at another firm, carrying charts showing that the CEO’s firm was 
losing market share to rivals and asking what they would do about it.  In 
one case a firm apologized to another firm for making a low bid and 
stealing the second firm’s customer.
384
 
The plaintiffs’ economic expert testified that market prices would 
have been lower absent price collusion.385  Reviewing the entire 
record, a minority of Eighth Circuit judges credited the class with 
producing “evidence of a market structure ripe for collusion, a sud-
den change from price war to supracompetitive pricing, price-fixing 
overtures from one competitor to another, voluntary disclosure of se-
cret price concessions, an explicitly discussed cheater punishment 
program, and advance knowledge of other producers’ price moves.”386 
Despite this evidence, the Eighth Circuit sitting en banc issued an 
opinion for a narrowly divided court in which the majority held that the 
defendants were entitled to summary judgment.387  Rejecting all of the 
plaintiffs’ factual evidence and expert testimony, the majority criticized 
the plaintiffs for “assum[ing] a conspiracy first, and then set[ting] out 
to ‘prove’ it.  However, a litigant may not proceed by first assuming a 
conspiracy and then explaining the evidence accordingly.”388  In es-
sence, the court accused the plaintiffs of falling victim to confirmation 
bias.  But this misconstrues the lens through which evidence is viewed at 
this stage of the litigation.  Because the defendants moved for summary 
judgment, the court was supposed to view all of the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the plaintiffs.  The majority did not do so and in 
fact condemned the plaintiffs for doing so.  Professor Hovenkamp 
rightly cites this as an example of the “[f]ailure to account for the dis-
tinction between rational and irrational conspiracies [that] has led sev-
eral courts to dismiss conspiracy claims incorrectly.”389 
 
383 Id. at 1033. 
384 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 135. 
385 Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1037-38.  
386 Id. at 1051 (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
387 Id. at 1038 (majority opinion). 
388 Id. at 1033. 
389 HOVENKAMP, supra note 4, at 134-35. 
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Ultimately, the Eighth Circuit erred by treating price-fixing conspi-
racies as though they were as implausible as predatory pricing conspira-
cies.  The Matsushita opinion commands lower courts considering de-
fendants’ summary judgment motions to demand more evidence from 
plaintiffs who advance economic theories that strike the court as im-
plausible, such as predatory pricing conspiracies.390  The decision, how-
ever, did not elevate the evidentiary standards for all antitrust plain-
tiffs.391  Despite this, many courts apply Matsushita broadly such that 
price-fixing cartels are treated similarly to other, more fanciful antitrust 
conspiracies.392  But while predatory pricing conspiracies are relatively 
risky and rare, price-fixing conspiracies are common and generally 
profitable, even when detected and prosecuted.393  While the Matsushita 
Court may have been wise to increase the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden 
when its claims make no economic sense,394 it is illogical for courts to 
treat all antitrust conspiracies as equally implausible.  Such an approach 
invites mistakes and creates false negatives, as truly harmful anticompe-
titive conspiracies escape liability. 
C.  Group Boycotts of Suppliers 
Courts have held group boycotts against a supplier to be implausi-
ble, and thus, defendants accused of such conduct are entitled to 
summary judgment.  Such holdings have been made despite strong 
evidence of the existence of such boycotts and their injurious effects 
on competition.  For example, in Adaptive Power Solutions, LLC v. 
Hughes Missile Systems Co., APS produced a specialized missile part and 
faced only one other competitor.395  Only two defense contractors, 
 
390 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).  
391 See, e.g., Petruzzi’s IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Del. Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 
1232 (3d Cir. 1993) (stating that Matsushita merely held that “the acceptable infe-
rences which can be drawn from circumstantial evidence vary with the plausibility of 
the plaintiffs’ theory and the dangers associated with such inferences”); see also In re 
Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 787 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Posner, J.) (citing Matsushita for the proposition that plaintiffs have the burden of 
producing economic evidence that shows that collusive action is more likely than indi-
vidual action, but noting that the evidence need not “exclude all possibility” that the 
defendant’s action was unilateral). 
392 See Blomkest, 203 F.3d at 1032 (“We are among the majority of circuits to ap-
ply . . . Matsushita . . . broadly . . . .”). 
393 See Leslie, supra note 367, at 799 n.222. 
394 This standard is intuitively acceptable in principle.  It is courts’ application of 
the standard that creates problems because judges cannot consistently distinguish be-
tween plausible and economically senseless business conduct.  See supra Part III.  
395 141 F.3d 947, 949 (9th Cir. 1998). 
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Hughes and Raytheon, purchased that particular missile part.396  
When APS attempted to raise the price it charged Raytheon for the 
missile part, Raytheon balked and asked Hughes to join it in refusing 
to buy parts from APS at any price.397  According to APS, Hughes and 
Raytheon jointly agreed to discipline APS by boycotting it and driving 
it from the market entirely.398 
After APS sued Hughes and Raytheon for violating section 1 of the 
Sherman Act, the district court granted summary judgment to the de-
fendants, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.399  The judges followed the 
reasoning of the lower court and found that the alleged boycott would 
be illogical:  Hughes and Raytheon had no incentive to hurt APS as a 
supplier because this would leave APS’s sole competitor with a mono-
poly over the missile part.400  Reasoning that no buyer would rationally 
seek to subject itself to a monopolist, the court concluded that “APS’s 
argument makes no economic sense.”401 
The court’s logic is perfectly reasonable:  firms should prefer to 
buy inputs in a competitive marketplace rather than a monopolized 
one.  But the theory espoused by the Ninth Circuit’s opinion is com-
pletely at odds with the facts of the case.  First, the defendants them-
selves conceded (for purposes of summary judgment) that they 
agreed to boycott APS.  The court acknowledged that 
defendants do not contest APS’s allegation that because Raytheon was 
“angered at APS’s attempt to charge Raytheon an increased price for 
A3’s,” Raytheon convinced Hughes to join it in refusing to deal with APS 
“for the purpose and with the intent of driving APS out of the market for 
the manufacture of A3’s.”
402
 
Second, and most shockingly, after evaluating the facts of the case it-
self, the court concluded “the evidence establishes without contradiction 
that Raytheon and Hughes boycotted APS to punish it.”403 
The case illustrates how courts are unable to appreciate the ratio-
nality of apparently irrational conduct.  The Ninth Circuit asserted 
that Hughes and Raytheon would not boycott its own supplier because 
that would be irrational.  But the court failed to appreciate that ex-
 
396 Id. 
397 Id. 
398 Id. 
399 Id. at 949, 953. 
400 Id. at 952-53. 
401 Id. at 953. 
402 Id. at 949. 
403 Id. at 953 (emphasis added). 
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ecuting an “irrational threat” would make future threats credible.404  
Hughes and Raytheon were more concerned with signaling the le-
gions of small subcontractors from whom they purchased other inputs 
that if they raised prices, they would be driven from the market just 
like APS.  By “irrationally” boycotting APS, Hughes and Raytheon 
could keep their other suppliers in line.  In essence, Hughes and 
Raytheon initiated a game of Chicken and refused to swerve.  Carrying 
out seemingly irrational threats can be a rational long-term strategy.  
Game theorists recognize this, but some federal judges do not. 
D.  Conspiracy to Conceal an Invalid Patent 
Even when they consider the available evidence, courts sometimes 
fail to appreciate the rationality of various forms of conspiracy.  For ex-
ample, in In re DDAVP Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation,405 the court 
reasoned that an alleged conspiracy to conceal an invalid patent was 
implausible because it entailed a licensee paying a royalty on an invalid 
patent.406  Plaintiffs alleged an antitrust conspiracy between Ferring and 
Aventis in which Ferring acquired a patent through inequitable con-
duct, which rendered the patent unenforceable.407  Plaintiffs further al-
leged that Aventis knew of the inequitable conduct, but instead of ex-
posing the patent’s unenforceability, Aventis conspired with Ferring to 
conceal the misconduct before the Patent and Trademark Office.408  
This conspiracy included Aventis paying Ferring for a license to use the 
patent at issue.409  The district court granted summary judgment to the 
defendants, reasoning that an allegation “[t]hat Aventis would pay to 
license a patent which it knew to be unenforceable flies in the face of 
reason.  That Aventis agreed with Ferring to participate in a scheme to 
exploit an unenforceable patent or that Aventis shared Ferring’s alle-
gedly anti-competitive intent also makes no sense.”410 
Whether such a conspiracy actually existed, the alleged conspiracy 
could have been a rational profit-maximizing scheme.  Maintaining 
invalid patents—whether fraudulently procured or not—can be a cost-
effective path to monopoly profits.  Invalid patents can deter market 
 
404 See supra Section III.D. 
405 No. 05-2237, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96201 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 2, 2006). 
406 Id. at *25. 
407 Id. at *6-7. 
408 Id. at *5. 
409 Id. at *23. 
410 Id. at *25-26. 
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entry even if the licensees know or suspect that the patent is not en-
forceable.411  Thus, Ferring had an incentive to acquire a patent even 
if the patent was not legally enforceable.  Given the exclusionary ef-
fects of such patents, Aventis had a strong incentive to have Ferring’s 
patent invalidated.  The district court implicitly assumed that it would 
be more rational for Aventis to invalidate Ferring’s patent than to pay 
for a license. 
But if Aventis were to expose the patent’s invalidity, the market 
would likely become competitive, eliminating the possibility of supra-
competitive profits.  Aventis would compete on a level playing field 
against Ferring, but it would also face competition from other firms 
that would enter the market after a court rendered Ferring’s patent 
unenforceable.412  Aventis would maximize its expected profits not by 
competing in a competitive market but by sharing Ferring’s ill-gotten 
monopoly profits.  Similarly, Ferring would be better off concealing 
the unenforceability of its patent and sharing its monopoly profits in 
exchange for Aventis’s complicity.  Thus, both firms could maximize 
their profits by conspiring to insulate Ferring’s patent from judicial 
scrutiny.  The Federal Trade Commission and the Second Circuit have 
recognized this in the context of pioneer drug company payments to a 
generic drug company, noting that it might “make economic sense for 
the patent holder to pay some portion of [its monopoly profits] to the 
generic manufacturer to maintain the patent-monopoly market for it-
self.”413  Under some scenarios, a patentee and one of its competitors 
can jointly maximize their profits through collusion. 
This leaves the question of why Aventis would pay for a license.  
One explanation is that if Aventis received a royalty-free license, it 
would raise a red flag to others about the patent’s validity or enfor-
ceability.  When competitors pay for a license of even a suspect patent, 
this increases the market’s perception of the patent’s validity and con-
sequently enhances the exclusionary power of the patent.414  Given this 
fact, Aventis would be rational to pay an “unnecessary” royalty as part 
of a conspiracy to conceal the unenforceability of Ferring’s patent and 
 
411 See Leslie, supra note 185, at 113-39 (describing the injurious effects invalid pa-
tents may have on competition). 
412 See Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:  
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 958 (2004) (describing the public-good problem 
associated with invalidating patents); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty:  Litiga-
tion-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687 (2004) (same).  
413 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006). 
414 See Christopher R. Leslie, Patents of Damocles, 83 IND. L.J. 133, 156 (2008). 
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share in the supracompetitive profits made available from the patent’s 
exclusionary effect. 
The above analysis does not prove that a conspiracy actually ex-
isted but only demonstrates such a conspiracy’s plausibility.  Alterna-
tive benign explanations remain.  For example, Aventis might have 
paid a royalty not because of any conspiracy with Ferring but rather 
because it believed Ferring’s patent was valid and enforceable.  In 
short, if the defendants were rightfully entitled to summary judgment 
against the antitrust claim, it was not because the alleged conspiracy 
“makes no economic sense.”415 
V.  RECONSIDERING THE ROLE OF RATIONALITY  
ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
The problems described in Part III and illustrated in Part IV do 
not lend themselves to easy resolution.  In search of a solution, this 
Part begins with the source of these problems:  the Matsushita opinion 
itself, which created a procedural rule that lower courts transformed 
into a substantive one.  If Matsushita is properly understood as a pro-
cedural rule, judges need to be able to recognize economically im-
plausible claims and to determine what additional quantum of evi-
dence the plaintiff must present to support such claims.  After 
addressing these issues, this Part concludes by discussing the role of 
juries in a system where rationality analysis is properly applied. 
A.  Rationality and Implausibility Analysis—Procedural or Substantive Rules? 
The use of rationality analysis for both section 1 conspiracy and sec-
tion 2 monopolization claims emerged from cases involving predatory 
pricing.  This context is critical because the reasoning in these cases be-
gan to blur the distinction between procedure and substance.  Matsushi-
ta is nominally a procedural rule.  The opinion requires some plaintiffs 
(i.e., those making implausible claims) to present a greater quantum of 
evidence in order to survive summary judgment.  The case is frequently 
taught in civil procedure classes as a summary judgment case, not an 
antitrust case.  But the opinion has significantly transformed substantive 
antitrust law.  Matsushita made the empirical statement that predatory 
pricing does not happen.416  The Supreme Court based this contention 
 
415 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
416 See id. at 589 (“[T]here is a consensus among commentators that predatory 
pricing schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”). 
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on the theory that because predatory pricing is irrational, it is generally 
implausible that firms engage in such conduct.417  From this empirical 
assertion, lower courts have fashioned a quasi-substantive rule.  Lower 
courts repeat by rote Matsushita’s empirical assertion and reflexively re-
ject predatory pricing claims as irrational.418 
Two problems exist.  First, the empirical assertion is, at best, sus-
pect.  Most of the sources cited by the Court are not empirical analyses 
but rather theorists stating their reasons for thinking that predatory 
pricing is irrational.  Even the putatively empirical evidence is not ac-
tually empirical.419  Contrary to the Court’s assertion, predatory pricing 
does happen and does succeed, including when performed by cartels.420 
Second, Matsushita creates the risk that an empirical assertion—
based on a flawed theory—is being converted into a rule of substan-
tive law.  The procedural rule comes close to making predatory pric-
ing per se legal because the Court has suggested that the practice—
whether unilateral or concerted—is irrational and that firms do not 
engage in irrational conduct.  This backdoor approach to legalizing 
 
417 See id. at 589-90 (citing several Chicago School thinkers whose work supports 
this contention). 
418 See, e.g., United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1114-15 (10th Cir. 2003) 
(referring to Matsushita as proof of the Supreme Court having “adopted the skepticism 
of [the] Chicago” School of economic thought that has “long labeled predatory pric-
ing as implausible and irrational”); WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 238 F.3d 449, 463-64 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (citing Matsushita in upholding an FCC regulation against charges that it 
would lead to predatory pricing); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 
518, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Matsushita for the proposition that “the consensus 
among economists that such [predatory pricing] schemes are difficult if not impossible 
to successfully complete and thus unlikely to be attempted by rational businessmen”); 
Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1205 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Matsu-
shita in determining that a firm allegedly engaged in predatory pricing “had no rea-
sonable prospect of recouping any investment”); Stitt Spark Plug Co. v. Champion 
Spark Plug Co., 840 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988) (“Without an economically plausi-
ble theory of anticompetitive effect, Stitt was not entitled to reach the jury on the pre-
datory-pricing claim.”); Mathias v. Daily News, L.P., 152 F. Supp. 2d 465, 473 (S.D.N.Y. 
2001) (“Absent the reasonable possibility of success in such recoupment, below-cost 
pricing cannot be anticompetitive . . . .”); Servicetrends, Inc. v. Siemens Med. Sys., Inc., 
870 F. Supp. 1042, 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (citing Matsushita in “distinguishing those 
instances of legitimate price cutting that epitomize the benefits of unrestrained com-
petition”); Nat’l Benefit Adm’rs, Inc. v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ala., Inc., No. 88-
H-426-N, 1989 WL 146413, at *1-2 (M.D. Ala. July 27, 1989) (citing Matsushita for the 
proposition that a predatory pricing conspiracy “is practically and economically unrea-
sonable”), aff’d, 907 F.2d 1143 (11th Cir. 1990). 
419 See, e.g., James A. Dalton & Louis Esposito, Predatory Price Cutting and Standard Oil:  
A Re-Examination of the Trial Record, 22 RES. L. & ECON. 155 (2007) (reexamining the em-
pirical record in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), to 
refute McGee’s conclusion that Standard Oil did not engage in predatory pricing). 
420 See supra Section IV.A. 
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predatory pricing is problematic.  The Court has the power to make 
predatory pricing per se legal or to change the legal test for predatory 
pricing, for example, by adding elements or creating presumptions.  
Antitrust is essentially common law, and federal courts have broad au-
thority to treat challenged trade restraints as per se legal, per se illeg-
al, or subject to varying degrees of antitrust scrutiny.  Through the 
common law process, the legal treatment of various restraints has 
shifted over time.421 
This raises a question:  if the Court can revise predatory pricing 
law as it sees fit, why does it matter that the Court employed rationality 
analysis to effect this change?  Although the Court has the authority to 
make predatory pricing per se legal, such changes in substantive law 
should be clearly announced and defended based on antitrust doc-
trine, not achieved through purportedly neutral changes in procedur-
al rules or evidentiary standards.  If predatory pricing sometimes oc-
curs, then its legality should depend on an evaluation of its likely 
effects on competition and the likelihood of false positives, not on a 
mistaken assertion that it does not happen.  Manipulating a proce-
dural rule, instead of changing the substantive law directly, has also 
had deleterious effects on other aspects of antitrust law that are not as 
controversial as predatory pricing.422  The cases discussed in Part IV 
show how courts have employed Matsushita’s heightened standard to 
reject price-fixing claims as implausible despite the fact that price fix-
ing is relatively common.423  Price fixing is not irrational; it does not 
entail the guaranteed losses associated with predatory pricing—
whether unilateral or conspiratorial.  The so-called procedural rule 
based on rationality analysis makes it harder to litigate against price-
fixing cartels.  If the Supreme Court wishes to change substantive anti-
 
421 For example, the Court condemned vertical nonprice restraints as per se illegal 
in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., and then ten years later reversed itself and 
held that such agreements should be evaluated under the rule of reason.  388 U.S. 365, 
388 (1967), overruled by Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977). 
422 Antitrust liability for predatory pricing is controversial because low prices form 
the basis of the violation, which makes the cost of false positives high.  If courts incor-
rectly label a competitive price cut as predatory and hold the competitor liable for an-
titrust damages, then antitrust litigation may be used to injure or deter competition 
itself.  Because the Court might be legitimately concerned that judges may not be able 
to distinguish predatory price cuts from competitive price cuts, the Court may decide 
that predatory pricing law should evolve to address this concern. 
423 See generally CONNOR, supra note 114 (describing and analyzing the origins, op-
erations, and impact of global cartels in the markets for lysine, citric acid, and vita-
mins); Leslie, supra note 111 (discussing a variety of cases where price fixing has oc-
curred). 
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trust law with respect to predatory pricing, then it should do so direct-
ly.  Using procedural or evidentiary devices to stifle predatory pricing 
claims under the rubric of rationality and implausibility distorts un-
controversial areas of antitrust law. 
B.  Antitrust Litigation and the Focus on Facts 
Antitrust litigation should focus on two major issues:  (1) whether 
the defendant(s) engaged in the alleged conduct and (2) whether that 
conduct diminished competition in an unreasonable manner.  The first 
issue is entirely factual; the second includes issues of antitrust injury and 
the boundaries of antitrust liability and thus combines questions of fact 
and law.  Yet it is on the first question that courts typically appeal to ra-
tionality theory.  Courts sometimes mishandle theory by suggesting that 
proven conduct could not have occurred if the conduct appears to the 
judge to be inconsistent with rational profit maximization.424  This ap-
proach is mistaken because rational firms often engage in conduct that 
is not, or appears not to be, profit maximizing.425 
Instead of focusing on the theoretical plausibility of the defendant’s 
alleged conduct, courts should determine whether there is sufficient 
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the conduct 
in fact happened, whether rational or not.  The Matsushita standard as 
written may be defensible.  The decision provides that “if the factual 
context renders [plaintiffs’] claim implausible—if the claim is one that 
simply makes no economic sense—[plaintiffs] must come forward with 
more persuasive evidence to support their claim than would otherwise 
be necessary.”426  The Matsushita sliding scale is intuitively acceptable:  
less plausible claims should require more evidence. 
Two problems, however, have arisen in the rule’s application.  
First, can judges recognize when an antitrust claim alleges conduct 
that is truly irrational or implausible as opposed to conduct that is fa-
cially irrational but profit maximizing when strategic considerations 
are factored in?  Second, when judges do label an antitrust claim im-
plausible, how much more evidence must a plaintiff present to survive 
summary judgment?  This Section addresses these two questions. 
 
424 See, e.g., supra notes 394-403 and accompanying text. 
425 See supra Part II. 
426 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
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1.  Distinguishing Between Irrational and Strategic Behavior 
If the Matsushita standard is to function properly in antitrust cases, 
judges need to recognize economically implausible claims.  Parts III 
and IV of this Article argue that judges sometimes cannot properly 
distinguish implausible from strategic behavior.  To understand how 
to address the problem of judges rejecting plausible claims, we need 
to understand how we arrived at this point.  The federal courts’ adop-
tion of the peculiar form of rationality analysis detailed in Part IV is 
part of a larger pattern of courts increasing the burdens on antitrust 
plaintiffs.  Antitrust jurisprudence from the 1940s through the 1960s 
was decidedly pro-plaintiff.  Judicial decisionmaking in antitrust cases 
employed little economic reasoning and arguably created antitrust 
liability in a manner that condemned efficient conduct.  Against this 
backdrop, the Chicago School of Law and Economics emerged as a 
counterbalance to the then-prevailing pro-plaintiff antitrust ortho-
doxy.  Scholars associated with the Chicago School argued that courts 
had disapproved procompetitive mergers, condemned benign busi-
ness agreements, and encouraged anticompetitive litigation.427  These 
academics advanced a decidedly more pro-defendant vision of anti-
trust based on their economic theories that markets were self-
correcting.  Consequently, the Chicago School advocated a move away 
from per se illegality and toward per se legality for many categories of 
trade restraint, such as vertical restraints.428  The Chicago School 
gained traction with judges in the 1970s and onward as the Supreme 
Court gradually chipped away at antitrust’s per se rules.429 
The Chicago School advocates were perhaps too successful.  As 
Chicago School thinking has become entrenched, judges have dis-
missed and rejected antitrust claims based on narrow and inaccurate 
conceptions of how businesses operate.  Although early Chicago 
School thinkers were correct to criticize then-standard doctrine as ex-
cessively pro-plaintiff in antitrust cases, the pendulum has swung too 
far in the other direction as antitrust jurisprudence now improperly 
advantages defendants.  The courts’ invocation of irrationality and 
 
427 See generally BORK, supra note 12. 
428 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution:  Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981). 
429 See, e.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58 (1977) 
(eliminating per se rule against nonprice vertical restraints); see also Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 907 (2007) (eliminating the per se rule 
against resale-price maintenance); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21-22 (1997) (eli-
minating the per se rule against maximum-resale-price maintenance). 
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implausibility arguments in the cases detailed in Part IV is one indica-
tion of this favoritism toward defendants. 
What solution is there to this state of affairs in which judges are 
employing incomplete economic theories in a manner that under-
mines antitrust law more broadly?  The answer lies in educating 
judges about how businesses operate when they are trying to mono-
polize or cartelize a market.  Law review articles, such as this one, at-
tempt to correct the course of antitrust doctrine toward a more mod-
erate path that is neither improperly pro-plaintiff nor pro-defendant, 
but rather attempts to identify anticompetitive conduct that inflicts ac-
tual injury.  But law review articles are only part of the answer.  Advo-
cates of Chicago School philosophies succeeded for several reasons, 
including their well-founded indictments of many economics-free pro-
plaintiff decisions and their well-explained, easy-to-comprehend eco-
nomic theories.  But their philosophy also became dominant because 
its adherents aggressively preached their message to judges through 
books, law reviews, and, perhaps most notably, judicial conferences.430  
The post-Chicago movement431 needs to copy this play from the Chi-
cago School’s playbook.432 
Judges need to understand that economic theory has advanced 
considerably since the early days of the Chicago School.  The vast ma-
jority of federal judges are intelligent, thoughtful jurists who want to 
reach the correct result.  But people can only appreciate and employ 
the teachings to which they have been exposed, and many judges have 
been raised on a steady diet of Chicago School theories.433  Judges, 
however, can learn the new economic thinking associated with the 
post-Chicago School if they are given the same exposure to these new 
 
430 Bruce A. Green, May Judges Attend Privately Funded Educational Programs?  Should 
Judicial Education Be Privatized?:  Questions of Judicial Ethics and Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 941, 944-45, 944 n.19 (2002) (questioning the ethics of judicial participation in 
conferences sponsored by proponents of the law and economics movement).   
431 Post-Chicago broadly refers to a group of scholars that employ game theory, 
behavioral law and economics, and other dynamic models of strategic behavior to ex-
plain and predict economic activity. 
432 Some commentators have noted that privately funded junkets for judges raise 
legal ethics issues.  See, e.g., Douglas T. Kendall & Jason C. Rylander, Tainted Justice:  
How Private Judicial Trips Undermine Public Confidence in the Judiciary, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 65, 69 n.9, 70 (2004) (detailing how private organizations provide gifts to 
judges that inappropriately entangle them with entities that appear in their courts and 
advance the interests of their funders).  Judicial conferences to advance post-Chicago 
economic perspectives should be pursued in a manner that minimizes or eliminates 
such problems. 
433 See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying text. 
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theories as they were to the earlier Chicago School theories.  In the 
same way that the Chicago School held seminars and conferences to 
espouse their economic views, adherents of the post-Chicago School 
movement need to educate judges.  Future conferences for judges 
could explain economic theories that refute the Chicago School theo-
ries, review economic history, and show how cartels have stabilized 
themselves and endured, which gives lie to the Chicago School belief 
that cartels will unravel before they do much damage.  Judicial confe-
rences that explain post-Chicago economics would put future antitrust 
complaints in context.  The conferences could discuss the characteris-
tics of those cartels that successfully raised prices so that judges could 
better recognize when cartel claims are plausible and thus prevent 
mistakes like those examined in Part IV.  Presentations could also at-
tempt to quantify the harm caused by illegal monopolies and cartels 
in terms of lower output and increased prices.  With a fuller apprecia-
tion of the consequences of antitrust violations and of the emergence 
of post-Chicago economics, judges would be less likely to incorrectly 
label alleged conduct and conspiracies irrational or implausible.  Con-
sequently, judges should reach more accurate results in antitrust cases. 
2.  The Evidentiary Burden for Facially Irrational  
or Implausible Claims 
Assuming that judges can recognize irrational or implausible anti-
competitive conduct, the question remains how much additional evi-
dence an antitrust plaintiff must present in order to survive summary 
judgment.  Courts often make one of two mistakes in applying the 
Matsushita test.  First, some courts do not treat the Matsushita standard 
as a sliding scale, as the Court intended; rather, federal judges treat 
the inquiry as binary such that if the conspiracy does not seem ration-
al to the judge, then the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.  
For example, the Eleventh Circuit has held that “Matsushita dictates 
that if the alleged conspiracy is economically infeasible or irrational 
then, as a matter of law, summary judgment must be entered against 
the plaintiff.”434  Under this approach, if an antitrust claim seems im-
plausible or irrational to a judge, that is the end of the inquiry.  This is 
 
434 Helicopter Support Sys., Inc. v. Hughes Helicopter, Inc., 818 F.2d 1530, 1534 
(11th Cir. 1987); see also In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 
599, 614 (7th Cir. 1997) (Posner, J.) (“[S]ummary judgment for a defendant is proper, 
even if there is some evidence of an antitrust violation, if the plaintiff’s theory of viola-
tion makes no economic sense.  This has to be the right rule . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
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a misreading of the Matsushita opinion, which simply requires “more 
persuasive evidence”435 in the face of perceived implausible claims. 
Second, of those courts that correctly interpret Matsushita as in-
creasing the plaintiff’s evidentiary burden, some make this burden vir-
tually insurmountable.  Even when courts do not take the binary ap-
proach, they often impose unrealistic evidentiary burdens that are 
practically impossible to satisfy.  Most notably, many courts require an-
titrust plaintiffs to submit direct evidence.  In Matsushita, the Court 
declared that “[a]s a practical matter, it may be that only direct evi-
dence of below-cost pricing is sufficient to overcome the strong infe-
rence that rational businesses would not enter into conspiracies such 
as this one.”436  As a result, lower courts require the plaintiff to present 
direct evidence in predatory pricing cases.437 
Two problems have arisen in the wake of Matsushita’s statement 
that direct evidence may suffice.  First, some courts demand direct 
evidence in non–predatory pricing cases.  For example, the courts in 
the baby food438 and citric acid439 cartel cases required the plaintiff to 
present direct evidence in order to survive summary judgment.  This 
requirement makes little sense in these contexts because there is 
nothing inherently implausible or economically senseless about price-
fixing conspiracies in a concentrated market.  Indeed, this heightened 
evidentiary requirement conflicts with Supreme Court precedent that 
price-fixing agreements can be proven through circumstantial evi-
dence440—precedent that Matsushita did not disturb. 
Second, some courts that require direct evidence have narrowly 
defined the concept, and, consequently, they do not recognize direct 
evidence even when the plaintiff presents it.  This occurs in both pre-
datory pricing and price-fixing cases.  For example, the Matsushita ma-
jority held that the plaintiff’s claim of a predatory pricing conspiracy 
was implausible in part because the Justices did not believe that the 
alleged conspirators could coordinate and implement an agreement 
 
435 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). 
436 Id. at 585 n.9. 
437 See, e.g., Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, Inc., 51 F.3d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1995) 
(“Regardless of the measure of a defendant’s costs on which a plaintiff premises a pre-
datory pricing claim, a plaintiff cannot anchor its case on theoretical speculation that a 
defendant is pricing below that measure.”). 
438 See supra notes 267-82 and accompanying text. 
439 See supra subsection IV.B.2. 
440 See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 790, 814-15 (1946) 
(concluding that a violation of the Sherman Act had occurred on the basis of circums-
tantial evidence). 
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to allocate both the losses associated with predation and, later, the an-
ticipated cartel profits.441  To reach this conclusion, the Court disre-
garded the plaintiff’s direct evidence that showed actual price coordi-
nation and market allocation among the alleged conspirators.  The 
Court nonetheless dismissed “the ‘direct evidence’ [as having] little, if 
any, relevance to the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy.”442  While 
this direct evidence did not prove below-cost pricing—the plaintiffs 
relied on expert testimony for that proposition—the evidence did es-
tablish that the defendants were perfectly capable of running a well-
heeled cartel in the postpredation period, which tended to disprove 
the majority’s assertion that such coordination was implausible.  Ulti-
mately, the Matsushita Court chastised the Third Circuit for “fo-
cus[ing] . . . on whether there was ‘direct evidence of concert of ac-
tion’” instead of on whether the alleged predators had “a plausible 
motive to enter into the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy.”443  Yet 
that direct evidence undercut the Court’s view that the “concert of ac-
tion” necessary to the plaintiffs’ claims was too implausible to have oc-
curred.  In short, the Court did not understand the significance of the 
direct evidence before it. 
Courts have also improperly discounted direct evidence in price-
fixing cases.  For example, the Third Circuit in In re Baby Food narrow-
ly defined the necessary “direct evidence” as “evidence that is explicit 
and requires no inferences to establish the proposition or conclusion 
being asserted.”444  Even before application, the test seems odd be-
cause at summary judgment, the court is supposed to draw all infe-
rences in the nonmoving party’s favor.  When applying its test, howev-
er, the Third Circuit downplayed the plaintiff’s evidence that 
competitors exchanged confidential pricing information and the do-
cumentation of a “truce” among the competitors because the evidence 
was provided by individuals who did not personally have pricing au-
thority.  The court failed to appreciate that this was direct evidence 
that those with pricing authority were fixing prices through interme-
diaries.  After all, eyewitness testimony about a conspiracy is direct 
evidence even if the eyewitness is not herself a conspirator.  Similarly, 
in In re Citric Acid, the Ninth Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s di-
 
441 Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 590 (noting the strong incentive for coconspirators to 
cheat in a coordinated-pricing scheme). 
442 Id. at 595. 
443 Id. (quoting In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.3d 238, 304 (3d Cir. 
1983), rev’d, Matsushita, 475 U.S. 574). 
444 In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). 
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rect-evidence requirement and then discounted all of the plaintiff’s 
evidence as requiring inferences.445  Even though one of the convicted 
price-fixing conspirators testified that he discussed price with his 
counterpart at (fellow defendant) Cargill, the court asserted the “tes-
timony at the lysine trial does not constitute direct evidence, however, 
because it still requires an inference that the price discussions were 
conspiratorial in nature.”446  If discussing prices with a competitor and 
then charging the same price as that competitor—who is convicted of 
participating in a price-fixing conspiracy—is not conspiratorial, then it 
is hard to fathom what is.  In sum, courts have improperly raised evi-
dentiary burdens and then incorrectly applied these new standards. 
So what then should satisfy the heightened evidentiary require-
ment for facially irrational or implausible antitrust claims?  The evi-
dentiary burden should not be too low because antitrust defendants 
would be forced to go to trial against even frivolous litigation.  Courts 
should not return to the days of the Poller standard, under which prac-
tically all antitrust claims made it to a jury.447  But neither should the 
standard be so high as to prevent even legitimate claims from reach-
ing the jury, as in the cases discussed in Part IV.  Instead of either of 
these two extremes, judges should ask for what Matsushita dictates:  
“more persuasive evidence.”448 
This standard can be satisfied in either of two ways.  First, plaintiffs 
could provide direct evidence, properly defined.  Second, plaintiffs 
could provide substantial circumstantial evidence.  In the context of 
alleged conspiracies, antitrust courts already have an apparatus for re-
quiring such circumstantial evidence:  plus factors.449  In general, there 
is no minimum number of plus factors that a plaintiff must prove in 
order to survive summary judgment.  This approach is sufficiently flex-
ible that courts can employ plus-factor analysis when the conspiracy 
alleged by the plaintiff appears irrational or implausible.  If a court be-
lieves that an alleged conspiracy is implausible, it may require more 
plus factors before concluding that there is sufficient evidence from 
which a reasonable jury could infer an illegal agreement.  Requiring a 
plaintiff to prove more plus factors in order to satisfy the Matsushita 
sliding-scale test should be straightforward, but some courts that in-
 
445 In re Citric Acid Litig., 191 F.3d 1090, 1104 (9th Cir. 1999). 
446 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
447 See Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 474 (1962) (declining to 
grant summary judgment when affidavits merely alleged conspiratorial conduct). 
448 475 U.S. at 587. 
449 See supra notes 329-39 and accompanying text. 
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voke rationality or implausibility arguments also fail to appreciate the 
significance of plus factors.  For example, the Eleventh Circuit in Wil-
liamson Oil asserted that no plus factors were present despite the fact 
that the plaintiff presented approximately ten individual plus fac-
tors—including a history of prior illegal price-fixing agreements in the 
United States; ongoing price-fixing agreements in other countries; a 
concentrated oligopoly market structure; inelastic demand; high bar-
riers to entry; fungible products; opportunities to conspire; repeated 
simultaneous price increases without market research; and collective 
monitoring of each others’ output, shipments, and prices.450  The 
presence of just a few of these should probably have been sufficient to 
get the case to a jury.  Even if the alleged conspiracy were facially im-
plausible, the abundance of plus factors constituted “more persuasive 
evidence” and warranted allowing the plaintiffs to proceed to a jury trial. 
Finally, judicial conferences explaining post-Chicago economics 
could help judges properly apply the heightened evidentiary burdens.  
Judges need to recognize both direct evidence and the significance of 
proffered plus factors.  Understanding how monopolies and cartels 
operate should help federal judges comprehend the importance of all 
of these forms of evidence.  As a result, judges could better identify 
rational anticompetitive conduct and conspiracies as well as under-
stand what additional evidence a plaintiff can proffer in order to show 
that facially irrational conduct actually occurred. 
C.  The Proper Role of Juries 
If judges were to rely less on using their perceptions of irrationali-
ty and implausibility to grant summary judgment to antitrust defen-
dants, more antitrust cases may be decided by juries.  This creates the 
possibility of two countervailing risks.  On the one hand, a jury may 
make the same mistakes that judges do, and conclude that a pur-
ported antitrust violation must not have occurred because the plain-
tiffs’ allegations appear irrational or implausible—even though the 
defendants did, in fact, violate the antitrust laws.  On the other hand, 
a jury may find antitrust defendants liable when they are not.  The 
first scenario represents a false negative and the second a false posi-
tive.  Neither risk justifies the status quo.  The risk of juries replicating 
the mistakes outlined in Part III does not warrant turning a blind eye 
to the judicial errors observed in Part IV. 
 
450 Williamson Oil Co. v. Philip Morris USA, 346 F.3d 1287, 1305-20 (11th Cir. 
2003). 
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Some commentators worry that juries cannot sufficiently under-
stand the evidence in complex antitrust litigation.451  This creates the 
risk that juries will produce false negatives by deciding in favor of anti-
trust defendants when they should not.  Some evidence suggests that 
the American public, and consequently juries, may have difficulty un-
derstanding economic theory.452  The composition of juries could skew 
toward the less economically sophisticated members of society if law-
yers “use peremptory challenges to try to obtain a less informed jury” 
out of concern that having those with “business knowledge could in-
terfere with acceptance of their theory of the case.”453  Some worry 
that when juries “lack experience in commercial affairs,” they will “not 
be capable of understanding financial and business terminology.”454  
Independent of their “difficulty comprehending economic facts,”455 
jurors may be subject to the same confirmation bias that judges ap-
pear to exhibit in some antitrust cases.456 
While these observed problems with juries are real and deserve 
consideration and amelioration, some aspects of the jury system mean 
that jurors may be more adept at overcoming the problems identified 
in Part III.  Collective decisionmaking often leads to better results be-
cause “the jury as a group has wisdom and strength which need not 
characterize any of its individual members.”457  This is not merely a 
matter of twelve individuals making a joint decision, but the process 
by which they arrive at their conclusions.  By engaging in a delibera-
tive decisionmaking process, “the jury reduces the chance that factual 
misunderstandings will lead to faulty verdicts.  That is an important 
advantage, because judges and jurors alike may have difficulty under-
 
451 See, e.g., ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, COMPLEX LITIGATION CONFRONTS THE JURY SYS-
TEM, at vii (1984) (“Complex litigation—-antitrust warfare-—challenges the credibility 
of the jury system.  There is increasing doubt as to whether a typical jury can compre-
hend sufficiently to render a rational verdict.”). 
452 See, e.g., Valerie P. Hans, The Jury’s Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 177, 187 (identifying studies showing 
strong recall of “primary” facts but poor grasp of “economic” facts among lay jurors). 
453 Id. at 190; see also id. (“Through both excuses and challenges, prospective jurors 
who are sophisticated about business may be less likely to sit as jurors in business cases.”). 
454 AUSTIN, supra note 451, at 7. 
455 Id. at 85. 
456 See id. at 89 (“Jurors cope with unwelcome information by ignoring it, distort-
ing it to fit existing values, or minimizing its importance.” (citing Donald E. Vinson, 
Psychological Anchors:  Influencing the Jury, LITIG., Winter 1982, at 20)); Donald E. Vin-
son, The Shadow Jury:  An Experiment in Litigation Science, 68 A.B.A. J. 1242, 1244 (1982) 
(“[M]any jurors come to a decision very early in the trial and then seek support for 
their conclusion.”). 
457 HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 8 (1966). 
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standing the scientific, technical, economic, and statistical evidence 
characteristic of many business cases.”458  While jurors confront each 
other with different interpretations of the same facts, the “judge does 
not have this vivid reminder that alternative construals are possible.”459  
Thus, even though individuals may experience the biases or problems 
discussed in Part III, the deliberative process with a jury increases the 
likelihood that “individual errors and biases are discovered and dis-
carded.”460  Although juries are not populated by economists, reviews 
of “very complex jury trials” reveal that “[e]ven when juries do not ful-
ly understand technical issues, they can usually make enough sense of 
what is going on to deliberate rationally.”461 
Finally, any lack of economic expertise by jurors does not neces-
sarily mandate their replacement by judges.  After all, as some federal 
judges have observed, 
[O]ne is more likely to find a computer technician or an economist on a 
jury than on the bench.  Complex and technical cases, no less than other 
cases, require judgments on the credibility of witnesses and inferences to 
be drawn from facts.  These are the tasks at which jurors, interacting with 
other jurors in the crucible of trial, particularly excel.
462
 
 
458 Hans, supra note 452, at 202; see also id. at 184 (“Supporters of the jury have 
frequently noted that an important enhancement of jury competence is the group de-
liberation, where jurors have the opportunity to discuss and debate the evidence and 
correct one another’s factual misunderstandings.  Empirical evidence from mock-jury 
studies confirms that the group nature of the deliberation can provide protection 
against individual factfinding errors.”). 
459 Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1989, at 205, 206.  Some might argue that appellate panels are deli-
berative as well.  But appellate judges do not interact in the way that jurors do nor do 
they observe the factual and expert witnesses.  In general, juries spend considerably 
more time than appellate panels do on an individual case.  Furthermore, most of the 
instances described in Part IV of judges employing rationality analysis to reject plausi-
ble (and sometimes irrefutably true) claims involved appellate judges. 
460 Id.; see also Hans, supra note 452, at 189 (“Full and competent adversarial ex-
amination of disputed technical issues, visual aids, and group deliberation may counte-
ract individual errors so that the group decision is a competent one.”). 
461 Valerie P. Hans & Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 
78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497, 1511 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quot-
ing Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases:  Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in 
VERDICT:  ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 181, 234 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)). 
462 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 935 (E.D. 
Pa. 1979), vacated on other grounds sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 
631 F.2d 1069 (3d Cir. 1980); see also In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609 F.2d 411, 431 (9th 
Cir. 1979) (“[N]o one has yet demonstrated how one judge can be a superior fact-
finder to the knowledge and experience that citizen-jurors bring to bear on a case.  We 
do not accept the underlying premise . . . ‘that a single judge is brighter than the ju-
rors collectively functioning together.’” (quoting Patrick E. Higginbotham, Observa-
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While jurors may experience difficulty assessing economic evidence, 
they may be no worse than judges.463  After all, we know that judges in 
antitrust cases sometimes elevate theory over fact when rejecting 
plaintiffs’ claims.464 
Even if juries are less likely to commit the errors discussed in Part 
III, the risk remains that juries may be more likely to create false posi-
tives, finding antitrust defendants liable when they should not.  False 
positives are costly because they may deter firms from engaging in ef-
ficient conduct and may punish defendants who have done nothing 
illegal.  The threat of false positives, fortunately, can be managed.  
First, simply because a plaintiff’s claim survives summary judgment does 
not mean that the plaintiff will necessarily prevail in the end, let alone 
that defendants will wrongly be held liable for an antitrust violation. 
Second, antitrust law has several mechanisms to protect defen-
dants from false positives.  Each antitrust claim has its own elements, 
many of which—such as monopoly power for a monopolization claim 
and specific intent to monopolize for an attempted monopolization 
claim—are difficult to satisfy.  Antitrust law also has a heightened 
standing requirement whereby an antitrust plaintiff must prove that it 
has suffered causal antitrust injury.  Antitrust victories are relatively 
rare, and false positives are particularly unusual. 
Third, little reason exists to conclude that jurors are more likely to 
create false positives in antitrust cases.  Professor Valerie Hans’s exten-
sive research on the role of juries in business litigation shows that ju-
ries are not biased against corporate defendants.  Indeed, her re-
search shows that jurors, like most Americans, share a healthy respect 
for capitalism and free-market competition.465  Jurors worry that litiga-
 
tion, Continuing the Dialogue:  Civil Juries and the Allocation of Judicial Power, 56 TEX. L. 
REV. 47, 53 (1947))); United States v. Luisi, 568 F. Supp. 2d 106, 118 (D. Mass. 2008) 
(“Inasmuch as critics of jury trials complain that juries will not reach the correct out-
come, they are plainly mistaken.  Twelve citizens drawn from all walks of life are simply 
more likely to discover the truth than a single fact-finder.  While a judge’s years on the 
bench may serve her well for resolving legal issues, juries bring to bear the values, 
common sense, and a fresh perspective that only come from life experience outside 
the courtroom.” (citation omitted)). 
463 See Hans & Albertson, supra note 461, at 1511 (“Nonetheless, experimental re-
search has identified some types of evidence that can be particularly challenging to 
jurors.  Statistical and economic evidence, for example, is difficult to weigh and assess 
properly, although judges can be just as susceptible to these problems as lay jurors.”). 
464 See supra Part IV. 
465 See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL:  THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RE-
PONSIBILITY 168 tbl.6-2 (2000) (presenting the results of a juror survey on business 
regulation and litigation); Valerie P. Hans, The Illusions and Realities of Jurors’ Treatment 
of Corporate Defendants, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 327, 332 (1998) (“For example, the public 
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tion against firms can “detrimentally affect the strength of the busi-
ness community” and damage awards “might lead to a loss of jobs or 
otherwise harm the company.”466  Consequently, jurors see part of 
their task as protecting businesses against frivolous lawsuits467 and, as 
such, jurors are often suspicious about people who sue corporations.468  
As a result, “on the whole, business corporations appear to enjoy more 
favorable experiences in court compared to other litigants.”469 
In sum, whatever misgivings one may have about the jury system—
whether it be a fear of false negatives, false positives, or both—the re-
sponse should not be to replace jury deliberations with judicial appli-
cation of economic theory, especially when judges misapply such 
theory to dispose of valid antitrust claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence holds that if the plaintiff’s 
theory of the case suggests that the defendant engaged in conduct 
that the reviewing judge finds implausible, then the plaintiff’s eviden-
tiary burden increases.  In practice, this has come to mean that the de-
fendant in such a situation is entitled to summary judgment.  This Ar-
ticle questions this approach for several reasons.  First, firms 
sometimes commit facially irrational acts.  If some of these acts have 
anticompetitive effects, then the defendant should not be absolved of 
liability because the conduct seems irrational.  Second, much conduct 
that appears irrational may be rational precisely because of its long-
term anticompetitive effects.  Courts should focus more on what the 
defendant actually did and less on whether the alleged conduct fits 
within any particular vision of rationality.  Finally, because of these 
judicial misperceptions and limitations, courts mistakenly label some 
anticompetitive conduct as implausible and reject antitrust claims that 
 
strongly endorses the free enterprise system, seeing it as a necessary precondition for 
free and democratic government.  Americans express support for cultural values un-
derlying a capitalist economy, such as the Protestant work ethic, personal ambition, 
and competition.” (footnote omitted)). 
466 HANS, supra note 465, at 217.  
467 See id. at 216 (“Part of the jury’s task, as they saw it, was to be vigilant about 
spotting frivolous lawsuits.”); see also Hans & Albertson, supra note 461, at 1507 (“Jurors 
were deeply committed to an ethic of individual responsibility, and many saw the fact 
of plaintiffs bringing lawsuits as counter to that ethic.  Interestingly, they saw them-
selves as standing guard against the potential of frivolous lawsuits.”). 
468 See HANS, supra note 465, at 216 (“[ J]urors are often suspicious and ambivalent 
toward people who bring lawsuits against business corporations.”). 
469 Hans, supra note 465, at 330 (emphasis omitted). 
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should succeed or at least proceed to a jury.  As a result, the rationality 
assumption, as applied, circumvents the factfinding process. 
Antitrust law is neither intended nor designed to evaluate the ra-
tionality of business conduct.  Antitrust litigation should determine 
whether the challenged conduct occurred and was on balance anti-
competitive.  To this end, once the plaintiff provides evidence that the 
defendant pursued a particular business strategy, courts should focus 
less on whether conduct is “rational” and more on whether it is anti-
competitive.  If an alleged conspiracy or predatory scheme failed—as 
the alleged predatory pricing conspiracy in Matsushita appears to 
have, if it existed—then the defendant may be entitled to summary 
judgment because of the plaintiff’s inability to demonstrate antitrust 
injury.  But the plaintiff should lose because it has not suffered the 
necessary injury, not because the court believes that the alleged plot 
was irrational and therefore implausible at its inception. 
If federal judges are in fact unable to accurately distinguish be-
tween rational and irrational business conduct, this suggests that 
judges hesitate more before invoking implausibility arguments to re-
ject antitrust claims.  Because courts are not well equipped to deter-
mine when anticompetitive schemes are actually irrational or implaus-
ible, federal judges should be more reticent to grant summary 
judgment to defendants based on the judge’s understanding of eco-
nomic theory.  Antitrust doctrine would be well served if judges fo-
cused less on theory and more on the facts before them. 
 
